City of Wenatchee v. Boundary Review Bd. of Chelan County

• Decision Date: 20 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 5942-III-1,5942-III-1
• Citation: 39 Wn.App. 249,693 P.2d 135
• Parties: CITY OF WENATCHEE, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. BOUNDARY REVIEW BOARD OF CHELAN COUNTY, an agency of the County of Chelan, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 249

39 Wn.App. 249

693 P.2d 135

CITY OF WENATCHEE, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. BOUNDARY REVIEW BOARD OF CHELAN COUNTY, an agency of the County of Chelan, Respondent.

No. 5942-III-1.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 3, Panel One.

Dec. 20, 1984.

John Hotchkiss, Carlson & Drewelow, P.S., Wenatchee, for appellant.

E.R. Whitmore, Pros. Atty., Wenatchee, for respondent.

MUNSON, Chief Judge.

The City of Wenatchee (City) appeals the Chelan County Boundary Review Board's (Review Board) denial of a notice of intention to annex 11.8 acres. The City contends: (1) RCW 36.93, establishing boundary review boards, is a special law contrary to the Washington Constitution, article 11, section 10 (amendment 40); (2) the Review Board acted beyond its scope of authority under RCW 36.93; and (3) the Review Board decision was arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.

Mr. and Mrs. Rick Ford and Mr. and Mrs. M.T. Ford requested the City to annex 11.8 acres consisting of an orchard and two residences, ostensibly to obtain inexpensive cable television service. The Review Board first decided to annex only a portion of the Fords' land; the Superior Court reversed and remanded on the basis of procedural irregularities. The Review Board then held another hearing, at which Rick Ford, various neighbors, and public officials testified. Many of the Fords' neighbors opposed the annexation, fearing the land would be subdivided and further encroachment by the City would hamper their orchard operations.

The Review Board denied the proposed annexation and the City appealed as an aggrieved party. The Superior Court affirmed and the City timely appeals.

The City first contends RCW 36.93, establishing boundary review boards, is a special law contrary to the Washington Constitution, article 11, section 10 (amendment 40). ¹ The City argues the discretion granted to review boards under RCW 36.93.170 and 36.93.180 constitutes a special law. ²

A special law is one restricted to particular persons or places which does not include all the natural members of that class. Everett v. Fire Fighters, Local 350 of the Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 87 Wash.2d 572, 555 P.2d 418 (1976); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 83 Wash.2d 523, 537, 520 P.2d 162 (1974); YMCA v. Parish, 89 Wash. 495, 498, 154 P. 785 (1916). No Washington case has considered the constitutionality of RCW 36.93, but other statutes have been upheld under article 11, section 10 (amendment 40).

The issue in Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, 52 Wash.2d 181, 324 P.2d 438 (1958), was whether the Legislature could constitutionally delegate to county commissioners the authority to establish boundaries of proposed cities and towns, and delegate to the people affected the right to vote on the boundaries. The court set forth several general rules in reaching its decision. First, the state constitution is not a grant, but a restriction on the Legislature's power; the Legislature's power to enact reasonable laws is unrestrained except where expressly or by fair inference prohibited by the state or federal constitutions. Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, supra at 184, 324 P.2d 438. Second, a statute is presumed constitutional unless its invalidity clearly appears or is made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt. Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, supra at 184, 324 P.2d 438.

Regarding article 11, section 10 (amendment 40), the court stated:

We find in Art. XI, § 10, no express prohibition of this type of authorization. The legislature is authorized to provide by general laws for the incorporation, organization, and classification in proportion to population, of cities and towns. It may not designate boundaries itself, for such action would be in contravention of that portion of the provision which forbids it to create corporations for municipal purposes by special laws. But there is no restriction on the procedure which the legislature may prescribe by general laws for such incorporation; nor is there any express provision denying to the legislature the right to provide that the question of whether or not an area shall become incorporated shall be left to the will of the people residing therein. There is no express requirement that the designation of boundaries or any other matter should be made by a legislative body. If, therefore, there is any unlawful delegation involved in the statute, it is because the act contravenes Art. II, § 1, vesting the legislative powers in the senate and house of representatives.

Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, supra at 186-87, 324 P.2d 438. The court held leaving the fixing of boundaries to the inhabitants directly affected was in accord with article 2, section 1 (amendment 72).

The act creating the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle was upheld in Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. Seattle, 57 Wash.2d 446, 357 P.2d 863 (1960). The court held the benefits of the act encompassed any area of the state which may elect to qualify under it, and therefore the act was a general, not special, law. See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Washington Life & Disability Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, supra (court held legislative classifications found in guaranty association act, RCW 48.32A, had a legitimate and reasonable basis, and therefore the act was not a special law).

Most of the cases cited by the Review Board deal with the constitutionality of the legislative delegations under the Washington Constitution, article 2, section 1 (amendment 72). That provision vests legislative powers in the state Legislature. Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, supra. The leading case is Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wash.2d 155, 500 P.2d 540 (1972), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 977, 93 S.Ct. 1503, 36 L.Ed.2d 173 (1973), which held the Legislature may constitutionally delegate power to an administrative agency if the Legislature: (1) provides guidelines which indicate in general terms what is to be done and the administrative body which is to do it, and (2) provides adequate procedural safeguards to test the constitutionality of administrative rules and control arbitrary administrative action and abuse of administrative discretion. General standards are sufficient where the subject matter will not admit of more precise standards. McDonald v. Hogness, 92 Wash.2d 431, 598 P.2d 707 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962, 100 S.Ct. 1650, 64 L.Ed.2d 238 (1980) (medical school admissions); Yakima Cy. Clean Air Authority v. Glascam Builders, Inc., 85 Wash.2d 255, 534 P.2d 33 (1975) (air pollution penalty ordinances); Rody v. Hollis, 81 Wash.2d 88, 500 P.2d 97 (1972) (Human Rights Commission rules).

As the Review Board points out, RCW 36.93 is intended to cover all Washington counties. The purpose of RCW 36.93 is to promote logical growth of local government. RCW 36.93.010. For every annexation decision, the Review Board must consider the factors set forth in RCW 36.93.170 ³ and attempt to achieve the objectives listed in RCW 36.93.180. ⁴ Richland v. Franklin Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 100 Wash.2d 864, 870, 676 P.2d 425 (1984); Spokane Cy. Fire Protection Dist. 9 v. Spokane Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 97 Wash.2d 922, 652 P.2d 1356 (1982). An appeal procedure is set forth in RCW 36.93.160.

We hold RCW 36.93 adequately limits the discretion of the review boards and does not exclude natural members of any class. The fact one review board may grant annexation and another deny it on similar facts does not convert RCW 36.93 into a special law. RCW 36.93 is neither a special law under article 11, section 10 (amendment 40), nor an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power under article 2, section 1 (amendment 72).

The City next contends the Review Board acted beyond the scope of its authority because the stated purpose of RCW 36.93 is to create boundary review boards in metropolitan areas to act as referees between competing municipalities. RCW 36.93.010. The City points out Chelan County is not a metropolitan area and two municipalities are not competing for the Fords' property. The City thus implies the Review Board has no authority.

One problem the Legislature sought to address in RCW 36.93 is haphazard extension of municipal boundaries. RCW 36.93.010. RCW 36.93.030 was amended by Laws of 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 111, § 1, pp. 824-25 to permit any county, of whatever size, to establish a boundary review board. Review boards are empowered to review changes in boundaries, without mention of competition between municipalities. RCW 36.93.090, .100. The Review Board acted within the scope of its authority when it heard and decided the Fords' proposal.

The City argues the Review Board's decision advances none of the purposes set forth in RCW 36.93.010, and therefore is void under Spokane Cy. Fire Protection Dist. 9 v. Spokane Cy. Boundary Review Bd., supra. That case holds at least one of the objectives listed in RCW 36.93.180 must be met before the Review Board's decision may be upheld. Here there is substantial evidence to support the uncontested findings that several of those objectives were met, i.e., preservation of natural neighborhoods, preservation of logical service areas, use of physical boundaries, prevention of abnormally irregular boundaries, and most importantly, preservation of agricultural lands.

The City last contends the decision of the Review Board was arbitrary and capricious. RCW 36.93.160(6)(f). The City argues the Review Board made a prohibited land use decision. Spokane Cy. Fire Protec. Dist. 9 v. Spokane Cy. Boundary Review Bd., supra.

If this property were annexed, minimum lot size would be reduced from 1 acre to 7,000 square feet. As stated in Spokane Cy. Fire Protec. Dist. 9 v. Spokane Cy. Boundary Review Bd., supra at 924-25, 652 P.2d 1356:

It is true that it is not the function of a boundary review board to make land use decisions. [Citations omitted.] The Board's decision in the instant case, however, was not a land use decision as...