Cota v. Madison Central School Dist.
| Decision Date | 04 March 1977 |
| Citation | 392 N.Y.S.2d 233,89 Misc.2d 646 |
| Parties | Rosemary COTA, Plaintiff, v. MADISON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT and Leon P. Slate, Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Plaintiff, Rosemary Cota, commenced this negligence action to recover money damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained as the result of a collision of motor vehicles. It is governed by the no-fault insurance law (Insurance Law, art. XVIII). On March 3, 1975 an auto driven by Ms. Cota and a school bus owned by defendant Madison Central School District (School District) and operated by defendant Leon P. Slate collided in the Village of Madison. Plaintiff served a notice of claim upon the School District on June 2, 1975 alleging the bus driver was negligent. A summons and complaint were served on the School District on January 19, 1977. Plaintiff does not claim a 'serious injury' under paragraph (a) of subdivision 4 of section 671 of the Insurance Law; she alleges a serious injury under paragraph (b) 'in that she has incurred hospital, medical and prescription drug charges exceeding $500.00'. (See CPLR 3016(g).) The School District moves for judgment dismissing the complaint under CPLR 3211(a)(5) on the ground the action is carred by a statute of limitations.
The School District contends plaintiff's action was not commenced within one year and ninety days after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based, as required by General Municipal Law § 50--i. Plaintiff claims she could not have commenced suit within one year and ninety days after the accident because it was not until December 27, 1976 when a prescription drug purchase amounting to $4.25 brought her total hospital, medical and prescription drug charges to over $500.00.
General Municipal Law § 50--i(1) reads in part: 'No action . . . shall be prosecuted or maintained against a . . . school district for personal injury . . . alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence or wrongful act of such . . . school district or of any . . . employee thereof, . . . unless . . . the action . . . shall be commenced within one year and ninety days after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based.'
Before 1959 there was no uniform rule regarding the commencement and limitation of actions against municipalities. (Erickson v. Town of Henderson, 30 A.D.2d 282, 284, 291 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405.) The hodge-podge of time periods and methods of computation was changed by General Municipal Law 50--i (L.1959, c. 788). Anent legislative intent, the comments of the Joint Legislative Committee on Municipal Tort Liability (N.Y.Legis.Doc.1959, No. 36, p. 21) are pertinent: (Cited in Erickson v. Town of Henderson, supra, p. 285, 291 N.Y.S.2d p. 406.) The legislature wanted to make 'uniform provisions relating to the commencement of actions against municipal corporations . . .' (Governor's Memorandum, 1959 Legislative Annual, p. 458.)
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