Costa v. Sam's East, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION 11-0297-WS-N |
| Parties | EVA COSTA, as Personal Representative for the Estate of EUGENE M. COSTA, deceased, Plaintiff, v. SAM'S EAST, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
This matter comes before the Court on five Motions in Limine (docs. 66, 68, 71, 72, 74) filed by defendant, Sam's East, Inc. The Motions have been briefed and are now ripe.
On March 17, 2010, Eugene M. Costa returned a television set to the Sam's Club store from whence he had purchased it because he was dissatisfied with the picture quality. In Costa's presence, a Sam's employee named Chris Middleton set the television on a display rack and proceeded to hook it up, so that the problem (if any) could be identified. Costa stood nearby because he wanted to observe what Middleton was doing (i.e., how Middleton was connecting the television). As Middleton worked, he apparently nudged a large boxed television set on the bottom shelf (just inches above floor level), causing it to tip over and fall. As fate would have it, the television landed on Costa's left leg. He suffered a hematoma on his leg,1 which produced pain and discomfort and necessitated medical treatment. The leg injury was one of many medical problems afflicting Costa at that time, as he had also been diagnosed with (and was receiving treatment for) coronary artery disease, hypertension and kidney disease.
Costa died on March 29, 2012. The cause of death was congestive heart failure. Costa's widow, Eva Costa ("Ms. Costa"), in her capacity as personal representative of Costa's estate, was subsequently substituted as the named plaintiff herein, pursuant to Rule 25(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. Ms. Costa is pursuing a single claim of negligence against Sam's, on the theory that Costa's leg injury proximately resulted from Middleton's negligence in bumping the television and that Middleton (who is not a named defendant) was acting within the line and scope of his employment for Sam's. This action is not now - and never has been - a wrongful death case, as plaintiff's sole cause of action is a common-law tort claim for personal injuries.
In anticipation of trial, Sam's has filed five motions in limine seeking to exclude particular categories of evidence from the trial proceedings. Plaintiff opposes most (but not all) of these motions, which will be considered sequentially.
Defendant's first Motion seeks to prevent plaintiff from presenting evidence that Costa's death "was caused by, was the result of, or was [in] any way contributed to by Mr. Costa's incident at Sam's." (Doc. 66, at 1.) It appears that plaintiff intends to offer testimony by J. Michael O'Dowd, M.D., that in his opinion the accident at Sam's contributed to Costa's death.2 Defendant maintains that such testimony is inadmissible.
Defendant's argument for excluding this evidence is straightforward, to-wit: Plaintiff has not brought a wrongful death claim, so the causes or contributing factors for Costa's death are irrelevant. Applicable law is clear "that in Alabama there is but one cause of action for wrongfuldeath, i.e., Code 1975, § 6-5-410." Alabama Power Co. v. White, 377 So.2d 930, 933 (Ala. 1979) (citations omitted); see also Millers Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Young, 601 So.2d 962, 964 (Ala. 1992) (same). Aside from that statute, Alabama courts emphasize that no remedy exists, inasmuch as "[t]here was no right to recover for death at common law." Akins v. Drummond Co., 628 So.2d 591, 592 (Ala. 1993). So any recovery for Costa's death must be funneled exclusively through the § 6-5-410 statutory mechanism. Plaintiff chose not to bring that cause of action; therefore, she cannot recover from Sam's for Costa's demise. Stated differently, because plaintiff has not brought a wrongful death claim, but instead couched her suit exclusively in common-law negligence principles, the medical causes or contributing factors for his death are irrelevant to the claim she did bring. Costa's death simply is not a part of this lawsuit, because plaintiff brought no wrongful death claim and is barred as a matter of Alabama law from recovering for his death on her personal injury claim.
Confronted with this compelling reasoning, plaintiff says that "in order to fully understand the significant impact this injury had to his life, Plaintiff needs to let the jury know that it contributed to his eventual death." (Doc. 80, at 2.) However, that appears to be simply another way of saying that plaintiff wants the jury to award her damages for Costa's death. Again, such an award is impermissible under Alabama law because plaintiff has not availed herself of the one statutory cause of action for wrongful death. Even if she had, compensatory damages for negligent conduct proximately causing death are not available to plaintiffs under that one cause of action for wrongful death. See, e.g., City of Tarrant v. Jefferson, 682 So.2d 29, 30 (Ala. 1996) () (citation omitted); King v. National Spa and Pool Institute, Inc., 607 So.2d 1241, 1247 (Ala. 1992) (); Roberts v. State, 863 So.2d 1149, 1158 (Ala.Crim.App. 2002) (); Jenelle Mims Marsh, Alabama Law of Damages § 37:9 (6th ed.) ().
To be sure, the Alabama Supreme Court has held that, where a plaintiff is deceased, the plaintiff's estate can bring a personal injury cause of action (independently of a statutory wrongful death claim) "for compensatory damages to compensate for expenses and lossesincurred up to the moment of death." King, 607 So.2d at 1248 (). So Ms. Costa can sustain her personal injury claim for "compensatory damages to compensate for expenses and losses incurred up to the moment of death." But she cannot obtain compensatory damages for the death itself by arguing to the jury that the Sam's accident caused or contributed to it.3
Plaintiff implies that she is not asking for compensatory damages for Costa's death (which would be impermissible for the reasons stated), but that she simply wishes to introduce evidence of causation to demonstrate "the significant impact this injury had to his life." (Doc. 80, at 2.) But presenting medical evidence of how Costa died would convey nothing about "the significant impact this injury had to his life." Instead, it would effectively invite the jury to award damages for Costa's death, which (again) is improper under Alabama law. If plaintiff wishes to show the jury the significant impact the Sam's accident injury had to Costa's life, she has abundant evidentiary avenues at her disposal. Indeed, plaintiff may put on evidence of Costa's deteriorating physical condition, pain and suffering, and so on (provided that she shows a causal connection between those circumstances and his injury at Sam's) from the moment of the accident until the moment of his death. But she cannot go further.
In short, because compensatory damages are unavailable for wrongful death in Alabama and because damages for plaintiff's personal injury claim necessarily terminate at the moment of death, whether the leg injury that Costa suffered at Sam's Club caused or contributed to his death is not relevant to any triable issue, and is therefore inadmissible under Rule 401, Fed.R.Evid. Alternatively, even if this evidence had some perceptible relevance in reflecting on the injury's impact on Costa's life, the Court deems this evidence inadmissible under Rule 403 because its minimal probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice (i.e., aninference that "Sam's killed Costa" even though this is not a death case), confusion of the issues (i.e., whether this case is one for wrongful death or personal injury), or misleading the jury (i.e., to award prohibited damages for Costa's death, as opposed to permissible damages for personal injuries preceding death).4 Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence or Testimony that Mr. Costa's Death was Caused by or was the Result of the Subject Incident (doc. 66) is granted. Plaintiff may not present evidence or argument at trial that Costa's leg injury caused or was a contributing factor in his death.
Defendant's second Motion in Limine requests that plaintiff be prohibited from presenting evidence or argument of medical expenses in excess of the $7,857.83 Medicare lien. Through this Motion, Sam's seeks to prevent Ms. Costa from submitting to the jury the total amount of Costa's medical bills (in the neighborhood of $50,000), which would include substantial amounts paid by third-party payors with no subrogation interest, or written down by law or contractual relationships between the payors and the providers. Simply put, Sam's position is that plaintiff can recover only medical expenses that Costa paid himself, or that he (or his estate) may become obligated to reimburse pursuant to a third party's subrogation interest. If Costa (or his estate) is not "on the hook" for those medical expenses, then Sam's position is that plaintiff cannot recover them.
Defendant's argument is anchored in more than a century of Alabama law. Back in 1911, the Alabama Supreme Court...
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