Couey v. Arrow Coach Lines
Decision Date | 22 February 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 10372,10372 |
Citation | 288 S.W.2d 192 |
Parties | Bryan H. COUEY, Appellant, v. ARROW COACH LINES, Inc., Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Bradbury, Tippen & Brown, Abilene, for appellant.
Truman Roberts, Hico, H. W. Allen, Hamilton, for appellee.
This suit arises from a conventional arbitration under an agreement between Arrow Coach Lines, Inc., hereinafter called 'Arrow' and Local Division No. 1313, Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, A.F.L., hereinafter referred to as the 'Association.'
The employee whose discharge by Arrow provoked this proceeding is appellant Bryan H. Couey of Abilene, Texas.
The award of the arbitration panel was in favor of appellant. 1 Suit in the court below was instituted by Arrow for the purpose of vacating such award. Motions for summary judgment were made by both parties. The motion of Arrow was granted, the motion of appellant denied. Judgment was rendered accordingly.
Since under settled legal principles later stated, we believe that our decision herein must turn upon a proper answer to the question of whether or not the award of the arbitration panel is within the scope of the controversy submitted to it, we will fully treat the procedural aspects of the case and minimize factual matters pertaining to the merits.
On September 13, 1954, Arrow notified appellant, who had been in its employment about 11 years, of his dismissal and gave these reasons:
On September 16, 1954, the Association, acting for appellant, requested that Arrow set a time and place for a hearing regarding appellant's discharge. This hearing resulted in a confirmation, by Arrow, of appellant's dismissal. We quote a portion of Arrow's letter, dated September 27, 1954, so advising appellant:
We quote now the relevant provisions of the contract between Arrow and the Association:
'In accordance with the established Company policy, an Employee will not be disciplined or dismissed from service nor will entries be made against his record without cause.'
Provisions are then made for a hearing before and decision of the General Manager or some other official of Arrow following which it is provided:
'If the Employee so disciplined, discharged or agaisnt whose record entries have been made, is dissatisfied with such written decision, he shall be entitled to demand arbitration thereof, * * *.'
Then follows directions for selecting the arbitrators and for the hearing to be conducted by them from which we quote:
'All parties at interest may appear at such hearing in person or by representatives, and there present all matters pertinent to the controversy in person, by witnesses and in such order as may be designated by the arbitrators. * * *
'A written decision of the controversy shall be made and signed by a majority of the arbitrators, with copies thereof to Company and Association, within twenty (20) days after the hearing is concluded, and such written decision by the arbitrators shall be final and binding upon all parties, their successors and assigns.'
The contract further provides:
'If as a result of the arbitration, the discipline or dismissal of an Employee is found to have been without sufficient cause, the record of the Employee shall be made to conform to the final decision of the Board, and if time has been lost, the Employee shall be paid for any loss of earnings which he may have suffered by reason thereof, or some much of such loss as may be finally determined by the Board of Arbitration to be due to him.'
Other provisions which may have a bearing are:
'No arbitration hereunder and no arbitrator or arbitrators shall change or add to any term or provisions of this contract.'
'The Association agrees that it has full notice of the rules and regulations of the Company.'
'Failure on the part of the Company from time to time or at any time to enforce any rule or regulation shall not be deemed as a waiver thereof, nor bar the enforcement of such rule or regulation for any subsequent violation of the same.'
'It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this agreement shall be subordinate to any present or subsequent federal, state, or municipal law or regulation to the extent that any portion hereof is in conflict therewith, * * *.'
Upon the hearing before the arbitrators it was stipulated:
As indicative of how the parties and the panel understood and construed the nature of the hearing we quote from the record:
'Mr. Lynch: (for Arrow) Mr. Tirey, I believe we might get the union representatives, who have had much more experience and are more familiar with arbitrations than we are, to state the facts that in these informal hearings of this type that the Rules of Evidence are not followed, and that hearsay or anything else is allowed in the record.
'Mr. Tirey: I am going to hold it up for the time being and you might take ip up with the panel again and then we will work it out.
'Mr. Hammett: (for Arrow) Mr. Tirey, wouldn't it probably expedite our hearing to let that go in subject to your later ruling on it?
'Mr. Tirey: Were you present when he had this conversation with this lady that you were talking about?' A. No, sir. Mrs. Cofer is President of the Company and she reported the conversation to me as her general manater.
'Mr. Tirey: Are there any objections?
'Mr. Tirey: All right, we will let it go, but I can't be very scientific in my rulings that way.'
We pause to observe that if all hearsay evidence was eliminated from this record little else would remain.
The rules of Arrow the violation of which is charged to appellant are:
Rule 44 provides
With respect to the evidence on the merits the record reflects that appellant admitted smoking on duty and speeding. He denied the reckless driving charge. As to the 'hostility' charge appellant admitted that he violated a company...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Coleman Co. v. International Union, United Auto., Aircraft and Agr. Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO)
...Service Electric and Gas Co., 44 N.J.Super. 316, 130 A.2d 421; Drake v. Stein, 116 Cal.App.2d 779, 254 P.2d 613; and Couey v. Arrow Coach Lines, Tex.Civ.App., 288 S.W.2d 192. This principle is expressly adopted by Section 10(d) of the United States Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C.A. § 10[d]) and i......
-
Tuco Inc. v. Burlington Northern R. Co.
...of error. 1 Appellees additionally cite Smith v. Barnett, 373 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1963, no writ), and Couey v. Arrow Coach Lines, Inc., 288 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1956, no writ), as examples of Texas courts approving summary judgments of arbitration awards. However, t......
-
Murillo v. Valley Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
...he should not be required to offer opposing evidence. Appellant cites Couey v. Arrow Coach Lines to support his position. Couey v. Arrow Coach Lines, 288 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1956, no writ). Reliance on Couey for such a posture is inappropriate. Couey merely holds that when a mo......
-
Smith v. Barnett
...imply bad faith or failure to exercise an honest judgment. Haddad v. Bagwell, Tex.Civ.App., 317 S.W.2d 781, 784; Couey v. Arrow Coach Lines, Tex.Civ.App., 288 S.W.2d 192, 196; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Henry & Dilley, 65 Tex. 685. Mere errors of fact or law are not grounds for settin......