Coxwell v. State
| Citation | 361 So.2d 148 |
| Decision Date | 20 July 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 51013,51013 |
| Parties | Chester COXWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Timothy D. Harley and M. Howard Williams of Williams, Gibson & Harley, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Michael H. Davidson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
Chester Coxwell was convicted of first degree murder for having procured the killing of his wife, and in accordance with the jury's recommendation he was sentenced to death by the trial judge. His conviction and sentence are brought to us for review pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and Section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1975).
The pertinent facts preceding and surrounding Mrs. Coxwell's death are relatively uncomplicated. Coxwell and his wife owned a thriving bait shop in Liberty County and lived in a trailer on the same property. For some time prior to the slaying, their marriage had grown increasingly discordant because Coxwell, age 58, had become romantically involved with a 26-year-old girl who worked at the bait shop, Judy Barnes. Mrs. Coxwell, an extremely jealous and high-tempered woman, discovered the illicit relationship and fired Barnes. The affair between Coxwell and Barnes continued nonetheless, causing recurring disharmony in the Coxwell home and a series of threats among the characters in this love triangle.
The evidence adduced at trial indicated that Coxwell first attempted to procure someone to murder his wife approximately six months before the events which actually led to her death. The first individual contacted, a friend of Judy Barnes, declined Coxwell's offer of $5,000. A second prospect for the job participated with Barnes in When these efforts proved fruitless, Coxwell asked George Kilpatrick, who sometimes supplied bait to Coxwell's store, to assist in finding someone who would commit the crime. Kilpatrick testified that he and Coxwell discussed the matter almost daily over a period of two months, but that they were unable to settle on a satisfactory plan. 2 At some point during these conversations, Coxwell raised his compensation offer and persuaded Kilpatrick to do the job himself. Approximately one week before the crime, Kilpatrick told Nelson Hughley, a 16-year-old boy who lived with Kilpatrick and assisted him in gathering bait, that he had accepted Coxwell's proposal.
one unsuccessful attempt on Mrs. Coxwell's life, but then declined further involvement. 1
The dates of the criminal sequence, June 24 and 25, 1976, now become important. On the 24th Coxwell informed Kilpatrick that Judy Barnes had entered the hospital to create an alibi for herself, and that he wanted Kilpatrick to "hurry up" so that he could bring her home to his trailer. Shortly after midnight, Kilpatrick came to the trailer, lured Mrs. Coxwell out to the store on the pretext of having some bait to sell, and bludgeoned her on the head with an iron pipe. With Hughley's assistance, Kilpatrick then placed her body in the trunk of his car and proceeded to a secluded wooded area to dispose of the corpse. At some point along the way, they heard Mrs. Coxwell moaning in the trunk. Kilpatrick stopped the car and delivered another, and fatal, blow to her head. Three days later, the victim's body was discovered in a boat on Syfrett Creek.
Coxwell, who had apparently remained in the trailer until after the killers left, summoned the sheriff and reported his wife missing. Subsequent investigation led to his arrest, and he ultimately identified Kilpatrick and Hughley as the individuals who had come to his trailer on the night of the murder. After they were apprehended, tried, and convicted, both Kilpatrick and Hughley testified against Coxwell at his trial.
In this appeal, Coxwell alleges six procedural errors in his trial and asserts that the death sentence was improperly imposed. We have determined that one of the alleged errors will necessitate a new trial, so that we need not address all of the points presented. 3
The state's principal witness against Coxwell was Kilpatrick, who testified that he agreed to commit the crime when Coxwell promised to give him $5,000 and a red truck. During the course of direct examination, the state sought to elicit from Kilpatrick a detailed account of his conversations with Coxwell regarding various plans which were discussed by them over the period of months leading up to the day of the crime. The transcript of the proceeding tells what occurred:
Q (prosecution continuing) Mr. Kilpatrick, you have had several conversations with Mr. Coxwell, then, about killing his wife, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Did you go through with any of those plans you had previously talked about?
A Did we go through with those plans?
Q Yes, did you ever carry it out, the ones you talked about?
A No.
Q George, the 24th day of June, 1976, do you remember that day?
A Yeah, I does.
Q Did you go to Chester Coxwell's bait shop on that day?
A Yes.
Q What time did you get there?
A It was in the afternoon in between 3:30 and 4:00 o'clock.
Q Did you talk with Chester on that day?
A Yes. Our conversation was that he said he had put his girlfriend in the hospital and he said when she come out of the hospital he wanted to bring her home, and he said his wife was in the way, and to hurry up.
Q To hurry up?
A. Yes.
Q How many conversations, approximately, do you recall having with Mr. Coxwell, Mr. Kilpatrick, concerning the various different plans to kill his wife?
A Well, I went to Bristol every day, and from the time this year since I been hauling baits over there to the time I got arrested, I'd say it was every day that I come over there, every day until that time. I'll say better than fifty or sixty times.
Q And every time he talked with you about killing his wife?
A Right.
Q The State just asked you a question, did you go through with any of those plans, and you answered no. Is that correct?
A Correct.
Q Did you kill Lela Mae Coxwell pursuant to any of these plans?
Coxwell suggests that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the state's objection, and that the court's curtailment of defense inquiry at this crucial juncture constituted a deprivation of his absolute and fundamental right to cross-examine a witness who testifies against him, as guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the federal constitution. 5 The ruling of the trial court that the question on cross-examination went beyond the scope of direct examination, Coxwell argues, was not merely erroneous as being plainly related to Kilpatrick's testimony regarding the plans and conversations with Coxwell on the day of the crime, but was also prejudicial to Coxwell's defense because it forestalled the development of the defense theory that Judy Barnes had procured Mrs. Coxwell's death, as to which Kilpatrick obviously would have first-hand knowledge. In urging that curtailed cross-examination was reversible error, appellant basically relies on Coco v. State, 62 So.2d 892 (Fla.1953).
Coco was a first degree murder case in which the state's fingerprint expert gave detailed testimony on direct examination as to his method of lifting and analyzing fingerprints from the murder weapon. He then identified certain exhibits as being fingerprint cards bearing the defendant's prints. When defense counsel sought on cross-examination to inquire concerning the results of the witness' comparison between defendant's fingerprints and those taken from the murder weapon, the state interposed an objection which was sustained by the trial court on the ground that the question exceeded the scope of direct examination. By aborting defendant's cross-examination, the state successfully conveyed to the jury a mistaken impression that the fingerprints matched, although the same expert had written a report concluding that the fingerprints on the murder weapon were not the defendant's.
On appeal, the state contended that the trial court's ruling was proper, but that if there was an error it was harmless since the defendant's identity had been independently established by eyewitness testimony. This Court nonetheless reversed Coco's conviction observing that:
6
The Court then quoted the following passage with approval:
" ...
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