Correia v. Bettencourt

• Decision Date: 19 June 2017
• Docket Number: No. 2016–273–Appeal (PC 12–6123),2016–273–Appeal (PC 12–6123)
• Citation: 162 A.3d 630
• Parties: Adam CORREIA v. John BETTENCOURT et al. v. James Martitz et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

162 A.3d 630

Adam CORREIA

v.John BETTENCOURT et al.

v.James Martitz et al.¹

No. 2016–273–Appeal (PC 12–6123)

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 19, 2017

Geoffrey M. Aptt, Esq., Michael Prew, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Sean C. Joanis, Esq., Thomas A. Madden, Esq., for Defendants.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court.

The plaintiff, Adam Correia, was seriously injured when a friend's High Standard Model 1911 .45–caliber handgun accidentally discharged, causing a bullet to strike Correia in the abdomen. At the time of the accident, the friends were target shooting on property owned by the defendants, John Bettencourt and Theresa Bettencourt (the Bettencourts). The matter presently before us is Correia's appeal from a final judgment entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure in favor of the Bettencourts. This case came before the Supreme Court sitting at Woonsocket High School, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Procedural History

On November 28, 2012, Correia filed a complaint against the Bettencourts and Edward Alexander in the Superior Court. The complaint alleged that the Bettencourts "knowingly allowed * * * Alexander to shoot firearms" on their property, located in Warren, Rhode Island (the property); that on or about August 7, 2011, Correia was invited to the property by Alexander; and that he went to the property to shoot firearms there. The complaint further alleges that "Alexander negligently handled a firearm and shot * * * Correia in the abdomen" and that Correia suffered serious bodily injuries as a result.

Count 1 of the complaint alleges negligence against Alexander.² Count 2 alleges that the Bettencourts breached their duty to control Alexander pursuant to Restatement (Second) Torts § 318 (1965).³ Count 3 of the complaint claims that the Bettencourts were negligent by failing to protect Correia under § 314A of the Restatement (Second) Torts (1965).⁴ Count 4 of the complaint alleges that, under the ad hoc duty analysis set forth in Banks v. Bowen's Landing Corp. , 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987), the Bettencourts failed to exercise reasonable care. Count 5 is a claim of premises liability against the Bettencourts, and count 6 alleges that their failure to supervise Alexander resulted in Correia's injuries.

On March 23, 2016, the Bettencourts filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts against them in Correia's complaint. In their motion, the Bettencourts argued that no duty of care existed which would entitle Correia to recovery because they were not present at, nor were they informed of, the dangerous activity and therefore they "had no opportunity to control the actions of Alexander"—an essential element under § 318 of the Restatement. They further argued that Correia's allegations under common law negligence and premises liability also must fail under the general rule expressed in Gushlaw v. Milner , 42 A.3d 1245, 1253 (R.I. 2012) that "[t]here is * * * no duty to control a third party's conduct to prevent harm to another individual[.]"

Correia filed an objection to the Bettencourts' motion for summary judgment. In his objection, Correia alleged that the Bettencourts leased a portion of the property to Alexander, John Bettencourt's cousin,⁵ "who kept cows, chickens, a trailer, and other items on the [p]roperty" and allowed Alexander's "friends to utilize [the] property as a shooting gallery," an activity in which Alexander had engaged on the property in the past. Correia supported these allegations with his own deposition testimony, as well as that of Alexander and James Martitz, who was also present on the property the day of the accident.

On June 7, 2016, a hearing on the Bettencourts' motion for summary judgment was held. The hearing justice summarized the facts of the case, stating: "Three guys decided to go do some shooting. They went out to the * * * Bettencourts' property and fired some shots and * * * the pistol or rifle jammed and a bullet was discharged accidentally and it went into * * * Correia's stomach and he sued * * * the landowners." The hearing justice cited to the general rule applicable to negligence actions as set forth in Willis v. Omar , 954 A.2d 126 (R.I. 2008) that "a plaintiff must establish a legally cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff * * *." Id. at 129 (quoting Mills v. State Sales, Inc. , 824 A.2d 461, 467 (R.I. 2003) ). The hearing justice also considered § 318 of the Restatement (Second) Torts and Volpe v. Gallagher , 821 A.2d 699, 706–10 (R.I. 2003).⁶ The hearing justice determined that "the presence of the landowner appears to be a key factor, perhaps the key factor, when deciding if the duty existed." He ruled that, because "[n]o competent evidence ha[d] been introduced to suggest that the Bettencourts were present on the property when Alexander accidentally discharged his weapon and shot Correia[,]" no duty existed on the part of the Bettencourts to protect Correia from harm due to the actions of Alexander.

On June 9, 2016, the Superior Court issued an order granting summary judgment to the Bettencourts. On June 23, 2016, Correia filed a premature notice of appeal.⁷

IIStandard of Review

"In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the trial justice must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, and if not, the trial justice must determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ferreira v. Strack , 652 A.2d 965, 969 (R.I. 1995). "The trial justice relies upon an examination of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and memoranda of law and reviews them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. "If no genuine issue of material fact is found, then the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.

"This Court will review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo , ‘employing the same standards and rules used by the hearing justice.’ " Newstone Development, LLC v. East Pacific, LLC , 140 A.3d 100, 103 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Daniels v. Fluette , 64 A.3d 302, 304 (R.I. 2013) ). "We will affirm a [trial] court's decision only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Daniels , 64 A.3d at 304 ). Moreover, "the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact and cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions or mere legal opinions." Id. (quoting Daniels , 64 A.3d at 304 ).

This Court has often instructed that "issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication, but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." Newstone Development, LLC , 140 A.3d at 103 (quoting Holley v. Argonaut Holdings, Inc. , 968 A.2d 271, 274 (R.I. 2009) ). "However, ‘summary judgment should enter against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case * * *.’ " Id. (quoting Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc. , 918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I. 2007) ).

IIIDiscussion

Correia's theories of recovery rely on the existence of a legally cognizable duty on the part of the Bettencourts. "[T]he existence of a duty is a question of law." Berard v. HCP, Inc. , 64 A.3d 1215, 1218 (R.I. 2013). The assessment of whether or not a duty exists is conducted on a "case-by-case basis." Gushlaw , 42 A.3d at 1252 (quoting Willis , 954 A.2d at 130 ). "If the court finds that no duty exists, ‘the trier of fact has nothing to consider and a motion for summary judgment must be granted.’ " Id. (quoting Berardis v. Louangxay , 969 A.2d 1288, 1291 (R.I. 2009) ).

The question squarely before this Court is whether John Bettencourt (Bettencourt) had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect Correia from the negligence of a third party, Alexander.⁸ To determine whether a duty exists in a particular instance, "we examine ‘all relevant factors, including the relationship of the parties, the scope and burden of the obligation to be imposed upon the defendant, public policy considerations, and notions of fairness.’ " Gushlaw , 42 A.3d at 1252 (quoting Volpe , 821 A.2d at 705 ). We also consider the "foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff." Banks , 522 A.2d at 1225. In Volpe , 821 A.2d at 706, this Court adopted the legal principles set forth in Restatement (Second) Torts , § 318, entitled "Duty of Possessor of Land or Chattels to Control Conduct of Licensee." We declared:

"Under § 318 of the [R]estatement, when possessors of property allow one or more persons to use their land or personal property, they are, if present, under a conditional duty to exercise reasonable care to control the conduct of such users to prevent them from intentionally harming others or from conducting themselves on the possessors' property in a manner that would create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others." Volpe , 821 A.2d at 706.

The conditions under the Restatement are that "the possessors of the property must (1) know or have reason to know that they have the ability to control the person(s) using their land, and (2) know or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control." Id. ; see also Restatemment (Second) Torts § 318 at 127.

Correia's arguments on appeal rest mainly on the assertion that the Superior Court...