Covell v. Burgess
| Decision Date | 22 October 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. B-254,B-254 |
| Citation | 115 So.2d 177 |
| Parties | A. B. COVELL, dba Covell Construction Company, Petitioner, v. Mrs. Doris BURGESS, widow, and Willie Franklin Burgess, Ronnie Rogers Burgess and Robert Wayne Burgess, minor children, and Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Campbell & Andrews, DeFuniak Springs, for petitioner.
Amos Hudson, Chipley, Burnis T. Coleman and Paul E. Speh, Tallahassee, for respondents.
The employer petitions for review by certiorari of an order entered by the Florida Industrial Commission, which affirmed the compensation order of its deputy. It is contended by petitioner that the deputy's order is not sustained by substantial, competent evidence, and should therefore be quashed.
The employee, Frank Burgess, now deceased, a thirty-nine year old male, was working for Covell Construction Company on August 4, 1958. On the afternoon of that date the deceased was admitted to Lakeside Hospital in De Funiak Springs. A diagnosis revealed that he was suffering a typical attack of coronary thrombosis with infarction, for which the usual treatment was prescribed. Three days later deceased developed pneumonia, and approximately forty-either hours before his expiration on August 23, 1958, he developed a saddle thrombosis of the lower abdomimal aorta which was followed by shock that became progressively worse until the time of death. The immediate cause of death was pulmonary embolus.
Although the deceased's widow, his brother-in-law, and his cousin all testified as to conversations they had with deceased after his admittance to his hospital, no one having personal knowledge of the conditions leading up to the deceased's admission to the hospital appeared or testified in the proceedings. The essence of their testimony is to the effect that on the day when deceased first became ill he was working inside a metal railroad gondola car unloading gravel; that at about 9 or 9:30 A.M. the deceased became overheated and decided to leave the car and sit in the shade in order to cool off; that in swinging down from the car by his left arm, he felt a sharp pain in his chest; that after resting he returned to his job and continued working until about 4 o'clock in the afternoon when he again became overheated and complained of pain. He was immediately taken to the hospital for observation and treatment.
The only medical proof offered on behalf of the claimant was the testimony of his attending physician. He testified that he first saw deceased at the hospital on the day following his admission; that the deceased was suffering considerable pain and the only history which the doctor was able to get from the patient was that he had become overheated some time during the day of his admission; that after sitting a while in the shade perspiring profusely and experiencing pain in his chest, he returned to work and later in the same day suffered a second collapse.
The deputy's order is based upon a finding that the coronary thrombosis suffered by the deceased was precipitated by becoming overheated during the course of his employment while working inside of the railroad car unloading gravel, and that the employee's death was caused by a natural and logical sequence of events directly related to the original coronary thrombosis.
Petitioner insists that there is no competent or substantial evidence in the record to sustain the deputy's finding that the deceased became overheated while working in the course of his employment. It is pointed out that the only evidence from which this finding could be made was the uncorroborated hearsay evidence given by the deceased's wife, brother-in-law, cousin and attending physician, none of whom had personal knowledge of the conditions which prevailed at the time deceased became ill and was taken to the hospital. Our attention is invited to that section of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which provides that declarations of a deceased employee concerning the injury out of which his claim arose shall be received in evidence, but will not be considered sufficient to establish the injury unless corroborated by other evidence. 1 The petitioner's position in this respect must be sustained. All the evidence with respect to the conditions prevailing at the time deceased allegedly became overheated and ill is hearsay in character and totally uncorroborated by any other evidence.
Petitioner further contends that even assuming that the hearsay evidence was sufficiently competent to sustain the deputy's finding that deceased became overheated from his work on the day of his admission to the hospital, that nevertheless the medical proof falls short of sustaining the deputy's finding that there was a causal connection between such overheated condition and the coronary attack which caused deceased's death.
The doctor who appeared and testified in the proceeding was extensively examined and cross-examined both by counsel for the respective parties and by the deputy commissioner. We have carefully reviewed this testimony and are forced to the conclusion...
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Carraway v. Armour & Co., 31978
...whether they develop as time goes on. I believe, however, though, that lifting could have made it worse in either case.' In Covell v. Burgess, Fla.App., 115 So.2d 177, First District, the court in passing upon a cardiac case indicated that an award would not stand when 'based on mere specul......