County of LA. v. The Super. Ct. of LA. County
| Decision Date | 29 August 2001 |
| Parties | (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2001) CRYSTAL B., et al. Real Parties in Interest. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; B137358 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE Filed |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. Petition for writ of mandate. Charles W. McCoy, Judge. Petition for the writ originally requested, to reverse to trial court's original order, denied; writ issued to direct trial court to vacate its subsequent order entered in response to order to show cause.
John J. Collins, Michael M. Bergfeld, and Tomas A. Guterres, Collins, Collins, Muir & Traver, LLP for Petitioner County of Los Angeles.
No appearance for Respondent.
Linda Wallace Pate, Pate & Pate for Real Parties in Interest Crystal B., Steven G., and Anita G.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
Real parties Crystal B., Steven G., and Anita G. (hereinafter Minors) have asserted personal injury claims against County of Los Angeles (County) for the physical and psychological abuse they allegedly received while placed in foster care. County denied their application to file late tort claims under the relevant provisions of what is popularly, albeit not officially, known as the California Tort Claims Act (the Act). (Gov. Code, 810 et seq.)1 Minors then petitioned the trial court to relieve them from the claim-filing requirements of the Act. They argued that accrual of their claims was tolled while they were dependent minors with no parents or guardians ad litem to represent them, and thus their claims were filed within a reasonable time under the Act. The trial court granted the petitions and allowed Minors to file a complaint against County.
County challenges this ruling, contending that even though Minors did not have a guardian ad litem while dependents of the court, the appointed independent counsel (IC), assigned by the juvenile court to act on their behalf by pursuing all potential tort claims against third parties, was the equivalent of a guardian ad litem.2 Because the application to file late claims was not filed with County within one year of the appointment of the IC, County argues that Minors' claims are untimely, and thus the trial court erred in allowing them to file suit without having presented their claims.
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial court did not err, and made the appropriate disposition to allow Minors' civil suit against County to proceed.
Minors were removed from their parents' custody and control in 1991, and placed in the licensed foster home of Sandra Rodriguez. In 1996, they were returned to the physical custody of their parents, but their status as dependent minors did not end until January 23, 1998. In May 1997, while living with their parents but still wards of the juvenile court, Minors disclosed to their therapist that between 1991 and 1996, while in foster care, they had been the victims of serious abuse.4 The therapist then notified County of Minors' allegations.
On January 7, 1998, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 317, subdivision (e), the juvenile court appointed independent counsel (IC) for the then-still-dependent Minors. The order expressly stated that the IC were appointed attorneys of record to represent Minors "in all potential third party personal injury . . . claims and probate matters on minor's [sic] behalf." The IC were required to "provide reports to both the court and Minors' dependency court attorney on the progress of the case on a regular basis." The court also ordered the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), County counsel, Minors' dependency court attorney, and the juvenile court clerk, to produce all records concerning Minors to the newly-appointed IC.
Apparently, the IC never filed any claim or complaint on Minors' behalf. At some point, Minors obtained new counsel and, over one year later, on January 25, 1999, the new counsel filed an application with County requesting leave to present Minors' tort claims. The application alleged that, while in the licensed foster home of Sandra Rodriguez from 1991 to October 1996, Minors sustained a number of physical and mental injuries due to alleged abuse and neglect. The claim alleged that County was liable for Minors' injuries because of DCFS's negligent supervision and monitoring of the Rodriguez foster home. It also outlined Minors' history in terms of whose custody and control they had been during the relevant time periods, and when and to whom Minors first revealed the abuse.
On March 11, 1999, County denied the application to present minors' tort claims as untimely. Minors petitioned the trial court for relief from the claim-filing requirements on October 5, 1999.5 The trial court granted relief from the claim-filing requirement, stating that "[p]laintiffs presented their claims within one year of the accrual of their causes of action as required by Cal. Government Code Section 911.4(b). In computing the one-year
period under this subdivision, the time during which Minors were mentally incapacitated and did not have a guardian or conservator is not counted . . . ."6
County then filed a petition for writ of mandate with this court to challenge the trial court's ruling. We issued a stay of all proceedings and an alternative writ of mandate. In response to the alternative writ, the trial court vacated its ruling and denied Minors' petitions. Nevertheless, because the issue raised by the petition is of general public interest, likely to recur, and also likely to be dispositive of Minors' claims against other parties to the superior court action, we have retained jurisdiction and decide the issue despite the fact that the trial court vacated its earlier ruling in response to the alternative writ. (See Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 294 []; In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23-25 [].)
County contends that the trial court erred in granting the petitions because Minors failed to present their late claim, within one year of the accrual of their causes of action, and takes the position that Minors' causes of action accrued on January 7, 1998, the date IC was appointed. County further contends that the juvenile court appointed IC specifically to investigate and pursue potential third party personal injury actions and to protect Minors' interests, and thus the IC were the functional equivalent of a guardian.
Minors, on the other hand, argue that the time within which to present a claim was tolled until their dependency status was terminated on January 23, 1998. They contend that even though they had court-appointed IC to pursue their tort claims against County, it was necessary for the juvenile court also to appoint a guardian ad litem to prosecute any civil proceeding. In other words, according to Minors, the time within in which they were required to act was tolled during the time that they had no parent or guardian legally authorized to act on their behalf. Thus, Minors claim that the trial court was correct in granting their application for relief from the claim-filing requirements.
Under the Act ( 810 et seq.), a person may sue a public entity for damages only if he or she first presents a claim to the public entity within six months of the claims' accrual, and if the entity has acted upon the claim or the claim is deemed rejected. ( 911.2 and 945.4; Draper v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 52 Cal.3d 502, 505; see also Torres v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 325, 337 [].) Section 911.4, subdivision (a), provides that when a party has not filed a claim within the required six-month period, that party may file an application with the public entity for leave to present a late claim.
As to an application to file a late claim, section 911.4 further provides, in relevant part, (Emphasis added.)7
2. Minors' Application to Present Late Claims Was Presented within One Year
It would be overly simplistic to conclude, based on the above-quoted language of section 911.4, subdivision (c), that, pursuant to section 911.4, subdivision (b), the one-year time period within which to present an application to file a late claim is not tolled simply if the claimant is a minor, without regard to any other consideration, and that it is tolled simply if the claimant is any claimant, regardless of age, so long as the claimant is both mentally incapacitated and without a guardian or conservator. In fact, such is not the case.
It is not a claimant's minority, per se, nor the legal and practical impairment associated with minority, that affects the tolling. That is because "it is not the knowledge or lack thereof of...
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