County of Alameda v. Sampson
Decision Date | 19 March 1980 |
Citation | 104 Cal.App.3d 584,163 Cal.Rptr. 915 |
Parties | COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Cecil Francis SAMPSON, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 46929. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Douglas N. Smith, Worthington & Smith, Napa, for defendant and appellant.
George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen. of Cal., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gloria F. DeHart, Laurence K. Sullivan, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.
The County of Alameda (hereafter respondent) filed and served an action naming as defendant Cecil Francis Sampson (hereafter appellant) for reimbursement of public assistance and child support. Respondent's complaint alleged that appellant is the father of Tamantha M. Sampson, born March 27, 1966, and Sean L. Sampson, born April 29, 1968 (hereafter the minor children), and that Lorraine Carol Sampson is their mother. After appellant filed his answer denying that he is the father of the children respondent filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of paternity. The motion was granted by default. However, by stipulation of the parties, the court set aside and vacated the default judgment. Thereafter, all parties appearing, the court reheard and granted the motion. The court's order granting partial summary judgment indicates that the court received in evidence two documents. Respondent "submitted" a "true" copy of appellant's interlocutory judgment dissolving his marriage to Lorraine Carol Sampson. Appellant "submitted" a sworn statement that appellant is not the father of Tamantha M. and Sean L. Sampson. However, documentary evidence of appellant's sterility was denied admittance.
The court held that the issue of paternity of the minor children is without substantial controversy. The court's order granting respondent's motion for partial summary judgment orders that at the trial of the action "it is deemed" that appellant is the father of the minor children.
Appellant herein contends that the trial court erred in foreclosing what is normally a triable issue of fact, i. e., paternity, by ordering partial summary judgment. We, for reasons we will explain, find no error and affirm the judgment.
It is not disputed that Lorraine Carol Sampson and appellant were married on January 28, 1967. It follows that the children whose paternity by this appeal appellant seeks authorization to litigate were born before (Tamantha M.) and after (Sean L.) Sampson's marriage. There is no question but that Lorraine Sampson (now Lorraine Sampson Moreau) is the natural mother of the minor children.
The Sampsons dissolved their marriage by court order. The dissolution action, filed July 14, 1972, was prosecuted to a final judgment dissolving the marriage as of November 8, 1972. The trial court herein took judicial notice of the Napa County interlocutory judgment dated July 14, 1972, as well as the final judgment dissolving the marriage. The final judgment incorporated by reference the provisions of the interlocutory judgment which ordered as follows: "The court also orders that the care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties, namely, TAMANTHA M. SAMPSON, born March 27, 1966 and SEAN L. SAMPSON, born April 29, 1968, is hereby awarded to Respondent with right of reasonable visitation reserved to Petitioner.
"The court also orders that petitioner shall pay to respondent as and for the support and maintenance of the minor children of the parties, the sum of $50.00 per month, per child, commencing forthwith."
On appeal we are required to apply the foregoing rules to the record in the present case with all intendments in favor of appellant as the party opposing the summary judgment. (Parker, supra, at p. 183, 89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689.)
Lorraine Sampson Moreau's affidavit in addition to declaring that appellant is not the minor children's father also reveals that she knew that appellant was sterile. From her affidavit it appears that she and appellant were motivated by a desire to keep the true facts from the children in allowing their decree of dissolution to state that they were the minor children's parents.
However, it also appears from a separate document introduced by respondent that Lorraine Sampson Moreau, in order to obtain financial aid for the minor children, swore that appellant was their father.
Appellant's basic contention is that the documentary evidence in support of and in opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment presented a triable issue of fact to the trial court, i. e., paternity (father) of the minor children. Appellant correctly points out that a trial court abuses its discretion if in granting a motion for summary judgment it decides a triable issue of act. (See Parker, supra, at p. 181, 89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689.)
The answer to appellant's contention is that collateral estoppel foreclosed the issue of paternity. The trial court did not pass upon i. e., weigh and consider the conflicting documentary evidence and decide that appellant is the minor children's father. Rather the court deftly applied the law and reasoned that appellant was estopped to introduce evidence that he was not their father.
Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy when the doctrine of res judicata in its subsidiary form of collateral estoppel refutes all triable issues of fact suggested by the pleadings and supporting documents. (See People v. One 1964 Chevrolet Corvette Convertible (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 720, 725-726, 79 Cal.Rptr. 447).
People v. One 1964 Chevrolet Corvette Convertible teaches that (At p. 726, 79 Cal.Rptr. at p. 450.) (See also Clemmers v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 874, 151 Cal.Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d 1098; People v. Taylor (1974) ...
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