County of Chesterfield v. Johnson

Decision Date13 January 1989
Docket NumberNo. 871113,871113
Citation376 S.E.2d 73,237 Va. 180
PartiesCOUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD v. Calvin L. JOHNSON. Record
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

Jeffrey L. Mincks, Sr. Asst. County Atty. (Steven L. Micas, County Atty; Gary K. Oldehoff, Asst. County Atty., on briefs), for appellant.

Malcolm Parks, III (Maloney, Yeatts & Barr, P.C., on brief), for appellee.

Present: CARRICO, C.J., POFF, * COMPTON, STEPHENSON, RUSSELL, THOMAS, and WHITING, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals in a worker's compensation case in which the sole issue was whether the injured worker's injuries arose out of his employment, within the meaning of the Worker's Compensation Act (the Act). The Industrial Commission (the Commission) held that the injuries complained of did not arise out of the employment. The Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the appeal because we deem it to be of significant precedential value to determine whether the decision by the Court of Appeals impermissibly blends together the separate and distinct concepts of arising "out of" and arising "in the course of" employment as those terms are used in the Act. See Code § 17-116.07 B.

The facts found by the Commission served as the basis of the Court of Appeals' decision. Those facts are as follows: Calvin L. Johnson, who was employed as a water filter operator in a Chesterfield County water treatment plant, accidentally injured his knee while at work on October 4, 1985. Johnson had descended steps to the basement of the plant to turn off certain pumps. As he started to leave the basement, he remembered--just as he got to the first step on the stairs--that he needed to check a certain meter to insure that it was functioning properly. He turned around on the first step to go back to the equipment. As he turned, his knee gave way and he fell to the floor.

Johnson did not slip, trip, stumble, or take an awkward step when his knee gave way. His knee gave way before he fell. When he fell, there was no evidence that he struck his knee. The steps were not defective. They were well-lighted. Johnson was wearing safety shoes which, according to him, hurt his feet but he gave "no explanation as to how this caused his knee to give way."

The Commission concluded further that Johnson "sustained the injury before there was any fall." The Commission also stated that "in the case now before us we do not find any [risks inherent in the employment environment] that have contributed to the employee's knee giving way prior to the fall."

The Court of Appeals reversed the Commission decision on the ground that the Commission had misapplied the law. Johnson v. Chesterfield County, 5 Va.App. 15, 359 S.E.2d 833 (1987). After reviewing the pertinent cases, the Court of Appeals stated that "where in the furtherance of his employment the employee is exposed to a hazard which causes him injury, his injury is a cost of doing that business and is, therefore, compensable." Id. at 20, 359 S.E.2d at 836. The Court of Appeals also stated that "[a]n injury arises out of the employment even if the employment does not enhance or increase the degree of the specific risk to which the employee is exposed. An injury is compensable so long as the risk causing the injury is produced by the employment." Id.

According to the Court of Appeals, the Commission made a mistake of law when the Commission said "that there were no 'risks in traversing the steps ... inherent in the employment environment' " because that statement suggests "a need to prove that the employment created a greater degree of risk in 'traversing the steps.' " Id. The Court of Appeals stated further that the "employee was only required to show that his employment required him to use the steps as he did and that this, not some unknown cause, caused the injury to his knee." Id.

The Court of Appeals stated that "[t]here is no question that the employee was on the mission of his employer when he found it necessary to turn around on the stairway which he was ascending. The attending physician reported that the employee's knee injury resulted from a twist type injury to his right knee at work. This was unrebutted evidence of a causal connection between the employee's work and the injury." Id. at 20-21, 359 S.E.2d at 836.

In order for an injured worker to recover under the Act, he must prove an injury by accident "arising out of and in the course of the employment." Code § 65.1-7 (emphasis added). The phrases arising "out of" and arising "in the course of" are separate and distinct. We have long held that they mean different things and that proof of both is essential to recovery under the Act. See Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938). The phrase arising "in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred. The phrase arising "out of" refers to the origin or cause of the injury.

We have considered, in several recent cases, the specific question whether an injury arises out of the employment. In United Parcel Service v. Fetterman, 230 Va. 257, 336 S.E.2d 892 (1985), a driver for U.P.S. was in the act of unloading packages when he noticed that one of his shoelaces was untied. He raised his foot to the back of the truck and bent to tie his shoe. He felt an acute pain in his back. The Commission found the claim compensable on the ground that the work environment had something to do with the way in which the claimant went about tying his shoe and that having his shoes tied was necessary for him to continue his work. We reversed and dismissed.

In Fetterman, we said that "[a]n accident arises out of the employment when there is a causal connection between the claimant's injury and the conditions under which the employer requires the work to be performed." Id. at 258, 336 S.E.2d at 893. We said further that the arising out of test excludes "an injury which comes from a hazard to which the employee would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work, incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the master-servant relationship." Id. at 258-59, 336 S.E.2d at 893. We rejected Fetterman's claim because in our opinion, "the act of bending over to tie the shoe was unrelated to any hazard common to the workplace. In other words, nothing in the work environment contributed to the injury. Every person who wears laced shoes must occasionally perform the act of retying the laces." Id. at 259, 336 S.E.2d at 893.

The sole issue in Central State Hospital v. Wiggers, 230 Va. 157, 335 S.E.2d 257 (1985), was whether the injury complained of arose out of the employment. There, a clerk at Central State Hospital arose from her desk and walked ten steps to an adjoining office to answer the phone. Just as she reached for the phone, her right ankle twisted. We pointed out that the claimant did not contend that she slipped, tripped, stumbled or fell, but only that she twisted her ankle while walking normally. The Commission made an award on the basis that the claimant twisted her ankle while walking on a floor made slippery by some unknown substance. We said there was no evidence of any substance on the floor. We reversed the Commission and entered final judgment for the employer on the ground that the claimant had failed to establish a causal connection between her work environment and her injury. Id. at 159-60, 335 S.E.2d at 257.

In Richmond Mem. Hosp. v. Crane, 222 Va. 283, 278 S.E.2d 877 (1981), a nurse stood up from a chair and began to walk straight ahead. She took her first step with her left foot. When she stepped with her right foot, she felt something snap in the lower back portion of her right leg. The employer conceded that the injury occurred in the course of employment; it argued, however, that the injury was not shown to have arisen out of the employment. The Commission found in favor of the injured employee. On appeal, we reversed and entered final judgment for the employer. We pointed out that the claimant neither slipped, tripped, stumbled, or fell. Her injury occurred while she was walking along a level, clean, unobstructed, well-lit corridor. On those facts, we concluded that nothing in her work environment contributed to her injury. Id. at 286, 278 S.E.2d...

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