State v. Holm

• Decision Date: 08 July 1927
• Docket Number: No. 26334.,26334.
• Citation: 215 N.W. 200,172 Minn. 162
• Parties: STATE ex rel. Frank E. PUTNAM et al. v. HOLM, Secretary of State, et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

215 N.W. 200

172 Minn. 162

STATE ex rel. Frank E. PUTNAM et al. v. HOLM, Secretary of State, et al.

No. 26334.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 8, 1927.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; C.W. Stanton, Judge.

Proceeding by the State, on the relation of Frank E. Putnam and others, against Mike Holm, as Secretary of State, and others, for mandamus. From a judgment quashing and dismissing an alternative writ, the relators appeal. Reversed, with directions.

Catherwood, Hughes & Alderson, of Austin, Edward P. Sanborn, O'Brien, Horn & Stringer, and Doherty, Rumble, Bunn & Butler, all of St. Paul, and Leonard, Street & Deinard, Kingman, Cross, Morley & Cant, and R. L. Tighe and Shearer, Bayard & Trogner, all of Minneapolis, for appellants.

C.L. Hilton, Atty. Gen., and Albert F. Pratt and Charles E. Phillips, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondents.

WILSON, C.J.

This is an appeal from a judgment quashing and dismissing an alternative writ of mandamus issued in a proceeding to have the respondents, who are state officials, authenticate and promulgate Senate File No. 137, which was a bill in the 1927 Legislature relating to the salary of district judges. The bill passed both houses and was presented to the Governor on Wednesday, April 13, 1927. On April 18, 1927, the Governor returned it, with his written objections, to the Lieutenant Governor while presiding over the Senate.

April 15th was Good Friday, which is a legal holiday in this state. April 17th was Sunday. The Senate adjourned from Thursday afternoon, April 14th, until Monday morning, April 18th.

1. Article 4, § 11, of our state Constitution, limiting the time in which the Governor may veto a bill, in part, reads:

"If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor within three days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Legislature, by adjournment within that time, prevents its return; in which case it shall not be a law. The Governor may approve, sign, and file in the office of the Secretary of State, within three days after the adjournment of the Legislature, any act passed during the last three days of the session, and the same shall become a law."

This action is prosecuted upon the theory that the language of the Constitution is plain and that Sunday is the only day to be excluded in computing the "three-day" period. Respondents claim that in construing this language legal holidays must be excluded in such computation. If so, the return was timely and the bill is dead; otherwise, it became a valid law at midnight on Saturday. There is no doubt that the time must be computed by excluding Wednesday, the day the bill was presented to the Governor, and by including Saturday, the third day thereafter, unless an intervening day is to be excluded.

Respondents claim that the Constitution does not define the word "days" and that the rule of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" has no application because at the time of the adoption of the Constitution we had no holidays. They concede the distinction between holidays and Sunday. They point to the fact that a state policy has been established that no public business shall be transacted on legal holidays and it is claimed that this leads to the conclusion that we should now construe the "three days" as meaning "three working days."

In Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366 (Gil. 326), the court said:

"Construing the last clause of the section above quoted [which is the same as we have quoted], according to its strict letter, we should probably be required to hold the act in question void, as not having been signed and filed within the prescribed time. We are satisfied, however, that the intent and spirit of the instrument require a different construction; and that the purpose of the framers of the Constitution was to give the Governor three full working days, after the adjournment, for the consideration and filing of bills. Such time is expressly granted during the session of the Legislature; and as the clauses occur in close connection, treating of the same subject-matter, it does not seem unreasonable to hold that the exception of Sunday applies to the latter, although not repeated in terms. If it was thought proper to grant the executive three full working days for the consideration of bills during the session of the Legislature, it is difficult to see why the same time should not be granted for the same purpose after the adjournment of that body."

There is nothing to indicate that the court had in mind the question of holidays. It was dealing with Sundays and reached its conclusion, not because of the reason tendered us by respondents, but because of the presence of "(Sundays excepted)" in the preceding sentence.

In Re People ex rel. Akin v. Rose, 167 Ill. 147, 47 N.E. 547, the language and question were substantially the same as in the Stinson Case, and the court said:

"The paragraph consists of a single sentence in the first clause, of which use is made of the words `within ten days,' followed by the further words, `Sundays excepted,' in parentheses. The words `within ten days,' used in the last clause of the sentence, must be given the same meaning as that indicated by their use in the first clause, and will be held to mean within ten days of such adjournment exclusive of Sundays."

In both cases it was quite natural to conclude that it was the intention that the Governor should have the same time for the second duty which he was expressly given in the first — both calling for substantially and practically an identical service.

In John V. Farwell Co. v. Matheis (C.C.) 48 F. 363, the court had under consideration the same language as in the Stinson Case, and said, "The `last three days of the session'" means working days to the exclusion of Sunday. Holidays were not involved.

In State ex rel. State Pharm. Ass'n v. Michel, 52 La. Ann. 936, 27 So. 565, 49 L.R. A. 218, 78 Am, St. Rep. 364, we find the Louisiana Constitution (Const. of 1898, art. 76) provides that a bill must be returned "within five days." The conclusion of the court that Sundays were to be excluded from the "five days" was based in part upon a preceding state policy of the law toward Sundays and holidays.

The authorities mentioned relate to the construction of the second sentence quoted from the Constitution. The spirit and expressed language of the preceding sentence dictate the construction of the second. But we are here construing the first sentence as if it stood alone. There is an important distinction between Sunday, the Lord's Day, and a secular holiday, even though the Legislature, by laws, has established the policy of not transacting public business other than necessary on such days. Malmgren v. Phinney, 50 Minn. 457, 52 N.W. 915, 18 L.R.A. 753; Glenn v. Eddy, 51 N.J. Law, 255, 17 A. 145, 14 Am. St. Rep. 684; Page v. Shainwald, 169 N.Y. 246, 62 N.E. 356, 57 L.R. A. 173; Spalding v. Bernhard, 76 Wis. 368, 44 N.W. 643, 7 L.R.A. 423, 20 Am. St. Rep. 75; Latta v. Catawba, 146 N.C. 285, 59 S. E. 1028; 25 R.C.L. 1413; State v. Duncan, 118 La. 702, 43 So. 283, 10 L.R.A.(N. S.) 791, 11 Ann. Cas. 557; Crabtree v. Whiteselle, 65 Tex. 111, 113.

It is doubtful if the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is to be applied with the same rigor in construing a constitutional limitation as a statute. It may very well be argued that the distinguished statesmen in our constitutional convention must have contemplated the creation of legal holidays in this commonwealth as had been done in their native states. But, that aside, we are interested in reaching the viewpoint of the framers of our fundamental law. Their intent gathered from both the letter and spirit of the language is the law. Unambiguous words need no interpretation. How can there be any doubt as to the meaning of such words: "Three days (Sundays excepted)"? We are not empowered to say that these men meant something they did not say. Their failure to include "and holidays" cannot be construed to mean that they impliedly included them. We are not at liberty to give the language of the Constitution any meaning other than its natural and ordinary meaning, unless such construction would lead to an unjust or otherwise unreasonable result manifestly not intended. The Constitution is the mandate of the sovereign power and we must accept its clear language as it reads. Cooke v. Iverson, 108 Minn. 388, 397, 122 N.W. 251, 52 L.R.A.(N.S.) 415. It is our duty to construe the law. We cannot ingraft upon the Constitution things that might have been included. Szroka v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co. (Minn.) 213 N.W. 557.

In Richter v. C. & E.R. Co., 273 Ill. 625, 113 N.E. 153, the statutory rule that the first day is to be excluded and the last included, unless it falls on Sunday, when it shall be excluded, was stated, and it was held that the statute did not exclude the last day falling on a holiday, unless such holiday also fell on a Sunday.

In English v. Dickey, 128 Ind. 174, 27 N.E. 495, 13 L.R.A. 40, a statute providing a limitation of twenty days was construed as including intervening Sundays.

In Howeisen v. Chapman, 195 Ind. 381, 145 N.E. 487, the court construed:

"Upon the making of such report to the court, ten (10) days, exclusive of the day of filing such report and Sundays, shall be allowed * * * to remonstrate against the report."

The court held that, since the statute specified Sundays but not other holidays, only Sundays were to be excluded in computing time. To the same effect was the holding in Board of County Commissioners v. Tinchor Motor Car Co., 49 Ind. App. 221, 97 N.E. 22.

The common-law rule is that, when the time within which an act is to be done exceeds a week, an intervening Sunday is included in the computation; but, if the time limit is less than a week, such intervening Sunday is excluded. This rule does not apply in the face of G.S. 1923, § 10933, subd. 21,...