Carraway v. Armour & Co., 31978
Decision Date | 11 September 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 31978,31978 |
Citation | 156 So.2d 494 |
Parties | Winston CARRAWAY, Jr., Petitioner, v. ARMOUR AND COMPANY and the Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Donald G. MacKenzie, Miami, for petitioner.
Summers Warden, Miami, and Steve M. Watkins, of Truett & Watkins, Tallahassee, for Armour & Co.
Burnis T. Coleman and Patrick H. Mears, Tallahassee, for Florida Industrial Commission.
This is a workmen's compensation case within which the deputy commissioner made the finding that the petitioner-employee, Winston Carraway, Jr., 'sustained or aggravated an obstruction, causing a 'paraduodenal' hernia; * * *.' The employer controverted upon two grounds: (1) That the claimant did not suffer an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and (2) that there was no causal connection. The Industrial Commission reversed.
The deputy commissioner took the position that there was a compensable claim under § 440.15(6)(f), in effect determining that the injury constituted a hernia within the contemplation of that section. The Commission disagreed, saying:
We are in agreement with the opinion of the Commission that the injury did not fall within § 440.15(6)(f), and approve its language:
'In order to determine the legislative intent as to what hernias are encompassed by the terms, 'inguinal, femoral, or otherwise,' rules of statutory construction must be applied. In Ex parte Amos, 1927, 112 So. at page 293, the court stated the following:
See also Townsend v. State, 1912, , 57 So. 611, approving the doctrine, of 'noscitur a sociis or ejusdem generis.'
'It can be readily seen that the word 'otherwise', in the hernia statute, refers to hernias that are similar to those specified, to the inguinal or femoral hernias. 'Paraduodenal hernias' are conditions of a completely different nature. One certainly would not contend that a herniated disc, a ruptured blood vessel, or a ruptured organ would be included within the purview of Section 440.15(6), F.S., relating to 'hernias'.'
The Commission observes that 'such error is immaterial * * *.' Once again we agree but thereafter our roads part company, the Commission determining that '* * * the claimant failed to show an accident and failed to show a causal relationship within a reasonable medical probability.'
The petitioner was twenty years of age at the time of the injury on January 17, 1961, and was working for the respondent, Armour & Company, in the handling of heavy sections of beef weighing as much as 170 to 200 pounds. The claimant said: 'I suddenly felt a sharp pain in my stomach.'
Dr. Charles F. Biggane, the claimant's attending physician, first saw him December 21, 1960, and testified that at that time 'he had signa and symptoms of a small bowel obstruction * * *.'
Dr. Biggane was asked this question:
He further testified:
In Covell v. Burgess, Fla.App., 115 So.2d 177, First District, the court in passing upon a cardiac case indicated that an award would not stand when 'based on mere speculation or conjecture.' We are not unmindful of the competent, substantial evidence rule and in arriving at our conclusion we have considered United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., Fla., 55 So.2d 741; DeGroot v. Sheffield, Fla., 95 So.2d 912; Arkin Construction Company v. Simpkins, Fla., 99 So.2d 557-559; and Minute Maid Corporation et al. v. Florida Industrial Commission et al., Fla.App., 104 So.2d 104. These cases are to be distinguished from the one at hand, and we do not feel them to be controlling.
In Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation v. Davis, 191 Tenn. 42, 231 S.W.2d 376, Tennessee, the employee jumped from a truck in order to avoid an acid burn and immediately thereafter felt a sharp pain which later was diagnosed as a rupture. The attending physician was questioned as to whether or not the jump was the cause of the confirmed hernia, to which he replied: 'I would say it could be.' The court held this sufficient,...
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