Cotton v. Superior Court In and For Imperial County
| Citation | 56 Cal.2d 459,364 P.2d 241,15 Cal.Rptr. 65 |
| Parties | , 364 P.2d 241, 43 Lab.Cas. P 50,334 Robert COTTON, Jr. et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Callfornia IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF IMPERIAL, Respondent. L. A. 26351 |
| Decision Date | 07 August 1961 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
Charles K. Hackler, Los Angeles, Marshall Ross, Beverly Hills, and Richard W. Petherbridge, El Centro, for petitioners.
A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand, Los Angeles, amici curiae, for petitioners.
James E. Marable, Dist. Atty., and James E. Hamilton, Jr., Deputy Dist. Atty., El Centro, for respondent.
By this proceeding in prohibition the twenty-three petitioners challenge the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Imperial County to try them on an indictment returned by the grand jury.
It is the contention of petitioners that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the various counts of the indictment in question.
After amendment thereof, and action by respondent court dismissing certain counts pursuant to the provisions of Section 995 of the Penal Code, the indictment charges the petitioners and one Gregoric Nova Sanchez in nine counts with the commission of the following offenses:
I. Conspiracy to violate Penal Code section 404 (rioting), Penal Code section 245 (), Penal Code section 602 subdivision (e) () and Penal Code section 207 (kidnapping).
II. Assault with deadly weapon upon Corona. III, IV, VI. Aggravated assult on Martinez, Ramirez and Huante, respectively.
IX, X, XVI. Kidnapping Huante, Ramirez and Martinez, respectively. XVII. Riot.
The incident which occasioned the indictment arose at the Joe Corona Labor Camp which is used to house farm workers, mostly Mexican contract workers (referred to as 'braceros'). The camp had been picketed for some time by the AFL-CIO in an effort to induce the braceros to join a strike being conducted for the purpose of raising wages from 90 cents to $1.25 an hour and for union contracts. On the morning of February 9, 1961, a caravan of cars and trucks brought about 50 members of the union to the camp gate. At first, they verbally attempted to persuade the braceros to join their cause, and to come out of the camp. When the gate was opened to allow Fred Corna, a food contractor, into the camp, some of the pickets forced their way in. Fighting started, and Corona, Martinez (a cook), Ramirez and Huante (both braceros) were injured. When Deputy Sheriff Prikola entered the camp and placed everyone under arrest, the picketers ran to their cars and departed. All petitioners, except two (Lassig and Martin) were occupants of these cars and were apprehended by Deputy Sheriff Sutton. Lassig and Martin were indicted on the testimony of witnesses to the incident.
It is contended that there was no planned conspiracy, but that the alleged crimes were a '* * * spontaneous outgrowth of an unplanned altercation over whether a camp gate should be kept open or closed * * *.' Evidence brought forth by the prosecution in regard to the conspiracy was furnished primarily by three witnesses, who observed the caravan of cars and heard statements by some of the petitioners that could be construed to support the theory of conspiracy.
Section 939.8 of the Penal Code provides that the grand jury shall find an indictment when all the evidence before it, taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted would, in its judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury. Section 995, subdivision 2, of the Penal Code provides that the court must set aside the indictment upon motion of the defendant when the accused '* * * has been indicted without reasonable or probable cause.' Probable cause is shown if an man of ordinary caution or prudence could entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused, and if some rational ground exists for an assumption of guilt, the indictment will not be set aside. Bompensiero v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 178, 183, 281 P.2d 250.
We have concluded that the evidence presented to the grand jury on the question of conspiracy as charged in count I is sufficient to meet the standards required to uphold the indictment with the exception of the averment that petitioners conspired to violate Penal Code, § 207 for, as we shall later see, the testimony relative to a violation of the Penal Code section just cited is inadequate to bring petitioners' conduct within the purview of the law which denounces kidnapping. However, this does not invalidate the accusatory pleading because it also charges petitioners with conspiring to commit other offenses based on evidence to which similar objection cannot be made. People v. Vetri, 178 Cal.App.2d 385, 394, 2 Cal.Rptr. 795. As to the conspiracy count, there was testimony by one witness who followed the caravan of some twenty-five automobiles across the city of Brawley and witnessed the occupants of the parade ov vehicles enter the camp. Another witness who was riding in one of the cars testified that petitioner Williams, after the caravan stopped en route for a conference, returned to his automobile and said to the witness, 'Now, we go in force.' Another witness who was employed by the Imperial Valley Farmers testified that on the morning in question she had a conversation with petitioner Martin who asked her if she was working for the Imperial Valley Farmers, and when she replied in the affirmative, petitioner Martin said, 'Well, you'd better start looking for another job,' and when the witness asked him why, Martin said, '* * * because they were going to pull all those men off. * * *' There was also testimony that some of the petitioners called out, 'Get out or we are going to burn you our; get out of this camp or we are going to throw you out.' We are satisfied that the evidence before the grand jury is sufficient to meet the standard required to uphold count I of the indictment charging that petitioners combined and agreed together to commit certain unlawful acts.
As to the substantive offenses charged in counts II, III, V, VI (assault with a deadly weapon Pen.Code, § 245), and count XVII (riot Pen.Code, § 405), we shall not set forth in detail the evidence with regard thereto. Suffice it to say that it was sufficient both as to quantum and identification of petitioners to provide reasonable and probable cause for the grand jury to return an indictment thereon. Furthermore, at the oral argument, in answer to a question from the bench, 'You do not seem to be challenging the direct counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon Corona, and the aggravated assault on Martinez, Ramirez and Huante, and rioting,' counsel for petitioners replied,
Petitioners also contend that there could be no trespass since the possessory right of landowners (Pen.Code, § 602, subdivision (l)) is overridden by Penal Code, § 552.1, subdivision (a), which permits trespass in an attempt to organize a labor union. However, Penal Code, § 552.1, subdivision (a) applies only to posted industrial property the property upon which the incident here occurred was a farm labor camp.
We come now to petitioners' final contention with regard to counts IX, X and XVI, charging kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap in violation of section 207 of the Penal Code. This section, in part, provides that any person who forcibly steals, takes or arrests another and carries him from one part of the county to another is guilty of kidnapping. Unlike Penal Code, § 209, there need be no intent to hold or detain the person or to use the person for some...
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...be defined as kidnaping. 4 The California Supreme Court had previously construed the kidnaping statute in Cotton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 459, 465, 15 Cal.Rptr. 65, 364 P.2d 241 to mean that the asportation element of kidnaping was something more than an incidental movement involved in ......
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