Cox v. City of Lynnwood
| Decision Date | 13 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 30482-8-I,30482-8-I |
| Citation | 72 Wn.App. 1,863 P.2d 578 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Gale and Waltrout COX, husband and wife, Respondents, v. CITY OF LYNNWOOD, a municipal corporation, Appellant. Division 1 |
John Paul Watts, Riach, Gese, Seather & Watts, Lynnwood, for appellant.
Richard Sanders, Sanders Law Office, Bellevue, for respondents.
The City of Lynnwood appeals a judgment for damages and attorneys' fees. It claims the court erred in finding that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Gale and Waltrout Cox a boundary line adjustment.
The Coxes sought the City's approval of a subdivision of four lots into an eight-lot plat. However, when they discovered that Lynnwood code requirements for the eight-lot long plat required the dedication of land for a road and a boundary line adjustment (BLA) did not, they abandoned their plat application and instead applied for a BLA of three lots. Lynnwood denied the Coxes' application stating:
Boundary line adjustments are intended to apply to minor adjustments and not to significant changes such as you propose....
Additionally, according to Section 19.05.015 a division of land into more than four lots is a plat. If this application was approved, it is possible that more than four lots could be created without complying with the City's platting procedures and standards.
The Coxes' complaint stated four causes of action, one requesting the court issue a writ of mandamus to compel Lynnwood to approve the BLA under RCW 7.16.150 et seq. and another requesting damages under RCW 64.40.020 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted the writ of mandamus. The City neither appealed nor sought a stay of the writ of mandamus and issued the BLA. 1 The court then heard the damages portion of the suit. Michael Partridge, the Lynnwood planning director, testified that he knew the Coxes' BLA application complied with the City's requirements that: (1) no lot would be reduced in size below the minimum square footage requirements of the applicable zone; and (2) the BLA would not create a new lot. Lynnwood Municipal Code § 19.05.015. Partridge raised no technical objections regarding the size of the lots or the nature of the access. Rather, he testified that the reason for the disapproval was that he felt the BLA was limited to minor adjustments and this was not a minor adjustment. Mr. Cox testified that at the time of the City's disapproval, Partridge had told him that they were just trying to get around the subdivision requirements and for that reason his department would disapprove the BLA request.
After weighing the evidence the court concluded that the Coxes' BLA application complied with all municipal requirements, such lot boundary adjustment applications were expressly exempt from other subdivision requirements, and
[t]he denial of the Cox lot boundary adjustment ... was arbitrary, capricious and irrational and violated RCW 64.40 and 42 USC 1983. It was motivated by a desire to prevent the land owners possible future subdivision of the property through a possible future application to short plat the property rather than any lawful reason....
The 2 1/2-month delay in approval of the BLA delayed the Coxes' development project by a year because they were forced beyond the summer construction season. This resulted in increased construction costs, additional interest payments, professional fees, and lost profits in a declining market. In awarding $28,548.72 in damages and attorneys' fees the court discounted the recovery finding that the Coxes' own actions had caused part of the delay in the short plat completion. The award did not include the increased cost of construction, attorneys' fees in submitting the BLA application, engineering fees, or $2,764 in interest on the Coxes' development loan during the delay.
Lynnwood first claims the court erred in finding that it arbitrarily and capriciously denied the BLA. It argues it acted in good faith in interpreting its municipal ordinance, the court did not find it acted with knowledge that denial of the BLA was unlawful, or that it should have known the decision was unlawful. 2
First, the City's planning director, Partridge, knew the Coxes' application complied with the BLA ordinance, and Lynnwood has not assigned error to the court's finding that it knew or reasonably should have known that its denial of the lot boundary adjustment application of plaintiff Cox was unlawful or in excess of lawful authority at the time of the denial.
Finding of Fact 14. RCW 64.40.020(1) provides:
Owners of a property interest who have filed an application for a permit have an action for damages to obtain relief from acts of an agency which are arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or exceed lawful authority ... Provided, That the action is unlawful or in excess of lawful authority only if the final decision of the agency was made with knowledge of its unlawfulness or that it was in excess of lawful authority, or it should reasonably have been known to have been unlawful or in excess of lawful authority.
"The fact that the disjunctive 'or' is used in the first part of the statute shows that acting either arbitrarily and capriciously or unlawfully or in excess of lawful authority will create a cause of action." Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish Cy., 119 Wash.2d 91, 112, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert. den'd, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1044, 122 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Thus, since Lynnwood knew or should have known its conduct was unlawful, it is subject to liability under RCW 64.40.020.
Second, a government agency's action is arbitrary and capricious if it is:
"willful and unreasoning action in disregard of facts and circumstances." Washington Waste Sys., Inc. v. Clark Cy., 115 Wash.2d 74, 81, 794 P.2d 508 (1990). [However,] "if there is room for two opinions, discretion exercised upon due consideration will not be overturned." Wenatchee v. Boundary Review Bd., 39 Wash.App. 249, 256, 693 P.2d 135 (1984).
Concerned Land Owners of Union Hill v. King Cy., 64 Wash.App. 768, 772, 827 P.2d 1017, review den'd, 119 Wash.2d 1008, 833 P.2d 387 (1992). Here, Lynnwood admits it denied the boundary adjustment because the Coxes would be able to achieve a total of six lots through the boundary line adjustment and a future short plat process rather than go through the long plat process. The Lynnwood Municipal Code specifically exempts lot boundary adjustments from the Code's land use provisions:
B. The regulations in this ordinance shall not apply to:
....
6. A division made for the purpose of adjusting boundary lines where no lot is created thereby, and where no lot is reduced in size below the minimum square footage requirements required by the applicable zoning control and/or building code; provided that such adjustments are first approved by the Director of Planning who shall initial the revised plat map and shall cause same to be recorded with the Snohomish County Auditor's office at the applicant's expense. Any change in the number of lots shall be accomplished as a plat or short plat;
Ordinance 1314, LMC 19.05.015(B)(6). Thus, Lynnwood's decision which considered the long plat provisions of its Code, in contravention of that Code's specific exemption of BLAs, was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful.
In addition, there is no merit in Lynnwood's argument that it may look beyond whether the individual application complies with its ordinance and deny the boundary adjustment if it feels the application does not comport with the purposes and substance of the lot boundary line ordinance. R/L Associates, Inc. v. Klockars, 52 Wash.App. 726, 733, 763 P.2d 1244 (1988), review den'd, 112 Wash.2d 1021 (1989). The R/L dicta cited by Lynnwood is merely a general statement regarding the purpose of a lot boundary adjustment as derived from the words of the Seattle ordinance. It is hardly a statement justifying denial of a lot boundary adjustment which meets all of the requirements of the City's ordinance. Under the Seattle ordinance approval was mandatory when the criteria were met, and for that reason the court held that boundary adjustment provisions are to be strictly construed to effectuate their purposes. R/L Associates, 52 Wash.App. at 733, 763 P.2d 1244. Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wash.2d 275, 279, 300 P.2d 569 (1956).
We agree with the trial court that in denying the lot BLA Lynnwood
was motivated by a desire to prevent the land owners possible future subdivision of the property through a possible future application to short plat the property rather than any lawful reason to deny the lot boundary adjustment as such. The prospect that the land owner might sometime in the future apply for short subdivision is no reason to deny a lot boundary adjustment under the Lynnwood Municipal Code which provides no connection nor nexus between a lot boundary adjustment and any subsequent attempt to short plat property previously subject to a lot boundary adjustment. To deny the lot boundary adjustment for this reason was an irrational act which bore neither connection nor nexus to the lot boundary adjustment ordinance.
Lynnwood next claims that the availability of a state remedy under RCW 64.40 bars any remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We disagree.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may recover money damages if it has been deprived of some federal right and the person depriving the plaintiff of that right was acting under color of state law. Sintra, Inc. v. Seattle, 119 Wash.2d 1, 11, 829 P.2d 765, cert. den'd, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 676, 121 L.Ed.2d 598 (1992), citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,...
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