Corrigan v. Zolin

• Decision Date: 05 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. A070266,A070266
• Citation: 47 Cal.App.4th 230,54 Cal.Rptr.2d 634
• Parties: , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5118, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8214 Rosemarie McCarthy CORRIGAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Frank S. ZOLIN, as Director, etc., Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 634

54 Cal.Rptr.2d 634

47 Cal.App.4th 230, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5118,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8214

Rosemarie McCarthy CORRIGAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Frank S. ZOLIN, as Director, etc., Defendant and Respondent.

No. A070266.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

July 5, 1996.

Victor S. Amstadter, Ronald Dinan & Associates, Santa Rosa, for plaintiff and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Martin H. Milas, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Buell, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David M. Tiede, Deputy Attorney General, for defendant and respondent.

PARRILLI, Associate Justice.

Appellant Rosemarie McCarthy Corrigan's driver's license was suspended after she was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. She requested an administrative hearing before the Department of Motor Vehicles (the Department), and the hearing officer upheld the suspension. Appellant challenged the hearing officer's decision by filing a petition in superior court for a writ of mandate, which was denied. On appeal, she argues (1) there was no corpus delicti for driving under the influence; (2) there was not reasonable cause to arrest her under Vehicle Code sections 40300.5 and 40300.6; ¹ and (3) the Department did not meet its burden of proving her blood alcohol level was .08 percent or higher when she was driving. None of these contentions has merit. We affirm the denial of appellant's writ petition.

FACTS

On the evening of November 3, 1994, appellant was driving to her home in Kenwood from a real estate broker's open house. She admitted drinking several glasses of wine at the open house. As she turned onto the street where she lived, a neighbor's cat ran in front of her Jaguar. Appellant swerved and ran into a fire hydrant, causing extensive damage to the car. Appellant estimated the accident occurred at 9 p.m. She was very upset and walked home, which was about six houses away from the accident. She was unable to reach her husband by telephone, but some friends, the Harrymans, called her and volunteered to come over. When the Harrymans arrived, they went to the scene of the accident with appellant. Firemen arrived and informed them the Highway Patrol would be delayed because it was time for a shift change. ² The Jaguar was moved off the road, and appellant returned to her home with the Harrymans.

California Highway Patrol Officer Steven Potter testified at the administrative hearing that he and his partner were in the Santa Rosa area at 10 p.m., when they received a report of appellant's accident. They were delayed by two other incidents before they arrived at the scene. They obtained appellant's address by checking the Jaguar's registration and went to her house a little after 11 p.m. Margaret Harryman told Officer Potter she had been driving the Jaguar, and Potter testified appellant told him she had nothing to drink after the accident, and he noted this in his investigation report. Appellant testified Potter did not ask if she had been drinking after the accident, nor did she tell him. She claimed she began drinking more wine as soon as she got home after the accident, and continued drinking before and after she went back to her car with the Harrymans.

appellant identified herself as the owner of the car. Potter asked to speak with Margaret Harryman alone and became suspicious when she could not describe how the accident happened. As Potter was warning her about giving false information to a police officer, appellant, [47 Cal.App.4th 234] who could hear what he was saying from another room, came in and admitted she was the driver. Appellant smelled of alcohol, her eyes were bloodshot and watery, and she was unsteady on her feet. Potter gave her some balance tests and conducted a breath test with a preliminary alcohol screening device. He concluded appellant was under the influence and placed her under arrest. At the Sonoma County Jail, appellant took a breath test showing her blood alcohol level was .15 percent at 11:54 p.m.

DISCUSSION

The trial court's task was to use its independent judgment in determining whether the weight of the evidence supported the hearing officer's decision. We review the record to determine whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. We draw all legitimate and reasonable inferences in support of the trial court's decision, and may overturn its findings only if the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain them. (Gananian v. Zolin (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 634, 638, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 384.) However, we review questions of law independently. (Campbell v. Zolin (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 489, 493, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 348.)

1. The Corpus Delicti Requirement Does Not Apply

The corpus delicti, i.e., the body or elements of the crime, must be established in a criminal proceeding by proof other than the defendant's extrajudicial admissions. (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009, 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Elements of Crime, §§ 136-137, pp. 152-153.) Appellant acknowledges the case law holding the corpus delicti requirement does not apply in civil administrative proceedings. (Shakin v. Board of Medical Examiners (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 102, 110, 62 Cal.Rptr. 274 [hearing on revocation of physician's license]; Hansen v. Civil Service Board (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 732, 738, 305 P.2d 1012 [hearing on dismissal of fireman].) Nevertheless, she makes a perfunctory argument that "the rule is applicable where the issues concern whether or not a crime was committed," and contends it should be applied when a driver is arrested for driving under the influence after an accident which the arresting officer did not observe. ³

It is well settled administrative driver's license revocation proceedings are civil in nature and involve no criminal sanctions. (Larsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 12 Cal.4th 278, 286, fn. 6, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 151, 906 P.2d 1306; Morris v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 151, 160, 282 Cal.Rptr. 130; Mackler v. Alexis (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 44, 51, 181 Cal.Rptr. 613.) The Department is not required to establish the corpus delicti, and appellant's admissions were properly considered by the hearing officer.

2. There Was Reasonable Cause To Arrest Appellant

Section 40300.5 provides in relevant part: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person who is (1) involved in a traffic accident ... when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person had been driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage...." Section 40300.6 states: "Section 40300.5 shall be liberally interpreted No published case has considered the "reasonable time and distance" terms of section 40300.6 in a factual context, or discussed whether there was "reasonable cause" under section 40300.5 to arrest a driver in circumstances like those presented here, where appellant was arrested at her home over two hours after the accident occurred. Any determination regarding reasonable time and distance necessarily depends on the particular factual circumstances of the case. Substantial...