Draper v. City of Los Angeles, S011881

• Decision Date: 31 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. S011881,S011881
• Citation: 52 Cal.3d 502,802 P.2d 367,276 Cal.Rptr. 864
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 802 P.2d 367, 64 Ed. Law Rep. 846 Gayle DRAPER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 864

276 Cal.Rptr. 864

52 Cal.3d 502, 802 P.2d 367, 64 Ed. Law Rep. 846

Gayle DRAPER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S011881.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Dec. 31, 1990.

James H. Davis, James A. Quinn, Los Angeles, Riley & Associates, and William H. Waysman, Pasadena, for plaintiff and appellant.

James K. Hahn, City Atty., John T. Neville and Richard M. Helgeson, Asst. City Attys., and Katherine J. Hamilton, Deputy City Atty., for defendants and respondents.

MOSK, Justice.

In this case we are called on to decide whether plaintiff, physically unable to file a claim against a governmental entity within 100 days of an accident (Gov.Code, former § 911.2), ¹ may be denied relief from the Government Code's claim-filing requirements on the ground that an attorney, purporting to act on her behalf, filed a timely claim against a governmental entity different from the entity plaintiff now seeks to hold liable. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of relief. On the peculiar facts of this case, we reverse.

Plaintiff, who was 19 years old in 1987, was seriously injured on June 11 of that year when she was struck by a car driven by a high school student in a crosswalk in the Panorama City district of Los Angeles. The doctor who treated plaintiff from the time of her admission to the hospital on June 11 immediately after the accident until she was transferred to another hospital on July 22 stated that she was both physically and mentally incapacitated during the entire time she was under his care. Another declaration, from the doctor who cared for plaintiff during her hospital stay from July 22 until her discharge the following January, stated that plaintiff suffered severe head injury and multiple fractures in the accident, was totally dependent on others, had severe cognitive deficits and difficulty speaking, and was both physically and mentally incapacitated well beyond the 100 days following the accident. The supporting medical records reveal that plaintiff was in a coma until the end of July, and for some period of time thereafter could only give "yes-no responses" with "lap board communication" and could "identify simple objects" but could not talk. She was completely dependent on others for her physical needs, such as feeding and grooming, and she was immobile.

At the time of plaintiff's accident, section 911.2 provided that a personal injury claim against a governmental entity must be filed within 100 days of the accrual of a cause of action. ² An action for damages cannot be filed against such an entity unless the claim is first presented to it. (§ 945.4.) Sections 911.4 and 911.6 set forth a procedure for seeking leave to present a late claim. On November 4, 1987, less than two months after the one hundred-day claim-filing period had elapsed, plaintiff applied for such relief to the City of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Unified School District, and several other governmental units. She alleged that the accident was caused by defects in the condition of the intersection, and that she had not filed a timely claim because she was severely injured in the accident, suffered permanent brain damage, was unconscious and hospitalized for a long time, and did not have the assistance of counsel. The petitions were denied by operation of law. (§ 911.6, subd. (c).)

Section 946.6 provides that when an application for leave to present a late claim to a governmental entity is denied, a petition for relief from the claim-filing requirement may be filed with the court. Relief is conditioned on the presentation of the application to file the late claim within a reasonable time, not to exceed one year after accrual of the cause of action, and on satisfaction of one of the additional requirements of the section. We are concerned here with the requirement embodied in subdivision (c)(3) of section 946.6 (hereafter subdivision (c)(3)), which provides as a condition for relief that the "person who sustained the alleged injury, damages or loss was physically incapacitated ... [during the claim-filing period] and by reason of such disability failed to present a claim during that time."

Plaintiff sought relief under this provision on January 28, 1988, substantially less than one year after the accident. The petition was supported by her attorney's declaration that plaintiff suffered severe brain injuries in the accident and was not released from the hospital until after the 100-day claim-filing period. The city and the other defendants opposed the petition on the ground that it was not supported by competent medical evidence. In response, plaintiff's attorney filed a declaration from a doctor who began treating plaintiff six weeks after the accident, stating that she had suffered brain damage and other injuries. On March 28, the court continued the hearing to enable plaintiff to file supplemental declarations regarding her medical condition.

Prior to the date of the continued hearing, the Los Angeles Unified School District, by a special appearance, filed an opposition to the petition for relief from the claim-filing requirements, pointing out that a claim had previously been filed on plaintiff's behalf against the school district on August 3, 1987, by one George L. Hecker, an attorney, and had been rejected on September 11. The supporting documents indicated that the district had notified plaintiff's present attorney of the rejection in November 1987.

On the morning of June 6, 1988, the date set for the continued hearing, plaintiff's attorney did not appear, nor did plaintiff file any supplementary medical evidence. The court thereupon denied the petition, ruling that plaintiff failed to establish that her injuries were the cause of her failure to file a timely claim.

On June 15, plaintiff's attorney moved for reconsideration of the June 6 order on the ground of excusable mistake and neglect. (Code Civ.Proc., § 473.) ³ On July 7, the court denied the motion for reconsideration. It ruled that the claim filed by Attorney Hecker on plaintiff's behalf during the 100-day claim-filing period against the Los Angeles Unified School District demonstrated that any failure to file a claim against the city and other governmental units within that time was not caused by disability. ⁴ On August 5, 1988, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from both the order denying relief from the claim-filing requirements and the order denying reconsideration of that order.

The Court of Appeal, although affirming both orders, expressed the view that plaintiff had presented "powerful evidence" that she was seriously disabled during the 100 days following the accident. However, it held that the trial court acted within its discretion in ruling that the filing by Hecker of a timely claim on her behalf against the Los Angeles Unified School District indicated that plaintiff's disability was not the reason for her failure to file a timely claim against the other public entities.

The city does not contend that plaintiff failed to comply with the requirement of section 946.6 that she apply to file a late claim reasonably soon after her cause of action accrued. Our concern is whether plaintiff established that she was disabled during the 100-day claim-filing period, and if so, whether her disability explained her failure to file a timely claim. As will appear, we hold that in light of the information the court had before it at the June 6 and July 7 hearings, plaintiff satisfied the requirements of subdivision (c)(3) that she demonstrate both her incapacity and the fact that her disability was the cause of her failure to file a timely claim.

The rule that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 273-274, 228 Cal.Rptr. 190, 721 P.2d 71; Viles v. State of California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 32-33, 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818) applies with particular force when, as here, strict application of a statutory requirement will result in barring the claim of an incapacitated plaintiff and ultimately deny her a day in court.

The Legislature and the courts are concerned with protecting the rights of incapacitated persons, as with those of minors who cannot act for themselves. For example, a minor is not held accountable for the negligence of an attorney or parent who fails to file an application for a late claim on the minor's behalf within a reasonable time after accrual of the cause of action. (Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1020, 1029, 232 Cal.Rptr. 519, 728 P.2d 1154, citing Tammen v County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 479-480, 58 Cal.Rptr. 249, 426 P.2d 753; Williams v. Mariposa County Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 843, 850-852, 147 Cal.Rptr. 452.) And a mentally incapacitated person may postpone the filing of an application to present a late claim until a guardian or conservator has been appointed to act on his or her behalf. (§ 911.4.) Thus in Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d 468, 480, 58 Cal.Rptr. 249, 426 P.2d 753, we construed a claims statute in favor of a minor, relying on "the policy of the law toward liberal construction of remedial statutes for the protection of persons within their purview and the modern trend of judicial decisions in favor of granting relief unless absolutely forbidden by statute."

With regard to the first prong of the test set forth in subdivision (c)(3), we conclude that the evidence, viewed in light of the whole record, establishes in this case that plaintiff was incapacitated during the claim-filing period. It could be contended that the evidence plaintiff presented in her motion for relief under section 946.6 and her reply to the city's opposition to that motion was somewhat conclusory. Nevertheless, given the unusual facts of this case, we believe the trial court should have paid greater heed to the...