Cox v. People
| Decision Date | 09 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 11CA1940 |
| Citation | 2013 COA 70 |
| Parties | Robert Cox, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Douglas County District Court No. 11CV1445
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED
WITH DIRECTIONS
Opinion by JUDGE ROY*
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2012.
¶1 Petitioner, Robert Cox, appeals a district court's order denying his petition to seal records of non-traffic offense charges brought against him that were subsequently dismissed. We reverse and remand with directions.
¶2 The issue presented here is whether criminal justice records of an arrest and charges, which include both traffic and non-traffic offenses, can be sealed under section 24-72-308, C.R.S. 2012 (the statute), as to the non-traffic offenses. We decline to follow the majority opinion of a division of this court in Clark v. People, 221 P.3d 447 (Colo. App. 2009), and we answer in the affirmative.
¶3 Petitioner was charged in the Douglas County Court with possession of marijuana in violation of section 18-18-406(3)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2012 (); possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of section 18-18-428(2), C.R.S. 2012 (); and unsafe lane change in violation of section 42-4-1007, C.R.S. 2012 ().1 After his successful completion of a juvenile diversion program, all of the charges were dismissed with prejudice.
¶4 Subsequently, petitioner commenced these proceedings by filing a verified petition in the Douglas County District Court pursuant to the statute, requesting that the records of the case be sealed. In his petition, he alleged, among other things: 2 The prosecution, relying onClark, objected to the sealing of the records. At the hearing, both parties agreed that Clarkwas controlling. However, petitioner argued that the Clark dissent provided the better-reasoned approach to interpreting section 24-72-308(3)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2012, and he urged the court to grant his petition.
¶5 The court denied the petition, and this appeal follows.
¶6 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Vecellio, 2012 COA 40, ¶13, 292 P.3d 1004, 1010.
¶7 When interpreting a statute, our primary purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Kovacs, 2012 COA 111, ¶9, 284 P.3d 186, 188. To this end, we look first to the statute's plain language, giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. In addition, we must interpret a statute in a way that best effectuates the legislative intent and purpose. Id. at ¶10, 284 P.3d at 188. Thus, we must interpret relevant statutory provisions as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to their parts. Id.
¶8 A remedial statute is to be liberally construed to accomplish its object. § 2-4-212, C.R.S. 2012; Colorado & S. Ry. v. State R.R. Commission, 54 Colo. 64, 77, 129 P. 506, 512 (1912); cf. Flood v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, 176 P.3d 769, 773 (Colo.2008); Mishkin v. Young, 198 P.3d 1269, 1273 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶9 Furthermore, exceptions to a remedial statute are to be strictly construed. 3 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction§ 60.1, at 263 (7th ed. 2012) (Sutherland) (citingGolf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So. 2d 561, 565 (Fla. 2000); State Admin. Bd. of Elections Laws v. Billhimer, 314 Md. 46, 64, 548 A.2d 819, 828 (1988); Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center, 203 N.J. 184, 195, 1 A.3d 618, 624 (2010); Las Campanas Ltd. Partnership v. Pribble, 123 N.M. 520, 525, 943 P.2d 554, 559 (Ct. App. 1997); and Hulse v. Job Service North Dakota, 492 N.W.2d 604, 607 (N.D. 1992)).
¶11 In Clark, the defendant's son was involved in a one-vehicle accident. Clark, 221 P.3d at 448. A passing motorist called the defendant at his son's request. Id. The defendant arrived at the scene, where he remained while his son took the defendant's vehicle to contact a tow truck. Id. A passing officer stopped, and the defendant stated that he was the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident. Id. Ultimately, the officer issued a citation charging the defendant with failure to notify the police of the automobile accident, a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense. Id. The defendant pled guilty to false reporting, a class 3 misdemeanor. Id. When the defendant's securities license was placed in jeopardy because of the plea, the court allowed the defendant, with the prosecution's consent, to withdraw his plea, and the false reporting charge was dismissed. Id.
¶12 The majority in Clark recognized a general rule of construction, which is that "where a statute establishes a general rule subject to exceptions, we should interpret the exceptions narrowly to preserve the general rule's primary operation." Id. at 450 (). The statutes at issue in these cases do not appear to be remedial. Furthermore, the majority noted that the parties had reasonably assumed that the purpose of the exception was to avoid inundating the courts with petitions to seal records of minor traffic offenses.3 Clark, 221 P.3d at 459. We also agree that the assumption is reasonable.
¶13 The majority concluded that the phrase "pertaining to," as used in section 24-72-308(3)(a), was synonymous with "relating to" and should be given broad application, stating:
[The exception] should be applied to the full reach of its clear terms, even if those terms call for a broad application. . . . [And] we will not reduce the scope of the exception by adding exceptions, limitations, or qualifiers thereto that are not suggested by the plain language of the statute.
Id. at 449. Therefore, the petitioner was not permitted to seal the record of the charge of false reporting because the record also contained the dismissed charge of failure to notify, a traffic offense. Id. at 449-50.
¶14 Judge Russel, in dissent, agreed that the court cannot seal "records pertaining to" traffic infractions and that the exception encompasses documents of all types; however, he did not agree that that foreclosed relief. Id. at 450-51 (Russel, J., dissenting). He disagreed because (1) he saw no practical impediment to offense-specific sealing; (2) he believed that offense-specific sealing would further the legislative policy because it gives broad effect to the general rule; and (3) he concluded that the statute does not prohibit offense-specific sealing. Id. at 449.
¶15 Our supreme court in People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326, 1331- 32 (Colo. 1993), held that a predecessor and broader version of the statute was remedial in nature because it did not create or destroy substantive rights, and its repeal, which accompanied the adoption of the present version of the statute, had retroactive application to pending proceedings. See also E.J.R. v. District Court, 892 P.2d 222, 224 (Colo. 1995); 3 Sutherland § 60:2, at 265-66. Therefore, as previously noted, the statute is to be liberally construed to further its objectives, and exceptions are to be strictly construed.4
¶16 The purpose of the...
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