Courtney v. Prystalski, No. 22292.

• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: STONE
• Citation: 192 N.E. 908,358 Ill. 198
• Parties: PEOPLE et rel. COURTNEY, State's Atty., v. PRYSTALSKI, Circuit Judge.
• Decision Date: 05 December 1934
• Docket Number: No. 22292.

358 Ill. 198
192 N.E. 908

PEOPLE et rel. COURTNEY, State's Atty.,
v.
PRYSTALSKI, Circuit Judge.

No. 22292.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 17, 1934.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1934.

Original petition for mandamus by the People, on the relationship of Thomas J. Courtney, State's Attorney, against John Prystalski, Circuit Judge.

Writ awarded.

[358 Ill. 200]

[192 N.E. 909]

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago, and J. J. Neiger, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson, James V. Cunningham, Walter L. McCoy, J. Albert Woll, and Henry E. Seyfarth, all of Chicago, of counsel), for petitioner.

John Owen, of Chicago, for respondent.

[192 N.E. 910]

STONE, Justice.

This cause arises on an original petition for mandamus filed on leave of this court, seeking a writ commanding the respondent, as judge of the circuit court of Cook county and ex officio judge of the criminal court of that county, to expunge from the record of the criminal court a judgment order releasing one Hazel Renke on a writ of habeas corpus. A demurrer has been filed to the petition, and thus a question of law is presented.

The facts out of which this cause arises are as follows: On May 17, 1933, an information was filed in the municipal court of Chicago charging Hazel Renke with having unlawfully in her possession, for the purpose of administering a habit-forming drug, a certain hypodermic needle and syringe adapted for the use of habit-forming [358 Ill. 201]drugs by subcutaneous injection, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided. A hearing was had on this charge before the court without a jury, and she was found guilty and sentenced to the Reformatory for Women at Dwight for a term of six months. On July 18, 1933, proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus were instituted in the criminal court of Cook county before the respondent, who on hearing awarded the writ and discharged said Hazel Renke from custody. This is the judgment order sought to be expunged by the present proceeding.

Petitioner contends that the judgment discharging Hazel Renke was void because respondent was without authority or jurisdiction to enter such order, for the reason that the municipal court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the information against Hazel Renke, had jurisdiction of her person, and had power and jurisdiction to render the judgment entered against her. Respondent, on the other hand, contends, first, that this court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the petition for mandamus because its jurisdiction in matters of habeas corpus is only concurrent with that of the criminal court, and it may not review habeas corpus by mandamus; second, because the criminal court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person of Hazel Renke, and likewise had jurisdiction to enter an order awarding the writ of habeas corpus and discharging her, and that the action of the criminal court is not reviewable by mandamus in this court. It is also argued that the petition does not show a clear and legal right to the writ.

That mandamus is the proper remedy to expunge void orders entered in habeas corpus proceedings where the court entering the order did not have jurisdiction to enter it has been definitely settled in this state. People v. Shurtleff, 355 Ill. 210, 189 N. E. 291;People v. Shurtleff, 353 Ill. 248, 187 N. E. 271;People v. Kelly, 352 Ill. 567, 186 N. E. 188;People v. La Buy, 305 Ill. 11, 136 N. E. 870. Likewise the rule was established by the cases above cited that [358 Ill. 202]mandamus may not be invoked except where the order sought to be expunged is void for want of jurisdiction either of the subject-matter, of the parties, or want of jurisdiction to enter the order complained of. The only question, therefore, arising in the case before us, is whether the criminal court had jurisdiction and power to enter the order. People v. Shurtleff, 355 Ill. 210, 189 N. E. 291;People v. Circuit Court, 347 Ill. 34, 179 N. E. 441;People v. Williams, 330 Ill. 150, 161 N. E. 312;People v. Siman, 284 Ill. 28, 119 N. E. 940;People v. Zimmer, 252 Ill. 9, 96 N. E. 529;People v. Superior Court, 234 Ill. 186, 84 N. E. 875,14 Ann. Cas. 753;People v. Jonas, 173 Ill. 316, 50 N. E. 1051.

The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, and should never be exercised to discharge offenders who have been lawfully convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by other courts. People v. Eller, 323 Ill. 28, 153 N. E. 597, 49 A. L. R. 490. Jurisdiction of a court does not depend primarily upon facts alleged but on authority to determine the existence or nonexistence of such facts and to render judgment in accordance with such finding. People v. Superior Court, supra. If on the hearing of a writ of habeas corpus it develops that the court does not have jurisdiction in the particular case, any order except one dismissing the proceeding is void. People v. Shurtleff, 355 Ill. 210, 189 N. E. 291. In a habeas corpus proceeding, such as the one before us, the court hearing the petition for the writ has jurisdiction to award it only where the original judgment of conviction is void, or where something has happened since the rendition of the judgment to entitle the prisoner to a release. Respondent, as judge of...