County of San Diego v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2, 255

• Decision Date: 28 October 1983
• Docket Number: No. 255,255
• Citation: 148 Cal.App.3d 548,195 Cal.Rptr. 895
• Parties: COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD NO. 2 of San Diego County, Defendant and Respondent; Charles D. HERRING (Application), et al., Real Parties in Interest and Appellants. Civ. 28098.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 895

195 Cal.Rptr. 895

148 Cal.App.3d 548

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD NO. 2 of San Diego County, Defendant and Respondent Charles D. HERRING (Application No. 255), et al., Real Parties in Interest and Appellants.

Civ. 28098.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Oct. 28, 1983.

Herring & Stubel and Steven Williams, San Diego, for real parties in interest and appellants.

Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., County Counsel, and Bruce W. Beach, Deputy County Counsel, San Diego, for petitioners and respondents.

HANSCOM, Associate Justice. ^*

The County of San Diego (the County) and E.C. Williams, assessor for the County, filed two separate petitions for writs of administrative mandate. The petitions asked for issuance of a writ ordering Assessment Appeals Board No. 2 (the Board) of the County to set aside its decisions regarding reduction of the 1979 taxable values of certain properties within the La Vista Grande subdivision. After a hearing, the trial court issued a writ of mandate directing the Board to set aside its decisions regarding the 1979 taxable values of the properties in question. The writ also ordered the Board to reconsider the homeowners' applications for equalization of their 1979 property tax assessments in light of the court's decision. Monte N. Stewart, Charles D. and Delayne E. Herring, real parties in interest, file a consolidated appeal from the judgment granting the petition for the writ.

In 1979, Stewart and the Herrings, with other homeowners in the La Vista Grande subdivision, filed applications with the Board requesting equalization of their 1979 real property assessments. They contended the county assessor erred in computing their property assessments. The Board held hearings on the applications in January and February 1980. These proceedings involved presentation of testimony and evidence by various parties in interest, including Stewart, the Herrings and the County. Subsequently, the Board issued its oral and written determination that the applicants' properties were nonmarketable as of the 1979 lien date. The Board reduced the value of the land to one-sixth of its intrinsic market value and determined the value of the improvements to be zero. It cited the inadequate drainage system, resultant flooding, erosion and septic system failures among factors for its findings and conclusions.

On February 26, 1981, the County and the assessor filed two petitions for writs of administrative mandate under CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 1094.5¹. The petitions named the Board as respondent and Stewart (case No. 466459) and the Herrings (case No. 466460), along with other homeowners and Does I through X, as real parties in interest.

The superior court on November 4, 1981, heard case Nos. 466459 and 466460 with the Herrings appearing as real parties in interest. Stewart did not appear at that hearing.

The court in its conclusions of law found abuse of discretion is established if the Board's "decisions" are not supported by the findings or the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. The court also found the Board's findings--that each property at issue was totally nonmarketable at lien date, that the value of the land was one-sixth of its intrinsic market value and that each improvement had a zero market value for the taxable year 1979--were not supported by the evidence or testimony in light of the whole record. ² The court held this to be prejudicial abuse of discretion.

The County's petition for the writ of administrative mandate was granted March 30, 1982. The Herrings and Stewart filed timely consolidated appeals from the judgment granting the petition for the writ.

On appeal, Stewart and the Herrings have four main contentions.

First, they allege the trial court had no jurisdiction to review the decision of an assessment appeals board with respect to an owner-occupied, single-family residence. As a basis for this contention, they state the Legislature has not given the superior courts jurisdiction to review such decisions.

While such authority may not have been specifically granted by the Legislature, the courts of California have addressed the issue. In County of L.A. v. Tax Appeals Bd. No. 2, 267 Cal.App.2d 830, 73 Cal.Rptr. 469, the court rejected a contention the county could not bring an action against a tax appeals board without express statutory authority. The court stated, "it is clear that such review is provided in California by Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5." (Id. at p. 833, 73 Cal.Rptr. 469.) Without such a right of review, the county would have no adequate remedy at law (County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2, 32 Cal.App.3d 654, 673, 108 Cal.Rptr. 434). Further, without administrative mandamus or similar methods of review, the county would have no available procedure to review tax appeal proceedings or to cause assessment appeals boards to conform to the law (Board of Supervisors v. Archer, 18 Cal.App.3d 717, 721, 96 Cal.Rptr. 379; County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2, supra, 267 Cal.App.2d at p. 673, 108 Cal.Rptr. 434). ³

Second, the Herrings and Stewart argue the County did not file its petitions for writs of administrative mandate within 90 days of the final decision as required by section 1094.6, subdivision (b). They allege, as a result, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the matter.

Section 1094.6, subdivision (e), limits the application of section 1094.6 to adjudicatory administrative decisions "suspending, demoting or dismissing an officer or employee, revoking or denying an application for a permit or license, or denying an application for any benefit or allowance." Section 1094.6, subdivision (g), goes on to make section 1094.6 applicable to "a local agency only if the governing board thereof adopts an ordinance or resolution making this section applicable." It has not been alleged or proven that such an ordinance or resolution has been adopted by the County. Section 1094.6 does not apply to this case.

The statute of limitations for ordinary civil actions applies where no other period of time is specified (§§ 1109, 363). Depending on the specific nature of the right asserted, a three or four-year period usually applies in similar mandamus proceedings (County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d 654, 661-662, 108 Cal.Rptr. 434). Even if a one-year statute applied, the County filed within the time limit.

The trial court's review of the Board's action is governed by the substantial evidence test and all parties agree to this. (See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., 11 Cal.3d 28, 32, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29.)

In order to properly apply the substantial evidence test, its current interpretation must be ascertained, as the scope and extent of the test has changed with time. ⁴

The test now is that a court reviewing the evidentiary basis of an agency's decision must consider all relevant evidence in the administrative record including evidence that fairly detracts from the evidence supporting the agency's decision (Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456; Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal.3d 130, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242). The trial court's and appellate court's functions in reviewing the evidentiary basis of the agency's decision are still identical regardless of whether the trial court upheld or overturned the administrative action (Bixby v. Pierno, supra, 4 Cal.3d 130 at p. 149, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242).

Under the Universal Camera rule, however, both the trial and appellate courts have broader responsibility to consider all relevant evidence in the administrative record, both contradicted and uncontradicted (Jasmine Vineyards, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 113 Cal.App.3d 968, 975, 170 Cal.Rptr. 510). This consideration involves some weighing of the evidence to fairly estimate its worth (Universal Camera Corp., supra, 340 U.S. at p. 490, 71 S.Ct. at 465). This broadening of the substantial evidence test allows the party aggrieved by an administrative action a greater chance to overturn the agency's action than under the formerly applied isolation rule. ⁵

In general, substantial evidence has been defined in two ways: first, as evidence of "ponderable legal significance ... reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value" (Ofsevit v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges, 21 Cal.3d 763, 773, fn. 9, 148 Cal.Rptr. 1, 582 P.2d 88); and second, as " 'relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion' " (Hosford v. State Personnel Bd., 74 Cal.App.3d 302, 307, 141 Cal.Rptr. 354).

A trial court which is reviewing the record of the assessment appeals board before it, however, must focus on two separate and distinct issues (Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. County of Alameda, 41 Cal.App.3d 163, 177, 116 Cal.Rptr. 160; Westlake Farms, Inc. v. County of Kings, 39 Cal.App.3d 179, 183, 114 Cal.Rptr. 137). In addition to examining whether the board's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the trial court must determine whether the board has committed any errors of law. "It has been held that the method of valuation 'presents a legal issue, the judicial review of which is within the province of the trial court...." (Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., supra, at p. 178, 116 Cal.Rptr. 160.)

In a conclusion of law, the trial court here held the Board failed to compute the taxable value of the property pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 51. The court found that by not determining the full cash value as of the lien date, taking into account reductions in value due to damage, destruction, depreciation, obsolescence, or other factors causing the decline in value, the Board had not proceeded in the manner required by law. Under section...