Corrigan v. General Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 January 1990
• Citation: 548 N.E.2d 1238,406 Mass. 478
• Parties: Pamela D. CORRIGAN v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1238

548 N.E.2d 1238

406 Mass. 478

Pamela D. CORRIGAN v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued Sept. 14, 1989.

Decided Jan. 18, 1990.

David C. Rodibaugh, for plaintiff.

Edward J. Musco, Boston, for defendant.

Before WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

This is an action to recover for loss of consortium due to a personal injury allegedly sustained by the plaintiff's husband on October 22, 1980, in the course of his employment by the defendant. Because the alleged injury occurred in 1980, this claim is unaffected by G.L. c. 152, § 24, as appearing in St.1985, c. 572, § 35, which effectively abolished loss of consortium actions for spouses and children of employees covered by workers' compensation. The single question on appeal is whether the doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, bars the plaintiff from litigating the question whether her husband was injured on October 22, 1980.

The plaintiff's husband had earlier instituted a workers' compensation claim in which he claimed such an injury. A member of the Industrial Accident Board, subsequently affirmed by the reviewing board, found that the husband had not sustained the claimed injury. Relying on that determination, the defendant sought and obtained summary judgment in the instant litigation on the ground that the workers' compensation decision collaterally estopped the plaintiff from relitigating the injury question. The plaintiff appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own initiative. This court affirms the judgment.

"A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that 'a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction ... cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies....' " Fidler v. E.M. Parker Co., 394 Mass. 534, 539, 476 N.E.2d 595 (1985), quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). This principle applies when the earlier determination has been made in a workers' compensation proceeding before the Industrial Accident Board. Martin v. Ring, 401 Mass. 59, 63-64, 514 N.E.2d 663 (1987). Furthermore, mutuality of parties is not always required. Martin v. Ring, supra at 61, 514 N.E.2d 663. Home Owners Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 448, 454, 238 N.E.2d 55 (1968).

In Fidler v. E.M. Parker Co., supra, we held that a spouse, not a plaintiff to the prior adjudication, was precluded from relitigating settled issues in the loss of consortium claim where the claim and the spouse's prior personal injury claim were "sufficiently related," and no "other circumstances existed which warrant[ed] relitigation of the issues." Id. 394 Mass. at 541-542, 548, 476 N.E.2d 595.

Here the defendant seeks to invoke issue preclusion to bar a plaintiff from relitigating an issue decided against the plaintiff's spouse in a prior case. The principal difference between this case and Fidler is that here the plaintiff could not have been a party to her husband's prior workers' compensation claim, while in Fidler the spouse could have, but did not, join in his wife's tort claim. This court has ruled that a spouse's loss of consortium claim is an independent cause of action, Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 543, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980) (Wilkins, J., dissenting). The Legislature, however, has since nullified the Ferriter decision by preventing recovery for loss of consortium by spouses or children of employees subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, G.L. c. 152, § 24, as amended through St.1985, c. 572, § 35.

Although, under the teaching of Ferriter, the plaintiff's loss of consortium remains a separate cause of action, the relationship to her spouse's claim is symbiotic. Central to both claims is the causation of her husband's back injury. Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 167-168, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973). The workers' compensation claim has established that this injury did not occur to the husband in the course of his employment. The plaintiff does not dispute that this issue was fully litigated in the workers' compensation case. We conclude that the spouse ought not to be able to recover for claims resulting from injuries to her husband that prior workers' compensation proceedings have established are not compensable. Under Fidler, the wife's claim is "sufficiently related" and no "other circumstances exist which warrant relitigation of the issues." Id. 394 Mass. at 541-542, 548, 476 N.E.2d 595. "Although it is not as clear that collateral estoppel should apply to preclude a party not a plaintiff in the prior action from litigating an issue, the policy of repose is especially significant when the spouse of a nonprevailing litigant seeks to litigate a claim related to the spouse's alleged injuries. The trend in the law is against allowing suits for loss of consortium where the injured spouse would be collaterally estopped from litigating the same or similar issues. See Roy v. Jasper Corp., 666 F.2d 714, 716 (1st Cir.1981) (holding that, under New Hampshire law, a spouse is collaterally estopped by prior judgment from litigating loss of consortium claim). 'When a person with a family relationship to one suffering personal injury has a claim for loss to himself resulting from the injury, the determination of issues in an action by the injured person to recover for his injuries is preclusive against the family member, unless the judgment was based on a defense that is unavailable against the family member in the second action.' Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 48(2) (1982)." Fidler, supra 394 Mass. at 547, 476 N.E.2d 595.

It is true that the plaintiff is precluded from joining her husband's workers' compensation claim. On the other hand, the defendant could not have avoided the prior claim because participation in the workers' compensation program is now compulsory for most employers. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, supra 381 Mass. at 520, 413 N.E.2d 690. Fairness requires that, when a spouse with a sufficiently related claim has fully litigated an issue, an employer should not be forced to relitigate the same issue. To provide otherwise would defeat the basic purpose of issue preclusion "to conserve judicial resources, to prevent the unnecessary costs associated with multiple litigation, and to ensure the finality of judgments." Martin v. Ring, 401 Mass. 59, 61, 514 N.E.2d 663 (1987).

Judgment affirmed.

WILKINS, Justice (concurring).

In Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 543, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980) (Wilkins, J., dissenting), I disagreed with the view that a spouse of an injured worker had a common law claim against the employer for loss of consortium. The Legislature has since overruled the Ferriter decision on this point. See G.L. c. 152, § 24, as appearing in St.1985, c. 572, § 35. Although (in order to achieve equal treatment) I accept the Ferriter rule for all persons as to events occurring before its legislative abrogation, I do not accept a Ferriter -like rule as to a spouse of a worker who, it has previously been determined, did not have a compensable claim. I need not worry about issue preclusion. The spouse simply has no common law claim.

O'CONNOR, Justice (dissenting, with whom GREANEY, Justice, joins).

The plaintiff's loss of consortium claim and her husband's workers' compensation claim related to separate and independent rights. See Pinheiro v. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n., 406 Mass. 288, 547 N.E.2d 49 (1990); Bilodeau v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 392 Mass. 537, 539, 467 N.E.2d 137 (1984); Olsen v. Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 388 Mass. 171, 176-177, 445 N.E.2d 609 (1983); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 607, 421 N.E.2d 67 (1981); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 519-530, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 160, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973); Erickson v. Buckley, 230 Mass. 467, 470-471, 120 N.E. 126 (1918); Duffee v. Boston Elevated Ry., 191 Mass. 563, 564, 77 N.E. 1036 (1906). Furthermore, "it creates no privity between two parties that, as litigants in two different suits, they happen to be interested in proving or disproving the same facts." Sturbridge v. Franklin, 160 Mass. 149, 151, 35 N.E. 669 (1893). The court acknowledges, as it must, that the "spouse's loss of consortium claim is an independent cause of action," ante at 1240, but concludes nevertheless that facts decisive of the plaintiff's claim have been established against her in a case in which she was not a party, could not have been a party, and was not in privity with a party.

In "explanation," the court advises that, although the plaintiff's and her husband's claims were independent, they were "sufficiently related" so that the demise of the consortium claim was the inescapable result of the failure of the workers' compensation claim. That is to say, the...