Carraway v. Armour & Co., 31978

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Citation: 156 So.2d 494
• Docket Number: No. 31978,31978
• Parties: Winston CARRAWAY, Jr., Petitioner, v. ARMOUR AND COMPANY and the Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.
• Decision Date: 11 September 1963

Page 494

156 So.2d 494 Winston CARRAWAY, Jr., Petitioner,
v.
ARMOUR AND COMPANY and the Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents. No. 31978. Supreme Court of Florida. Sept. 11, 1963.

Donald G. MacKenzie, Miami, for petitioner.

Summers Warden, Miami, and Steve M. Watkins, of Truett & Watkins, Tallahassee, for Armour & Co.

Burnis T. Coleman and Patrick H. Mears, Tallahassee, for Florida Industrial Commission.

COLLINS, THOMAS J., Circuit Judge.

This is a workmen's compensation case within which the deputy commissioner made the finding that the petitioner-employee, Winston Carraway, Jr., 'sustained or aggravated an obstruction, causing a 'paraduodenal' hernia; * * *.' The employer controverted upon two grounds: (1) That the claimant did not suffer an accident arising out of and in the course of employment,

Page 495

and (2) that there was no causal connection. The Industrial Commission reversed.

The deputy commissioner took the position that there was a compensable claim under § 440.15(6)(f), in effect determining that the injury constituted a hernia within the contemplation of that section. The Commission disagreed, saying: 'In our opinion, the deputy commissioner has erred in treating the claimant's condition as a 'hernia' under Section 440.15(6)(f), F.S. This Commission has previously held in Harris v. South Broward Water Company Decision No. 2-853, 1959, that a 'diaphragmatic hernia' was not covered by said Section 440.15(6)(f); and we discussed the types of internal and external ruptures contemplated and not contemplated by the 'hernia' paragraph.'

We are in agreement with the opinion of the Commission that the injury did not fall within § 440.15(6)(f), and approve its language:

'In order to determine the legislative intent as to what hernias are encompassed by the terms, 'inguinal, femoral, or otherwise,' rules of statutory construction must be applied. In Ex parte Amos, 1927, [93 Fla. 5] 112 So. at page 293, the court stated the following:

"The rule has long been generally accepted as a controlling one in statutory construction. It simply means that:

"'Where an author makes use first of terms each evidently confined and limited to a particular class of known species of things, and then after such specific enumeration subjoins a term of very extensive signification, this term, however general and comprehensive in its possible import, yet when thus used embraces only things ejusdem generis; that is, of the same kind of species with those comprehended by the preceding limited and confined terms.'

"The maxim is a mere specific application of the broader maxim 'noscitur a sociis,' which means that general and specific words which are capable of an analogous meaning being associated together take color from each other, so that the general words are restricted to a sense analogous to the less general.'

See also Townsend v. State, 1912, [63 Fla. 46], 57 So. 611, approving the doctrine, of 'noscitur a sociis or ejusdem generis.'

'It can be readily seen that the word 'otherwise', in the hernia statute, refers to hernias that are similar to those specified, to the inguinal or femoral hernias. 'Paraduodenal hernias' are conditions of a completely different nature. One certainly would not contend that a herniated disc, a ruptured blood vessel, or a ruptured organ would be included within the purview of Section 440.15(6), F.S., relating to 'hernias'.'

The Commission observes that 'such error is immaterial * * *.' Once again we agree but thereafter our roads part company, the Commission determining that '* * * the claimant failed to show an accident and failed to show a causal relationship within a reasonable medical probability.'

The petitioner was twenty years of age at the time of the injury on January 17, 1961, and was working for the respondent, Armour & Company, in the handling of...