Cox v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

Decision Date17 January 1966
Docket NumberNo. 5-3729,5-3729
Parties, 17 A.L.R.3d 1376 Alfred E. COX et ux., Appellants, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

H. Clay Robinson, Fort Smith, for appellants.

Dobbs, Pryor & Dobbs, Fort Smith, for appellee.

GEORGE ROSE SMITH, Justice.

This is an action by the appellants upon a fire insurance policy issued by the appellee. The policy provided coverage of $10,000 upon the appellants' dwelling and $4,000 upon unscheduled personal property. The dwelling and its contents were damaged by fire in 1964. The insurer paid the full limit of its liability for unscheduled personal property and paid $5,220.14 for damage to the dwelling.

The only item now in dispute is damage of $335.01 to a wall-to-wall carpet. The homeowners contend that the carpet was a fixture, so that its loss falls within the coverage upon the dwelling. The trial court held, however, that the carpet was personal property, for the loss of which the insurance company had discharged its maximum possible liability of $4,000.

All the facts were stipulated. When the plaintiffs bought the house the downstairs floors were covered with wall-to-wall carpeting that had worn out. About a month before the fire the plaintiffs moved this carpeting upstairs and replaced it with new carpeting downstairs. The new carpet was specially cut to fit the house; its effect in enhancing the value of the house was greater than its resale value. It was attached to the floor with tacks around the edges and could have been removed without damage to the house.

The hardwood floor under the carpet had been patched with unfinished boards. It was stipulated that the plaintiff (if permitted to do so) would have testified: (a) That if they had removed the carpet to use the bare floor they would have relaid and refinished parts of the floor; (b) that in laying the carpet they meant for it to become part of the house; and (c) that if they should sell the house it would be their intention to sell the carpeting along with the building.

The case was tried by the court sitting without a jury. Even though there was an agreed statement of facts the court's judgment has the binding effect of a jury verdict if there were inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the stipulated proof. Robson v. Tomlinson, 54 Ark. 229, 15 S.W. 456 (1891). Thus the question is whether it must be said as a matter of law that the wall-to-wall carpeting was a fixture. In many cases we have held such an issue about an asserted fixture to be one for the jury. Thomas Cox & Sons Mach. Co. v. Blue Trap Rock Co., 159 Ark. 209, 251 S.W. 699 (1923); Bache v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 127 Ark. 397, 192 S.W. 225 (1917); British & American Mtg. Co. v. Scott, 70 Ark. 230, 65 S.W. 936 (1901).

Here the question was plainly one of fact. It is agreed that the carpeting could have been removed without any damage to the floors. Such ready removability supports the conclusion that the article is not fixture. See Anderson v. Southern Realty Co., 176 Ark. 752, 4 S.W.2d 27 (1928). On the other hand, the carpeting was cut to fit this particular house--a circumstance that led the plaintiffs to regard it as so much a part of the dwelling that they would only have sold the house and carpeting as a unit. This determination on their part is clearly not conclusive of the issue. Bookcases, tables, cabinets, and other pieces of stationary furniture are often constructed to fit a particular wall or corner in a particular room. Nevertheless, if they merely stand in place without being permanently attached to the house they are certainly not fixtures as a matter of law, no matter how sincere the owner may be in his determination not to sell the house apart from such custom-built furniture.

Whether wall-to-wall carpeting is a fixture has been considered in a number of other states. The decided majority of the cases have concluded that such carpeting is not a fixture. Plough v. Petersen, 140 Cal.App.2d 595, 295 P.2d 549, ...

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3 cases
  • Southwest Title & Trust Co. v. Norman Lumber Co.
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • 14 Mayo 1968
    ...505 and 506 of the A.L.R.2d, Later Cases Service supplement for Volumes 49--55 A.L.R.2d. Thus, in Cox v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 240 Ark. 60, 398 S.W.2d 60, 17 A.L.R.3d 1376, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed a trial court judgment to the effect that wall-to-wall carpeting, lai......
  • Core v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 2 Abril 1979
    ...Shoop v. State, 209 Ark. 498, 190 S.W.2d 988; Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Lea, 208 Ark. 260, 186 S.W.2d 429; Cox v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 240 Ark. 60, 398 S.W.2d 60. We cannot say that it was unreasonable for the trial judge to draw an inference unfavorable to appellant on the e......
  • B. J. McAdams, Inc. v. Best Refrigerated Exp., Inc.
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 23 Abril 1979
    ...Co., 253 Ark. 441, 486 S.W.2d 672; Mid-South Ins. Co. v. Dellinger, 239 Ark. 169, 388 S.W.2d 6; Cox v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 240 Ark. 60, 398 S.W.2d 60, 17 A.L.R.3d 1376. There was direct evidence that there was no agency. We cannot say that the finding that appellant had failed t......

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