Larsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, S040219

• Decision Date: 26 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. S040219,S040219
• Citation: 906 P.2d 1306,12 Cal.4th 278,48 Cal.Rptr.2d 151
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 906 P.2d 1306, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9875, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,089 Charles Hale LARSEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 151

48 Cal.Rptr.2d 151

12 Cal.4th 278, 906 P.2d 1306, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9875,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 17,089

Charles Hale LARSEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S040219.

Supreme Court of California.

Dec. 26, 1995.

Michael R. McDonnell, David Joseph Macher and Jeffrey D. Kent, La Habra, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Daniel L. Lungren, Attorney General, Robert L. Mukai, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Henry G. Ullerich, Assistant Attorney General, Martin H. Milas and Thomas Scheerer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.

GEORGE, Justice.

Vehicle Code section 13352, subdivision (a)(1), imposes a duty upon the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to suspend the license of any driver, in the case of a first offense, for a period of six months "upon receipt of a duly certified abstract of the record of any court showing that the person has been convicted" of the criminal offense of driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or any drug. (Veh.Code, § 23152 et seq.) ¹ Section 13352 makes no distinction between convictions arising in California and equivalent convictions arising out of state. ²

In Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 335, 90 Cal.Rptr. 586, 475 P.2d 858, this court concluded that when the DMV suspends a California driver's license upon the driver's conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol, and the driver seeks to challenge the license suspension upon the ground that the conviction is constitutionally infirm, the driver may not raise such a claim in the first instance by seeking a writ of mandate against the DMV, but first must successfully challenge the validity of the conviction in the court in which it was rendered, or in a mandate proceeding directed at the rendering court, or in a criminal proceeding in which the conviction was alleged as a prior offense. Although the court in Thomas recognized that, in a criminal proceeding, a prior conviction generally may be attacked at any time upon limited constitutional grounds whenever the prior conviction provides the basis for imposing increased punishment upon the defendant, we held that a similar rule does not apply in a mandate proceeding brought against an administrative agency, which is not authorized to determine the validity of a prior conviction, when that agency is under a statutory duty to suspend a license upon the basis of the conviction. The question presented by the case before us is whether our holding in the Thomas case should be applied to a mandate petition filed by plaintiff against the DMV, in which plaintiff sought to challenge the constitutionality of his prior out-of-state conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol without having had an opportunity to challenge that prior conviction in a subsequent California criminal proceeding.

In the Thomas case itself, the challenged prior conviction was a California conviction, and therefore the plaintiff in that case had a means of challenging the validity of the conviction in a California tribunal. In the present case, by contrast, the challenged conviction is an out-of-state conviction that has not been alleged as a prior conviction in any California criminal proceeding. Plaintiff contends that, because the application of the Thomas ruling in this context would permit California to suspend his driver's license without affording him a proceeding in any California forum in which to challenge his prior conviction, the Thomas holding should not, and constitutionally may not, be applied in the present circumstances.

The superior court disagreed with plaintiff's contention and denied his mandate petition, relying upon the decision in Cook v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 265, 109 Cal.Rptr. 104. When plaintiff appealed, the Court of Appeal, relying upon the contrary decision in Axness v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1489, 255 Cal.Rptr. 896, reversed the judgment of the superior court and concluded that when California suspends a driver's license upon the basis of an out-of-state conviction, it must afford the driver an opportunity to challenge the constitutional validity of the conviction in a California forum. We granted review to determine the proper application of our holding in Thomas in this setting.

As we shall explain, we conclude that the Thomas decision constitutionally may be--and should be--applied in the present context. Consequently, the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal must be reversed.

I

On May 8, 1992, Charles Larsen, a resident of Orange County, was arrested in Clifton Park, New York, for driving while intoxicated and for failing to remain on the right of the median line of the road. Thereafter, Larsen's defense counsel submitted to the Clifton Park Justice Court a guilty plea form that had not been executed by Larsen. Due to that circumstance, the court requested confirmation that counsel fully had explained to Larsen his rights and had been authorized by Larsen to enter a guilty plea on his behalf. On June 2, 1992, defense counsel submitted his own affidavit, stating he fully had explained the charges to Larsen, and fully had advised him of the "ramifications" of a guilty plea to lesser charges of driving while "ability impaired," and of failing to obey a traffic device.

On July 7, 1992, Larsen was convicted of driving while ability impaired (N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1192, subd. (1) (McKinney 1995)), and of failing to obey a traffic device (N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1110, subd. (a) (McKinney 1995)). ³ The New York court ordered Larsen to pay fines totaling $350 and to undergo evaluation by an accredited alcoholism treatment center. On August 18, 1992, after receiving notice of the New York conviction, ⁴ the California DMV, acting "under the authority of sections 13352A1 and of the Vehicle Code," issued an order suspending Larsen's driving privilege for a period of six months, commencing on July 7, 1992.

Thereafter, on October 7, 1992, Larsen filed in superior court a petition for an alternative writ of mandate (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085), requesting that the court order the DMV to set aside the suspension of his driving privilege, upon the ground that his conviction in New York was invalid because he had not been advised of his rights (Boykin v Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274]; see In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449) prior to entering a guilty plea. ⁵ After a hearing, the superior court denied the requested writ. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, in a two-to-one decision, reversed. We granted review to resolve the conflict in the decisions of the Courts of Appeal.

II

In numerous instances under provisions of California law, a criminal conviction may give rise to a variety of collateral consequences. Perhaps the most common context is the use of prior convictions to increase the term (or impose other penal sanctions, such as ineligibility for probation) in the event the defendant is convicted of a subsequent offense. (See People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 71-72, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83.) A conviction, however, frequently may have consequences outside the criminal context, and, for example, may provide a basis for the suspension or revocation of a license or other benefit that the state has granted to the convicted individual. (See, e.g. § 13352, subd. (a)(1); Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 490, 10177, subd. (b); Ed.Code, § 44424.) In each of these situations, whenever the state seeks to take action against an individual on the basis of a conviction, he or she may attempt to challenge the state's action on the ground that the conviction upon which the state is relying is constitutionally invalid.

In California, the Legislature has not enacted a generally applicable statute addressing the question whether, and in what manner, an individual may raise a collateral challenge to the constitutionality of a conviction. Thus, the courts of this state have addressed this issue in the various contexts in which it has arisen.

We first addressed in the criminal context the question of the proper procedure for challenging the constitutional validity of a conviction that the state was proposing to employ for collateral purposes. In In re Woods (1966) 64 Cal.2d 3, 48 Cal.Rptr. 689, 409 P.2d 913, this court recognized the propriety of bringing a habeas corpus petition in a California court to challenge a sentence that had been based, in part, upon prior convictions that the defendant contended were constitutionally invalid because he had not been represented by counsel in the underlying proceedings. (Id. at p. 5, 48 Cal.Rptr. 689, 409 P.2d 913.) In that context, the court in Woods recognized that even when the challenged conviction arose from out-of-state proceedings, the defendant properly could raise in a California court a constitutional challenge to the conviction. (Ibid.) Thereafter, in People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15, this court held that when a prior conviction was being employed in a California criminal proceeding as a basis for increasing the defendant's punishment, the defendant not only could bring a habeas petition after the increased sentence had been imposed, but could challenge the validity of the prior conviction during the criminal proceeding itself, by a pretrial motion to strike the prior as constitutionally invalid. (Id. at pp. 214-215, 60 Cal.Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15.)

Three years after the decision in Coffey was rendered, a question relating to the proper procedure for challenging the validity of a conviction upon which the state was relying (as a basis for suspending an individual's driver's license) came before this court in Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles supra, 3 Cal.3d 335, 90 Cal.Rptr. 586, 475 P.2d 858. In that case, a driver had been convicted in California in 1966, without...