Cotterman v. City of Cincinnati
| Decision Date | 25 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:17-cv-00608-WOB-KLL |
| Parties | JASON COTTERMAN PLAINTIFF v. CITY OF CINCINNATI; ELIOT ISAAC, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Cincinnati Police Department; MATTHEW DEBLAUW, in his official capacity as Special Agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and his individual capacity; AND MICHELLE LONGWORTH, in her official capacity as a City of Cincinnati Police Officer and her individual capacity. DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
This is a 42 U.S.C. 1983 case that arises from the discharge of Cincinnati Police Officer, Jason Cotterman. After his termination, the City of Cincinnati failed to reinstate Cotterman to the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD). In his second amended complaint, Cotterman claims the City of Cincinnati deprived him of numerous constitutional rights and alleges claims of abuse of process and malicious prosecution. (Doc. 107). Also, Cotterman sued FBI agent, Matthew DeBlauw for violating his constitutional rights. Id. The City of Cincinnati, Chief of Police, and Michelle Longworth (collectively “Defendants”) moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 111). Matthew DeBlauw moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 113).
The Court previously heard oral argument and took the motions under submission. (Doc. 106). Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court now issues the following Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Before Cotterman became a police officer, he served in the United States Marine Corps from 1995-2000. However, a traumatizing and embarrassing experience led him to leave the Corps. (Doc 87 at 6). To expediate his dismissal from the Corps, he attempted suicide. (Doc. 87 at 7). Ultimately, Cotterman received an Honorable Discharge. By 2004, Cotterman joined the CPD. For years, Cotterman had a solid service record with good evaluations. (Doc. 1 at 2).
On March 22, 2015, Cotterman investigated an accident involving an off-duty police officer. The accident involved a one-car collision with a stationary object. At least one witness believed the off-duty officer was driving impaired, but the story was later found to be uncreditable. (Doc. 1 at 3). As the lead investigator on scene, Cotterman decided not to not cite his fellow officer. (Doc. 1 at 3). That decision led to Cotterman being investigated, and criminally prosecuted, for dereliction of duty and obstruction of justice. Cotterman alleges the CPD acted for political reasons in their prosecution. (Doc. 1 at 3).
Pending the investigation, the CPD transferred Cotterman to a different district. This caused Cotterman to become angry at what he believed were, unfair events. (Doc. 1 at 4). Because of his anger, the CPD ordered him to see the police psychologist. After Cotterman's meeting with the psychologist, the CPD placed Cotterman on administrative leave while awaiting his criminal trial.
A year later, Cotterman had his trial. At trial, Cotterman failed to move to suppress evidence or challenge any evidence used against him as being “fruit of the poisonous tree”. But, ultimately, the jury acquitted Cotterman.
Following the trial, Michelle Longworth, the Internal Investigation officer assigned to Cotterman's case, contacted FBI agent Matthew DeBlauw to obtain Cotterman's military records-without Cotterman's permission. (Doc. 1 at 5). Longworth stated she needed the records to confirm Cotterman worked as a sniper in the military. When DeBlauw sent the records, it included some medical records.
The CPD medically separated Cotterman based on the psychologist's recommendation that he was unfit for duty. Cotterman appealed the medical separation to the City of Cincinnati Civil Service Commission. Yet he never showed for his hearing, forfeiting his right to challenge his discharge. Cotterman worked to restore himself to full health but was denied reinstatement to the CPD. (Doc. 1 at 7). The CPD's psychologist still found Cotterman unfit for duty, partly because of his military medical records. (Doc. 1 at 7). During this time, Cotterman continued alleging the CPD was acting with a political motivation. Ultimately, Cotterman sued.
Cotterman's complaint specifically names the Defendants in their “official” capacities. As a result, the claims against the Cincinnati Chief of Police and police officers are essentially claims against the entity for which they are agents-the City of Cincinnati. Thus, his complaint fails to state a viable claim against the City of Cincinnati because municipalities are not vicariously liable for the actions of their employees under § 1983. “It is firmly established that a municipality, or ... a county, cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Gregory v. Shelby County, Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
Rather, to state a claim for relief against the City of Cincinnati, the complaint must assert facts showing the misconduct leading to Cotterman's injuries stemmed from a policy, statement, regulation, decision, or custom promulgated by the City. Bright v. Gallia Cnty., Ohio, 753 F.3d 639, 660 (6th Cir. 2014), cert, denied, 135 S.Ct. 1561 (2015) (citing Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 556 (6th Cir. 2003)); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996).
“The ‘official policy' requirement [of Monell] was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphasis in original). Thus, to succeed on this claim, “plaintiff must adequately plead (1) that a violation of a federal right took place, (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law, and (3) that a municipality's policy or custom caused that violation to happen.” Bright, 753 F.3d at 660 (citing Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008)). See also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) ().
(Doc. 49 at 4).
Although the complaint makes a blanket reference to a policy, it offers no factual basis. In fact, the conclusory statement above cannot state a claim for relief under § 1983. Cotterman failed to “identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)). See also Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 479 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[E]ven assuming there was an underlying constitutional violation, we affirm the dismissal of the Monell claim because Plaintiffs have failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish an unconstitutional custom or policy.”).
Nor does Cotterman allege any facts showing a custom or practice was the moving force behind his arrest, detention, and prosecution. “[A] custom-of-tolerance claim requires a showing that there was a pattern of inadequately investigating similar claims.” Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478 (citations omitted). His complaint fails to assert the existence of any other instances of misconduct that would plausibly support an inference of such a pattern.
To refute this argument, Cotterman argues that the “policy”, at the very least, shows the CPD and Chief of Police failed to “adequately train and supervise” its officers. This is exactly the type of legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation that does not pass muster. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
“A failure-to-train claim ... requires a showing of prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [municipality] ha[d] ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.” Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). Cotterman's complaint fails to allege a single prior instance or statistic in support of this claim. Because there are no factual allegations that would “raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” Cotterman's conclusory allegations of an unidentified policy and of a failure to train and supervise fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Longworth seeks dismissal based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. To overcome qualified immunity, Cotterman must prove that Longworth's conduct violated clearly established law. Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability when their conduct “does not violate...
To continue reading
Request your trial