Corwin v. Comptroller Gen.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1875
• Citation: 6 S.C. 390
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: CORWIN v. COMPTROLLER GENERAL.

6 S.C. 390

CORWIN

v.COMPTROLLER GENERAL.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

October, 1875.

This was a petition to the Supreme Court, entitled “The State of South Carolina, ex relatione Henry C. Corwin, against Thomas C. Dunn, Comptroller General of the State of South Carolina,” praying for a writ of mandamus to issue to the petitioner four warrants pursuant to the provisions of the Act of March, 1875, “to provide for the settlement and redemption of certain claims against the State,” in payment of a certain pay certificate owned by the petitioner which had been audited and allowed by the Commission on Claims sitting under the authority of said Act.

A rule to show cause was issued, and the Comptroller General made return thereto and showed cause as follows:

“1. That the so-called Act of the General Assembly referred to in the second paragraph of the petition herein, entitled ‘An Act to provide for the settlement and redemption of certain claims against the State,’ and which it is alleged in said petition became a law under the Constitution and laws of this State in the month of March, A. D. 1875, is not a law of this State, because the said so-called Act of the General Assembly has not been passed and enacted in the manner required by the Constitution of this State, in this that the said so-called Act was returned by the Governor of this State to the House of Representatives, the house in which it originated, without his approval and with a statement of his objections thereto, within the time prescribed in Section 22 of Article III of the Constitution of said State, and that the so-called Act was not thereafter reconsidered by the said House of Representatives and passed by two-thirds of said House of Representatives nor by two thirds of the Senate, the other house of the General Assembly.

Wherefore, this respondent shews for cause that the said so-called Act of the General Assembly is wholly inoperative and void and gives no authority of law to this respondent, and imposes no duty on this respondent to do the acts demanded of him by the relator in this cause.

2. And for a second cause why said writ of mandamus should not issue to this respondent, as prayed for in the petition herein, this respondent shews: That the said so-called Act of the General Assembly, which it is alleged in said petition became a law in the month of March, A. D. 1875, is unconstitutional and void because it is in conflict with and is forbidden by Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States, which, among other things, declares that ‘no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts,’ in this that the said so-called Act of the General Assembly impairs the obligation of the contract made and entered into by the State of South Carolina by the Joint Resolution of the General Assembly, approved January 29, 1873, whereby it was made a part of the Constitution of said State that the General Assembly should not thereafter create any further debt or obligation, either by the loan of the credit of the State, by guaranty, endorsement or otherwise, except for the ordinary and current business of the State, without first submitting the question of the creation of such debt to the people of the State at a general election, and unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of the State, voting on the question, shall be in favor of the creation of such debt.

That, relying on the contract embodied in said Joint Resolution amending the Constitution of said State, many persons have since purchased the public securities and evidences of indebtedness issued under the Act of the General Assembly of said State, approved December 22, 1873, entitled ‘An Act to reduce the volume of the public debt and to provide for the payment of the same;’ that the said so-called Act of the General Assembly, under the authority of which the relator herein now asks for a writ of mandamus to this respondent, violates the contract expressed in said Joint Resolution amending the Constitution of the State and impairs the obligation thereof by authorizing the creation of a debt of said State contrary to the provisions and requirements of said Joint Resolution and the amendment to the Constitution therein contained, and without the consent of those persons who hold and own the public securities and evidences of indebtedness of this State issued by the State and purchased by the owners thereof under the contract herein set forth.

Wherefore, this respondent shews for cause that the said so-called Act of the General Assembly which it is alleged in said petition became a law in the month of March, A. D. 1875, is unconstitutional and void and gives no authority of law to this respondent, and imposes no duty on this respondent to do the acts demanded of him by the relator in this cause.”

Bachman & Youmans, for relator.

Melton, Attorney General, contra.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by MOSES, C. J.

The return of the respondent to the rule requiring him to show cause why the writ of mandamus should not issue contests the validity of the Act under which the relator seeks to enforce his alleged right: First, because it was not passed in conformity with the mode prescribed by the Constitution; and, second, if not obnoxious to the said objection, it is void because in conflict with the tenth Section of the first Article of the Constitution of the United States. The question arising under the first exception involves the rights and powers of the Executive in regard to the legislation of the General Assembly, which can only be effective when in the form of a Bill or Joint Resolution, either by the approval of the Governor or his failure to return it, with his objections, to the house in which it originated within the time fixed by the Constitution, or its passage over his veto by a two-thirds vote of both branches.

The Bill in question was not signed by the Governor; but it is contended that it has acquired the constitutional force of an Act because he failed to return it to the House of Representatives (that being the body in which it originated) within the period limited by the Constitution.

The facts are as follows:

The Bill was duly passed by both houses and presented to the Governor Thursday, March 11, 1875, at 11:30 A. M. The House adjourned on that day to 7 o'clock P. M. of Monday, March 15, when the Speaker took the chair. The roll was called by the Clerk, but, a quorum not answering, at 7.30 P. M. it adjourned till Tuesday, the 16th, on which day it was in session. The Senate adjourned on Friday, March 12th, to Tuesday, March 16th, and was in session March 11th, 12th and 16th. The Bill was returned by the Governor to the House on Wednesday, March 17, with a message, expressing his objections, dated on the same day.

The twenty-second Section of the third Article of the Constitution provides as follows:

“If a Bill or Joint Resolution shall not be returned by the Governor within three days after it shall have been presented to him, (Sundays excepted,) it shall have the same force and effect as if he had signed it, unless the General Assembly, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not have such force and effect unless returned within three days after their next meeting.”

It is admitted that the Bill was not returned within three days after its presentation to the Governor, but it is claimed that the General Assembly, “by their adjournment,” prevented its return within the time prescribed, and that the veto was sent to the House “within two days after their next meeting.”

It becomes, therefore, necessary to inquire what, in the view of the Constitution, is an adjournment of the General Assembly.

Section 1 of Article II vests “the legislative power of the State in two distinct branches, one to be styled the ‘Senate,’ and the other the ‘FHouse of Representatives,’ and both together the ‘General Assembly of the State of South Carolina.”The separate and independent action of each house to the same end, if not in conformity with the forms required by the Constitution, would fail to impress it with the sanction of law. Certain separate powers, too, are confided to the House and Senate. These they exercise by virtue of the exclusive authority granted to each by the Constitution. But action so permitted and recognized as valid for the proposed purpose is not the action of the General Assembly. A component part cannot assume a right which, in the language of the grant conferring the power, can only be enforced by the concurrent will of the several parts constituting the whole.

The General Assembly, under the Constitution, must have at least one session annually. By Section 12 of Article II it “ shall be convened on the fourth Tuesday in November annually;” and the election for Senators and Representatives, by Section 11 of same Article, “shall be held on the 14th, 15th and 16th days of April, in the year 1868, and the second on third Wednesday in October, 1870, and forever thereafter on the same day in every second year.” [Changed, by amendment of Constitution, to “first Tuesday following the first Monday in November in every second year.”]

The first session terminates on a day fixed by the concurrence of the two branches; the other must close before the second Monday after the next general election, because, by the thirteenth Section of the second Article, the ““““ terms ” of the Senators and Representatives then elected begin. The General Assembly is to convene on the day named in the Constitution; but, by the twenty-fifth Section of the same Article, “neither house, during the session of the General Assembly, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days.” It would thus seem that there could be no final close of a session of the General Assembly, where it does not expire by constitutional limitation, except by the concurrent action of both houses. The General Assembly cannot be said...