County of Ventura v. Castro

• Decision Date: 25 May 1979
• Citation: 93 Cal.App.3d 462,156 Cal.Rptr. 66
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: COUNTY OF VENTURA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rudy CASTRO, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 54214.

Page 66

156 Cal.Rptr. 66

93 Cal.App.3d 462

COUNTY OF VENTURA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rudy CASTRO, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 54214.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

May 25, 1979.

Hearing Denied July 19, 1979.

King & Skeels and Paul Lockwood Skeels, Santa Paula, for defendant and appellant.

George Duekmejian, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman H. Sokolow and Andrew D. Amerson, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Channell Counties Legal Services Assn., Stephen P. Wiman, San Francisco, Manuel Jose Covarrubias, Oxnard, Richard A. Weinstock, Ventura, and Robert Guerra, Oxnard, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

ALARCON, Associate Justice.

Defendant has appealed from the order denying his motion to set aside judgment for child support. ¹ The judgment was entered pursuant to an agreement for the entry of judgment as authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 11476.1.

Contentions on Appeal

Appellant asserts that:

(a) Welfare and Institutions Code section 11476.1 is unconstitutional because it authorizes the entry of judgment without notice and opportunity to be heard, or adequate waiver thereof, and thus deprives defendant of due process of law; and

(b) the agreement for the entry of judgment is a contract between defendant and the District Attorney of the County of Ventura and is void.

Amici curiae contend that the statutory requirement that the court enter judgment pursuant to stipulation is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Summary of the Facts

Prior to August 2, 1977, Viola Gonzales applied for welfare benefits from the County of Ventura. She informed the county employees that she was pregnant and that Rudy Castro, Jr. was the father of her unborn child. The Family Support Division of the Office of the District Attorney of Ventura County wrote a letter to Mr. Castro requesting that he come into the Ventura County District Attorney's office to discuss the matter. On August 2, defendant came to the office in response to the letter and spoke to Juanita J. Hickman, a family support officer of the office of the district attorney.

Ms. Hickman asked defendant if he was the father of the child and defendant stated that there were some doubts in his mind but "more than likely I am the father." Ms. Hickman explained to defendant his options. She explained that if he wished to agree to paternity of the unborn child, he could enter into an agreement of paternity with the district attorney's office which would be filed with the court and which would result in a judgment of paternity and an order that he pay child support. She told him that if he was not sure he was the father, the office would file a civil paternity action, serve him with summons and complaint, and he would have thirty days within which to file an answer and have a trial on the issue. She also explained that if he did nothing after the summons and complaint were served upon him, a judgment by default would be entered against him, resulting in an order requiring him to pay child support.

She told him that Ms. Gonzales had nothing to do with bringing the action except that she had accepted welfare assistance and that any money paid by defendant for the support of the child would be used to reimburse the county for the welfare assistance expended for the child. Defendant agreed to sign the agreement for judgment. He read and signed the agreement prepared by Ms. Hickman and was provided with a copy of the agreement.

The agreement was filed with the Ventura County Superior Court on August 11, 1977. The agreement contains the following provisions:

"It is hereby agreed by plaintiff, through C. STANLEY TROM, District Attorney for the County of Ventura, and Rudy Castro, Jr., defendant, that the following facts are true and that a judgment be entered against the defendant in accordance with this agreement.

"1. Defendant acknowledges that the District Attorney of Ventura County does not represent him and that he understands that he has had an opportunity to have an attorney advise and represent him in this matter.

"2. Defendant understands that a judgment for child support will be entered against him based upon this agreement.

"3. The defendant is the father of: unborn child of Viola Gonzales, due to be born December 1977.

"4. The defendant agrees to pay $125.00 per child per month commencing on Sept. 1, 1977, and on the same date each month thereafter until termination by operation of law or further order of court."

In addition, the agreement provides for payment of a $2.50 processing service charge per month, a mode of payment and address to which payments are to be mailed, a requirement that defendant keep the district attorney's office apprised of his address, and an acknowledgment that if defendant should become two months in arrears in child support payments, his wages shall be assigned.

On August 11, 1977, judgment for child support by agreement was entered by the Ventura County Superior Court. In that judgment, the court decrees that defendant is the father of the unborn child of Viola Gonzales and orders defendant to pay the sum of $125 per month child support "until termination by operation of law or further order of court."

On February 9, 1978, defendant moved to set aside the agreement and the judgment entered thereon pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473. Defendant's motion was supported by his declaration that at the time he visited the district attorney's office, he had serious doubts that he was the father of the child; that he was aware that the district attorney prosecutes criminal cases and feared that he could be sent to jail for refusal to sign the agreement; that he did not realize that he was giving up his right to trial by jury on the issue of paternity, his right to discovery, and his right to a blood test. He further stated that he was not aware that by signing the agreement he was agreeing to support an unborn child until the child reached the age of 18 years.

Defendant averred that he did not sign the agreement freely and voluntarily but as the result of coercion and duress, nor did he understand the nature and consequences of the document.

Opposition to the motion to set aside the judgment was supported by a declaration executed by Juanita Hickman setting forth the information she had provided to defendant and the explanation she had given him concerning his options. The contents of her declaration are as previously summarized in the summary of the facts. Her declaration concludes:

"At no time was Mr. Castro threatened in any fashion nor were any promises made to him to induce him to enter into this agreement. I made every attempt to explain to him his options to his satisfaction and answer his questions. There was no mention of any criminal action in any respect during our conversation nor was there any mention of the possibility of any jail sentence being imposed."

Defendant's motion to set aside the judgment was denied, and this appeal followed.

Constitutionality of Welfare and Institutions Code Section 11476.1

Appellant argues that the code section authorizing the entry of a judgment establishing paternity and an obligation to pay child support pursuant to stipulation is violative of due process. Welfare and Institutions Code section 11476.1 provides as follows:

"In any case where the district attorney has undertaken enforcement of support, the district attorney may enter into an agreement with the noncustodial parent, on behalf of the custodial parent, a minor child, or children, for the entry of a judgment determining paternity, if applicable, and for periodic child support payments based on the noncustodial parent's reasonable ability to pay. Prior to entering into this agreement, the noncustodial parent shall be informed that a judgment will be entered based on the agreement. The clerk shall file the agreement without the payment of any fees or charges. The court shall enter judgment thereon without action. The provisions of Civil Code Section 4702 shall apply to such judgment. The district attorney shall be directed to effect service upon the obligor of a copy of the judgment and notify the obligor in writing of the right to seek modification of the amount of child support order upon a showing of changes of circumstances and upon showing the court shall immediately modify the order and set the amount of child support payments pursuant to Section 11350, and to promptly file proof of service thereof.

For the purposes of this section, in making a determination of the noncustodial parent's reasonable ability to pay, the following factors shall be considered:

(a) The standard of living and situation of the parties;

(b) The relative wealth and income of the parties;

(c) The ability of the noncustodial parent to earn;

(d) The ability of the custodial parent to earn;

(e) The needs of the custodial parent and any other persons dependent on such person for their support;

(f) The age of the parties;

(g) Any previous court order imposing an obligation of support."

Appellant relies on the recent California Supreme Court decision, Isbell v. County of Sonoma (1978) 21 Cal.3d 61, 145 Cal.Rptr. 368, 577 P.2d 188, in support of his contention that the statute under consideration here is unconstitutional. In Isbell, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional the California Confession of Judgment statutes (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 1132-1134). Appellant's analogy between the confession of judgment condemned there and the agreement for judgment procedure utilized here is well drawn. The Isbell court first observed that, under the due process clause of the federal Constitution, (p. 64, 145 Cal.Rptr. p. 369, 577 P.2d p. 189): "(A) court may enter judgment against a defendant only if the record shows that either (a) the defendant has received notice...