County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court

Decision Date31 July 2000
Docket NumberNo. B134958.,B134958.
Citation98 Cal.Rptr.2d 564,82 Cal.App.4th 819
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesCOUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Adam Axelrad, Real Party in Interest.

NOTT, Acting P.J.

Petitioner, the County of Los Angeles (County), seeks extraordinary writ relief to compel the trial court to vacate its order granting real party in interest Adam Axelrad's motion, brought pursuant to the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov Code § 6250 et seq.),1 to compel the production of certain public records in the possession of the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Axelrad is an attorney employed by the Law Offices of Robert Mann and Donald Cook. Mann and Cook represented, in three civil actions, former inmates of the County jail who allegedly were over-detained, and then sued the County alleging false imprisonment. Mann and Cook sought in each of these cases the disclosure of certain documents. When the discovery motions were denied, Axelrad filed with the County two requests pursuant to the CPRA seeking the identical documents.

Axelrad sought either access to or copies of the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department Inmate Reception Center Manual (IRC Manual), the Inmate Reception Center Task Force Report (IRC Task Force Report), "paper logs maintained by the Sheriffs Department Inmate Reception Center that tracks erroneous releases and over-detentions," (Logs) and "[o]verdetention reports made by or under the supervision of Sheriffs Department Captain Betkey to Sheriff's Department Chief Barry King" (Over-detention Reports). The County refused to disclose or provide access to the requested documents. Subsequently, Axelrad, represented by Mann and Cook, filed a request pursuant to sections 62582 and 62593 of the CPRA for an order compelling the disclosure of the documents. The County opposed the petition claiming application of a number of exemptions contained within the CPRA. The County also claimed that because Axelrad was attempting to "circumvent" prior discovery rulings in the civil actions filed by his employer, the petition should be denied.

The court, apparently assuming that Axelrad had filed his CPRA request in an attempt to obtain documents for use in connection with the three over-detention cases being handled by his employer, opined that nothing contained within the CPRA prohibits a litigant from filing a CPRA request as an "alternative" to civil discovery, and proceeded to the merits of the request.

Following an in camera review, the trial court ordered the County to provide all the records requested except volumes 4 and 8 of the IRC Manual. As to these volumes, the court held that they were exempt from disclosure based on the "public interest" exemption set forth in section 6255 because they "contain matters that, in the public interest, should not be disclosed because the information involves security procedures necessary for running the Inmate Reception Center." As to the remaining documents, the court, without conducting an in camera review, concluded that the County had failed to meet its burden of showing that the documents are exempt from production under the CPRA, and directed production of the records. This petition for writ of mandate followed.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

The County contends that "the CPRA should not be employed to systematically circumvent the effect of prior civil discovery rulings that pertain to the public records sought," and that the trial court erred in finding inapplicable the exemptions found in sections 6254 and 6255.

III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

A superior court order directing disclosure of public records held by a public agency "is not a final judgment or order within the meaning of Section 904.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure from which an appeal may be taken, but shall be immediately reviewable by petition to the appellate court for the issuance of an extraordinary writ." (§ 6259, subd. (c); Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 115, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160.) Appellate review of the order is "independent on issues of law, and follows the substantial evidence test with respect to any issues of fact. [Citation.]" (City of Hemet v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 1411, 1416, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 (City of Hemet).)

B. CPRA

In 1968, the Legislature clarified the scope of the public's right to inspect public records by enacting the CPRA. (CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 651, 230 Cal.Rptr. 362, 725 P.2d 470.) The act was modeled on its federal predecessor, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.). (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1338, 283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d 240; CBS, Inc. v. Block, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 651, 230 Cal.Rptr. 362, 725 P.2d 470.) The two enactments have similar policy objectives and should receive a parallel construction.4 (City of Hemet, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417, fn. 6, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 532.)

The CPRA makes clear that "every person" has a right to inspect any public record (§ 6253, subd. (a)), for any purpose (§ 6257.5), subject to certain exemptions, including those found in sections 6254 and 6255.

Section 6254 contains numerous express exemptions, "ranging from certain library records ... to records of Native American gravesites." (City of Hemet, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421, 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 532.) Section 6255 is a catchall provision. It provides that even if the record does not fall within one of the section 6254 exemptions, the record still can be withheld if the government can demonstrate that "on the facts of [a] particular case the public interest served by not making the record public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record." (§ 6255.) These exemptions are to be narrowly construed (Fairley v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1414, 1420, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 648 (Fairley)), and the government agency opposing disclosure bears the burden of proving that one or more apply in a particular case. (Rogers v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal. App.4th 469, 476, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 412.)

The County is a "local agency" subject to the CPRA. (§ 6252, subd. (b).) The requested records are "public records" as that term is defined in the CPRA (§ 6252, subd. (d) [defining a "public record" as "any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics"].)

We have no difficulty, on this record, concluding that Axelrad filed his CPRA request in an attempt to obtain documents for use in the over-detention cases filed by his employer.5 However, he was permitted to do so under the CPRA, which provides that there are no "limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure." (§ 6257.5.)6 The reason for such a rule, we believe, is that "[t]here is no practical way of limiting the use of the information, once it is disclosed, to the purpose asserted by the requestor. Indeed, there is no way of assuring that the information will not be used by the requestor for other purposes, or, for that matter, will not be used by third parties who manage to obtain the information once it has been disclosed to [the requestor]." (See Hughes Salaried Retirees v. Adm'r of Hughes (9th Cir.1995) 72 F.3d 686, 693 [holding that under the FOIA the question of disclosure cannot turn on the purpose for which the request for information is made].)

We conclude that a plaintiff who has filed suit against a public agency may, either directly or indirectly through a representative, file a CPRA request for the purpose of obtaining documents for use in the plaintiffs civil action, and that the documents must be produced unless one or more of the statutory exemptions set forth in the CPRA apply. The County suggests that an exception to this general rule is warranted in this case because Axelrad filed his CPRA request with the intent of "nullify[ing] and bypassing] disfavored discovery rulings." The trial court rejected this argument, and found, as to most of the documents requested by Axelrad, that none of the exemptions set forth within the CPRA apply.

C. Axelrad's Alleged Abuse of the CPRA

The County, relying on County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal. App.4th 588, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 (Kusar) and federal cases interpreting the FOIA, claims that because Axelrad is attempting to circumvent "adverse" discovery rulings7 rendered against the plaintiffs in the over-detention cases being prosecuted by Axelrad's employers, the CPRA petition should have been denied.

In Kusar, a legal secretary (Ara Kusar) worked in the law offices of Ernest S. Gould, Esq. Gould represented Frank McMurray who had been arrested by Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriffs Jeffrey Bailey and Charles Morales. McMurray sued the two deputies alleging that they committed an assault and battery upon him and violated his civil rights. (Kusar, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 590-592, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 409.) Gould filed, in McMurray's civil action, discovery requests seeking information regarding every person arrested (for certain particular offenses) by Bailey and Morales over a 10-year period. (Id. at pp. 591, 593, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 409.) The County refused to produce the information. McMurray brought a motion to compel, which was denied—on the basis that McMurray had failed to meet the good cause requirements of Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045. (Kusar, supra, at pp. 593, 600, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 409.) He then...

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