County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court

• Citation: 127 Cal.App.4th 1263,26 Cal.Rptr.3d 445
• Decision Date: 29 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. B178541.,B178541.
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; N.L., Real Party in Interest.

26 Cal.Rptr.3d 445

127 Cal.App.4th 1263

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent N.L., Real Party in Interest.

No. B178541.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1.

March 29, 2005.

Law Offices of Michael H. Manning & Associates, Michael H. Manning and Marvin L. Benson; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Martin Stein and Carolyn Oill for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Bash Polyachenko, Alexander M. Polyachenko and Steven Bash for Real Party in Interest.

SPENCER, P.J.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner County of Los Angeles (County) seeks writ review of respondent Los Angeles Superior Court's order denying its motion for summary judgment. The County contends this personal injury action, filed by real party in interest N.L., is time-barred by the California Tort Claims Act, in that suit was not commenced within six months after the County mailed its notice rejecting N.L.'s claim, as required by Government Code section 945.6 (section 945.6). N.L. counters that she commenced suit within eight years of attaining the age of majority and thus her action was timely under the statute of limitations applicable to victims of childhood sexual abuse (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1 (section 340.1)). We conclude that the timeliness of N.L.'s action is governed by section 945.6, not section 340.1, and that her action is time-barred. We therefore grant the County's petition.

BACKGROUND

On July 28 and 29 and August 2 and 4, 2001, an employee of the County sexually assaulted N.L. while she was housed in a juvenile facility. N.L. was 17 years old at the time. After being released from custody, N.L. left the country and lost contact with her mother for about six months.¹ N.L. turned 18 on October 12, 2001.

On January 28, 2002, at the direction of N.L.'s mother, Attorney Steven Bash filed a timely claim with the County on behalf of N.L., listing the date of the incident as July 28, 2001. Counsel had never met N.L., and, like her mother, was unaware of her whereabouts.

On May 30, 2002, the County mailed a letter to Attorney Bash, informing him that N.L.'s claim had been deemed denied on March 14, 2002. This notice warned Attorney Bash that, with certain exceptions, he had only six months from the date the notice was personally served or deposited in the mail to file an action on the claim that had been denied and directed him to section 945.6. Attorney Bash did not receive the County's notice.

"[A]pproximately one year after the assault," N.L. learned "that [her] mother had spoken with an attorney about [her] case." On December 31 2003, more than one and one-half years after the County mailed its notice of the denial of N.L.'s claim, N.L., represented by Attorney Bash's law firm, filed this personal injury action against the County and her assailant, alleging causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring, supervision and retention. N.L. further alleged that she was "required to comply with a claims statute" and "ha[d] complied with applicable claims statutes." N.L. sought monetary damages.

The County moved for summary judgment on the ground that N.L.'s lawsuit was barred by section 945.6, in that N.L. failed to file this action within six months after the County mailed its notice denying the claim. N.L. opposed the motion, asserting that her "failure to file a claim within the usually proscribed period is excused because she was a victim of rape, because she was a minor at the time, and because the specific provisions of ... § 340.1 apply to her case." The trial court agreed with N.L., finding that the timeliness of this action was governed by the statute of limitations set forth in section 340.1 rather than section 945.6. In denying the County's motion for summary judgment, the court observed that section 340.1 is more specific and expressly states that its special limitations period applies to actions against an "entity."

DISCUSSION

California Tort Claims Act

The California Tort Claims Act (Act) (Gov.Code, § 810 et seq.) governs actions against public entities and public employees. The timeliness of such actions is governed by the specific statute of limitations set forth in the Government Code, not the statute of limitations applicable to private defendants. (Moore v. Twomey (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 910, 913-914, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 163; Martell v. Antelope Valley Hospital Medical Center (1998) 67 Cal. App.4th 978, 981, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 329.)

Under the Act, no person may sue a public entity or public employee for "money or damages" unless a timely written claim has been presented to and denied by the public entity. (Gov.Code, § 945.4; Curtis T. v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 208.) A claim pertaining to a cause of action for personal injury must be filed within six months after the cause of action accrues. (Id., § 911.2; Curtis T., supra, at p. 1415, 21 Cal. Rptr.3d 208.) With certain exceptions, an action against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim must be presented must be commenced "not later than six months" after written notice rejecting the claim is delivered to the claimant personally or deposited in the mail. (§ 945.6.) If the public entity deposits written notice of rejection in the mail, the six-month limitations period within which to file suit applies regardless of whether notice is actually received. (Dowell v. County of Contra Costa (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 896, 901, 219 Cal.Rptr. 341.) The claimant is charged with knowledge of the six-month period and is obligated to inquire as to the status of the claim if he or she has not received a written rejection notice within a reasonable time after the County's time to act or reject the claim has passed. (Ibid.)

Statute of Limitations for Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse

Section 340.1 sets forth a special statute of limitations for victims of childhood sexual abuse. Subdivision (a) of section 340.1 provides: "In an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse, the time for commencement of the action shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later, for any of the following actions: [¶] (1) An action against any person for committing an act of childhood sexual abuse. [¶] (2) An action for liability against any person or entity who owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff. [¶] (3) An action for liability against any person or entity where an intentional act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff."

Section 340.1 Does Not Trump the Act

The Legislature added section 340.1 to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1986. (Stats.1986, ch. 914, § 1.) In 1998, the Legislature amended section 340.1 to permit victims of childhood sexual abuse to sue persons or entities other than the actual abuser. (Stats.1998, ch. 1032, § 1.) Prior to the 1998 amendment, courts had held that section 340.1's liberalized limitations period applied only to causes of action against the actual perpetrator of the sexual abuse. (Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 603, 609-610, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 73; Tietge v. Western Province of the Servites, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 382, 387-388, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 53; Chaney v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 152, 155-156, 46 Cal. Rptr.2d 73; Debbie Reynolds Prof. Rehearsal Studios v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 222, 231, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 514.) To the extent that section 340.1 now authorizes suits against a person or entity other than the actual perpetrator, nothing in that statute or the legislative history of the 1998 amendment to that statute reflects an intent on the part of the Legislature to excuse victims of childhood sexual abuse from complying with the Act when the defendant is a public entity or public employee.

Code of Civil Procedure section 342, which neither party cites, has been part of the Code of Civil Procedure since 1963 (Stats.1963, ch. 1715, § 4, p. 3394) and was thus in existence when the Legislature amended section 340.1 in 1998. Entitled "[a]ctions against public entities," section 342 provides that "[a]n action against a public entity upon a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code must be commenced within the time provided in Section 945.6 of the Government Code." The Law Revision Commission Comment 1963 Addition explains that the Legislature "placed" section 342 "among the limitation of actions provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure so that the statute of limitations applicable to actions upon claims against public entities may be discovered by looking at either this section or the appropriate section of the Government Code." (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 13A West's Ann.Code Civ. Proc. (1982 ed.) foll. § 342, p. 516, italics added.) Sections 340.1 and 342 are part of the same legislative scheme. They are included in part 2, title 2, chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which chapter is entitled, "Time of Commencing Actions Other Than for the Recovery of Real Property."

"The Legislature `is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof.'" (People v. McGuire (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 687, 694, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 12.) We therefore presume that the Legislature...