County of Sonoma v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 14 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. A047126,A047126
• Citation: 222 Cal.App.3d 1133,272 Cal.Rptr. 297
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: COUNTY OF SONOMA, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, Judicial Council of California, et al., Respondents.

Page 297

272 Cal.Rptr. 297

222 Cal.App.3d 1133

COUNTY OF SONOMA, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, Judicial Council of California, et al., Respondents.

No. A047126.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Aug. 14, 1990.

James T. Ponzio, Mullen and Filippi, Santa Rosa, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondents W.C.A.B., State Compensation Ins. Fund, or Raymond Byrne.

Louis Harris, Krimen, Hershenson, Da Silva & Daneri, San Francisco, for respondent Judicial Council of California.

STRANKMAN, Associate Justice.

Petitioner County of Sonoma (County) seeks review of an order of the respondent Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Board) denying reconsideration of the decision of the workers' compensation judge (WCJ) that respondent Raymond J. Byrne (applicant), a County municipal court judge, was an employee of the County and not of the State of California (State) or any agency thereof. Respondent Judicial Council of California (Judicial Council) has filed an answer. Neither the Board nor either of the other two respondents has filed answers. We issued a writ of review. After due consideration of the record herein, we have determined that the Board's order and the decision of the WCJ must be annulled.

Factual and Procedural Background

Applicant was a municipal court judge, elected to serve in the County in June 1980. His term of office began in January 1981 and ran for six years. He lost his first bid for reelection on June 3, 1986. Beginning June 5, 1986, he was continuously absent from duty until January 5, 1987, the day his original term of office ended.

On January 8, 1987, applicant filed an application for adjudication of claim with the Board, case No. OAK 148411, in which he alleged cumulative injury to his nerves and psyche while employed as a municipal court judge. This application for adjudication of claim was made against both the State and the County, pending determination of the proper employer.

Several workers' compensation judges from the Santa Rosa office of the Board were disqualified or recused themselves from consideration of the matter. Thereafter, the matter was removed from the Santa Rosa office and referred to the Oakland office of the Board for reassignment and further proceedings. After hearings and submission of evidence, stipulated facts, and written arguments, the WCJ issued findings and an order on May 22 1989, finding that the applicant was employed as a municipal court judge by the County rather than the State or any State agency.

The County filed a petition for reconsideration, contending that the WCJ had erred in determining that a municipal court judge is a County employee for workers' compensation purposes. On June 30, 1989, the WCJ issued his report and recommendation on reconsideration, again finding that at the time of the applicant's alleged injuries, he was an employee of the County. On August 10, 1989, the Board itself issued an order denying reconsideration and incorporating the report and recommendation of the WCJ.

The County sought a writ of review of the Board's decision in this court. After our initial denial of the petition, the Supreme Court granted review and ordered the matter returned to this court with directions to vacate our original order and issue a writ of review.

Discussion

There is only one issue before us in this case. That question is whether, for purposes of workers' compensation benefits, a municipal court judge is an employee of the county wherein he or she sits, or of the State or any State agency. Surprisingly, this is a question which has apparently not been directly addressed by any reported decision in this State. We thus approach it as an issue of first impression.

Whether we approach the question from the standpoint of the constitutional and statutory position of municipal courts in the hierarchical system of State courts, or from the standpoint of logic and common sense, the idea that municipal court judges could be classified as county employees immediately appears counterintuitive. The system of courts in California is a statewide system, established by the State Constitution and the statutes enacted by the Legislature pursuant thereto. The workings, procedures, establishment, powers, makeup, and general constitution of municipal courts are State rather than municipal or local affairs. It is undisputed that the State Constitution and statutes give the State, not the counties, direction and control over municipal court judges.

The essential characteristic of the employment relationship is the right to control and direct the activities of the person rendering service or the manner and method in which the work is performed. (Industrial Ind. Exch. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 130, 134-135, 156 P.2d 926; National Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1943) 23 Cal.2d 215, 219, 143 P.2d 481; Edwards v. City of Chico (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 148, 153, 104 Cal.Rptr. 481; 2 Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law (9th ed. 1987) Workers' Compensation, § 150, p. 719.) Direction and control are thus the key elements identifying an employer for workers' compensation purposes, where the identity of the employer is unclear. Under the Constitution and statutes of the State, the State itself retains the authority to administer, control, direct, censure, discipline, remove, retire, and admonish judges of the municipal courts. There are no provisions delegating any authority for these functions to the various counties in which municipal court judges sit. In consequence, the counties have absolutely no influence or control over the manner in which a municipal court judge performs his or her duties. ¹

In this case, the WCJ's report and recommendation, which was adopted and incorporated by the Board in its decision, conceded as a matter both of fact and of law that the County Board of Supervisors lacked "the power to directly control the manner in which a municipal court judge performs his [or her] duties." As the WCJ stated: "A county now appears to have only the most indirect and remote influence over a municipal court. See, for example, the limited power of a board of supervisors to determine the division of the county into judicial districts under Government Code Section 71040 and following. [Citation.] As far as state statutes and constitutional provisions go, Sonoma County appears to be correct that almost all power over municipal courts has been vested in state-level agencies, primarily the Legislature, Judicial Council, Commission on Judicial Performance, and Supreme Court."

Nevertheless, the WCJ relied on the Supreme Court decision in Villanazul v. City of Los Angeles (1951) 37 Cal.2d 718, 235 P.2d 16 (hereinafter Villanazul ) to decide that municipal court judges are in fact county employees rather than State employees. In Villanazul, the Supreme Court found that although the municipal court system is part of the overall judicial system of the State, and was created by the State Legislature in accordance with the State Constitution, this alone did not make a municipal court an agency of State government for purposes of determining whether a deputy marshal of the municipal court was an employee of the State or of the county. Finding that "[t]he constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing and governing municipal courts, considered in connection with the purpose and effect of the establishment of such courts, lead to the conclusion that they have been impressed with a local character ..." (id., at p. 723, 235 P.2d 16), the court concluded that "[t]he fundamental basis of the [municipal] court, as fixed by the Constitution and statutes, indicates that essentially it is a creature of the county." (Id., at pp. 724-725, 235 P.2d 16.)

The issue in Villanazul arose in the context of an appeal from judgments entered upon the sustaining of separate demurrers by the city and the county in which the municipal court was located, as well as by the State. The underlying action was brought to recover damages assertedly caused by the negligence of the deputy marshal while acting within the course and scope of his employment by the municipal court. The Supreme Court concluded that the deputy marshal was an employee of the municipal court itself, not of any of the three governmental entities which had been sued (city, county, and State). It then went on to consider whether the municipal court itself was a city, county, or State agency, and determined that for purposes of determining the employment status of a deputy marshal, the court was "local" in character, and more closely connected with the county than with the city. ² The specific holding was to affirm the judgments as to the demurrers of the city and the State, and to reverse the judgment entered in favor of the county on its demurrer. (Villanazul, supra, 37 Cal.2d at pp. 722-726, 235 P.2d 16.)

In concluding that the deputy marshal was employed by the municipal court and not by the city, the county, or the State, the Supreme Court applied the well-established control test. As the court stated: "The essential characteristic of employment relationship is the right to control and direct the activities of the person rendering service, or the manner and method in which the work is performed. [Citation.] Existence of the right is often tested by determining whether, if instructions were given, they would have to be obeyed. [Citation.] The right to terminate the service at any time is a strong circumstance tending to show the right to control. [Citation.]" (Villanazul, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 721, 235 P.2d 16.) Because "neither one of the three governmental or political entities, as such, directly or immediately had the right to supervise the conduct of [the deputy marshal] or control and direct the manner in which his duties were to be performed ...," the court concluded that "[t]hat power was vested in the municipal court ..." alone. (Id., at p. 722, 235 P.2d 16...