Martell v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Medical Center

• Decision Date: 12 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. B119152,B119152
• Parties: , 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8391, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,649 Jeremiah Mitchell MARTELL, a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. ANTELOPE VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 329

79 Cal.Rptr.2d 329

67 Cal.App.4th 978, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8391,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,649

Jeremiah Mitchell MARTELL, a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. ANTELOPE VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant and Respondent.

No. B119152.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Nov. 12, 1998.

Berglund & Johnson and Harrison W. Sommer, Woodland Hills, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Lee A. McCoy and Thomas M. Stefanelli, Palm Springs, for Defendant and Respondent.

GODOY PEREZ, J.

Jeremiah Mitchell Martell, a minor, his mother Tammy Martell, for herself and as guardian ad litem for Jeremiah, and Jeremiah's father, David Martell (collectively "appellants"), appeal from the summary judgment dismissing as time-barred their medical malpractice complaint against respondent Antelope Valley Hospital Medical Center. After review, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Jeremiah Mitchell Martell was born in February 1989 at respondent Antelope Valley Hospital Medical Center, a district hospital covered by the California Tort Claims Act (Gov.Code, § 900 et seq. hereafter the "Act"). Because of respondent's alleged negligence, Jeremiah suffered injuries during birth. In August 1989, he presented respondent with a timely claim for medical malpractice in compliance with the Act, ¹ which respondent rejected in October 1989. In February 1990 Jeremiah and his parents filed a timely complaint against respondent for medical malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In May 1992, they dismissed their complaint without prejudice, however, apparently because Jeremiah's young age prevented the extent of his injuries from being fully known.

Almost five years later in February 1997, appellants filed a second complaint almost indistinguishable from the first. Respondent moved for summary judgment, arguing the new complaint was time-barred because of appellant's failure to comply with the Act's six-month filing requirement. (§ 945.6 [complaint must be filed within six-months of rejection of claim].) Respondent conceded that had it been a private hospital not covered by the Act, the renewed complaint would have been timely under the statute of limitations ordinarily applicable to a minor's claim for medical malpractice, which required appellants to file their complaint before Jeremiah's eighth birthday. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.) Respondent argued that in this instance, however, the second complaint was untimely because it was filed more than six months after respondent's October 1989 rejection of appellants' initial claim for malpractice. In support, respondent cited section 945.6, subdivision (a)(1) of the Act, which

                provides "any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with [the Governmental Tort Claims Act] must be commenced ...  [p] ... not later than six months after [statutory written notice of rejection of the claim] is personally delivered or deposited in the mail."   The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint.  This appeal followed
                

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal is from a summary judgment in which all relevant facts are undisputed. Accordingly, we independently review the trial court's judgment. (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 60, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 366, 939 P.2d 766 [summary judgment independently reviewed]; Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 883 P.2d 960 [when relevant facts undisputed, appeal presents question of law subject to independent review].)

DISCUSSION

Arguing once is enough, appellants contend they satisfied section 945.6 of the Act when they presented their initial claim in August 1989, releasing them from any obligation to present a second claim before they filed their second complaint. ² In support, appellants cite the policies behind the Act. "The claims-presentation requirements ... serve two basic purposes [citation]: [p] First, they give the governmental entity an opportunity to settle just claims before suit is brought. Second, they permit the entity to make an early investigation of the facts on which a claim is based, thus enabling it to defend itself against unjust claims and to correct the conditions or practices which gave rise to the claim. ..." (Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 1992) § 6.6, p. 635; see also City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 455, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701.)

Respondent, in contrast, urges application of section 945.6's plain meaning, noting it declares "any suit brought against a public entity" must be filed no more than six months after the public entity rejects the claim. (Italics added.) Respondent argues that finding a second complaint was timely despite being filed many years later would carve out a huge exception to section 945.6's plain meaning, an exception unsupported by statutory or case law. (See Edgington v. County of San Diego (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 39, 46, 173 Cal.Rptr. 225 ["plain meaning rule" applies to section 945.6 barring court from " 'go[ing] beyond [the statute] to find another meaning....' "].)

We hold that respondent has the better argument. "Suits against a public entity are governed by the specific statute of limitations provided in the Government Code, rather than the statute of limitations which applies to private defendants." (Dominguez v. City of Alhambra (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 237, 244, 173 Cal.Rptr. 345.) As the Law Revision Commission explained when it proposed the Act's enactment, "In order to avoid troublesome problems as to the interrelationship between the statutes of limitations and the claims statute, a special period of limitations applicable to actions based on claims should also be provided. This period should commence to run from the time the claim is acted upon or is deemed to have been rejected. In order to promote uniformity and avoid undue delay in a suit against a public entity, a relatively short period should be allowed for commencing suit regardless of the nature of the claim. The six-month period now provided in the State claims statute is recommended. The general statutes of limitation would thus have no application to actions against public entities upon causes of action for which claims are required to be filed." (4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963) p. 1014, italics added; see also id. at p. 1043 [same].)

In the years following the Act's passage, courts have assiduously implemented the Law Revision Commission's recommendation.

"With rare exceptions, courts have held that the six-month statute of limitations is inviolate. 'Where the notice of rejection complies with [the Act's requirements] the six-month statute of limitations cannot be extended by provisions outside the Tort Claims Act.' [Citation.]" (Anson v. County of Merced (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1195, 1200, 249 Cal.Rptr. 457, italics added.) ³ A number of decisions illustrate the extent to which the Act trumps other statutes. For example, Chase v. State of California (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 808, 136 Cal.Rptr. 833, restricted the ordinarily liberal rules allowing naming of "Doe" defendants when the defendant is a public entity. Typically, a defendant initially named a "Doe defendant" is considered a party to the action for purposes of the statute of limitations from the date the complaint is filed, regardless of when the defendant is later actually named. In Chase, however, the appellate court held the usual rule did not apply to governmental defendants; instead, the Act's shortened period for filing a complaint was inflexible, "the [A]ct manifest[ing] a purpose that the time within which an action may be commenced under it is absolute, and will not be extended for any reason." (Id. at p. 812, 136 Cal.Rptr. 833; see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Stockton Port Dist. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 111, 115, 189 Cal.Rptr. 208 [67 Cal.App.4th 983] [same]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 447, p. 545.) Also, Smith v. City and County of San Francisco (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 227, 137 Cal.Rptr. 146, held the normal five-day extension of time for service by mail did not apply to the Act's six-month statute of limitations. (Id. at pp. 231-232, 137 Cal.Rptr. 146.) Finally, Castro v. Sacramento County Fire Protection Dist. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 927, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 193, established that attorney mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect which would ordinarily entitle a party to relief from default (see Code Civ. Proc., § 473) did not apply to a plaintiff who failed to file his complaint within the six months required by section 945.6. (Id. at pp. 929, 934, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 193.)

Appellants counter with the observation that we must give effect, if possible, to both section 945.6 and Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, which codifies the statute of limitations for medical malpractice. They note that by allowing them only a six-month window to file any and all complaints, we deny Jeremiah the benefit of the far longer statute of limitations--in this case, until his eighth birthday--which Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 bestows upon minors. ⁴ They argue such a denial runs contrary to the public policy which they perceive disfavors interposing statutes of limitations against a minor's claims. (See, e.g., Wozniak v. Peninsula Hospital (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 716, 724, 82 Cal.Rptr. 84; see also Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 53, 210 Cal.Rptr. 781, 694 P.2d 1153 [by applying different time limits for adults and minors in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, the Legislature intended that minors should be treated more generously].) We note, however, that section 945.6 existed In addition, we find that the public policy disfavoring application of statutes of limitation to minors does not extend to complaints against public entities. Code of Civil Procedure section 352,...