Coyne v. John S. Tilley Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1975
• Citation: 331 N.E.2d 541,368 Mass. 230
• Parties: Leo COYNE v. JOHN S. TILLEY CO., INC.,
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 541

331 N.E.2d 541

368 Mass. 230

Leo COYNE

v. JOHN S. TILLEY CO., INC.,

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued April 9, 1975.

Decided June 25, 1975.

Walter G. Murphy, Boston, for plaintiff.

James B. Dolan, Jr., Boston (William H. Shaughnessy, Boston, with him), for John S. Tilley Co., Inc.

John W. McCann, Boston, for Lynn Ladder Co., Inc., submitted a brief.

Before TAURO, C.J., and BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

TAURO, Chief Justice.

These are two actions of tort in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries suffered in a fall from an aluminum stepladder. In his declarations, ² the plaintiff alleges that his fall 'was due to the negligent and careless manner in which said ladder was manufactured, designed, and constructed.' The two actions were consolidated for trial in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston. In the action brought against the manufacturer of the ladder, John S. Tilley Co., Inc. (Tilley), the trial judge, after denying the defendant's requests for rulings, ³ found for the plaintiff in the amount of $1,000. In the action brought against the wholesaler of the ladder, Lynn Ladder Co., Inc. (Lynn Ladder), the trial judge, after denying five ⁴ of the plaintiff's six requests for rulings, found for the defendant. The plaintiff and Tilley, alleging that they were aggrieved by the judge's denial of their requests for rulings, claimed reports to the Appellate Division of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston. G.L. c. 231, § 108. These reports were consolidated into a single report which stated that it 'contains all the evidence material to the questions reported.' The Appellate Division vacated the judge's finding for the plaintiff against Tilley and directed that a finding be entered for the defendant in each case. We treat the Appellate Division's order that a finding be entered for Lynn Ladder as a dismissal of the report in the plaintiff's case against Lynn Ladder. The plaintiff appealed to this court from the Appellate Division's orders. We transferred the cases to the Appeals Court. G.L. c. 211A, § 12. The Appeals Court affirmed the orders of the Appellate Division in both cases. COYNE V. JOHN S. TILLEY CO., INC., --- MASS.APP.CT. --- , 318 N.E.2D 623 (1974)^A. The cases are before us for further appellate review on the plaintiff's application. The principal question presented for our decision is whether the evidence warranted a finding for the plaintiff in either case.

We summarize the evidence contained in the report to the Appellate Division of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston in its aspect most favorable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was employed as a night cleaner by York Realty, Inc. (York). On the evening of May 12, 1969, the plaintiff ascended a six-foot aluminum stepladder in order to wash an overhead transom and door. After he had perched on the ladder 'for a minute or so,' a leg of the ladder 'collapsed inward at a 45 angle.' The plaintiff was thrown to the floor and suffered injuries. Prior to the accident, the ladder had appeared to the plaintiff to be 'free of defects.' '(T)he legs were straight, the finish was clean and bright, and it appeared new.'

The ladder in question was manufactured by the defendant Tilley. At some unstated time, the ladder was sold by Tilley to Lynn Ladder, also a defendant. On March 26, 1969, Lynn Ladder sold the ladder to Warren Electric & Hardware Supply Co., Inc. (Warren), which sold the ladder to York the following day. There was evidence that, before Lynn Ladder shipped ladders to customers, the ladders were inspected. There was further evidence that the president of Lynn Ladder examined the ladder in question prior to shipment to Warren and found it in good condition without apparent defects. The ladder was stored by York in the cellar storeroom of the building in which the plaintiff was working on the night of his accident. At some unspecified time, the night supervisor of the building, the plaintiff's brother, had removed the ladder from the storeroom and had given it to the plaintiff for use in his job. There was evidence that the night supervisor had observed the ladder and thought it free from defects: '(T)he legs were straight, and the surface of the ladder was shiny and free from dirt or paint.'

The plaintiff's theory of recovery in each case is the principle of negligence we announced in Carter v. Yardley & Co. Ltd., 319 Mass. 92, 96, 64 N.E.2d 693, 696 (1946): '(A) manufacturer or other person owning or controlling a thing that is dangerous in its nature or is in a dangerous condition, either to his knowledge or as a result of his want of reasonable care in manufacture or inspection, who deals with or disposes of that thing in a way that he foresees or in the exercise of reasonable care ought to foresee will probably carry that thing into contact with some person, known or unknown, who will probably be ignorant of the danger, owes a legal duty to every such person to use reasonable care to prevent injury to him.' Accord, Ricciutti v. Sylvania Elec. Prod. Inc., 343 Mass. 347, 352--353, 178 N.E.2d 857 (1961). The plaintiff argues that the defendants had a duty to discover defects in the ladder which, in his view of the evidence, caused its collapse when it was put to a normal and foreseeable use.

Though the Yardley case eliminated the privity of contract requirement in actions for the negligent manufacture and sale of a product (Carter v. Yardley & Co. Ltd., supra, at 96--97, 104, 64 N.E.2d 693), the case did not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving that a defect attributable to a manufacturer's (and in this case a wholesaler's as well) negligence caused his injuries. LeBlanc v. Ford Motor Co., 346 Mass. 225, 230, 191 N.E.2d 301 (1963). Carney v. Bereault, 348 Mass. 502, 506, 204 N.E.2d 448 (1965). In the instant case, the plaintiff has adduced no direct evidence as to the specific acts or omissions by the defendants which constituted negligence and as to the specific defect of manufacture which caused the accident. Cf. Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal.2d 229, 34 P.2d 481 (1934). To sustain his burden of proof, the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence and, consequently, on an inference of negligence which, he claims, one may permissibly draw from the occurrence of the accident. We pass to a consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence to support that inference against each defendant.

THE CASE AGAINST TILLEY.

The nature of the inference on which the plaintiff would rely in this case has been described in Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., Inc., 339 Mass. 177, 180, 158 N.E.2d 342, 345 (1959): '(T)he tribunal of fact (is permitted), if it sees fit, to draw from the occurrence itself of an unusual event the conclusion that it would not have happened unless the defendant had been negligent. It does no more than recognize that negligence and causation, like other facts, may be established by circumstantial evidence.' Accord, Roscigno v. Colonial Beacon Oil Co., 294 Mass. 234, 200 N.E. 883 (1936). In drawing this inference and determining that there is a balance of probabilities in favor of negligence, the trier of fact must be able to find, either from common knowledge (Graham v. Badger, 164 Mass. 42, 47, 41 N.E. 61 (1895); Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 39 Cal.2d 436, 442, 247 P.2d 344 (1952)) or from expert testimony (James v. Boston Elev. Ry., 204 Mass. 158, 162, 90 N.E. 513 (1910); LeBlanc v. Ford Motor Co., 346 Mass. 225, 231, 191 N.E.2d 301 (1963)) that the occurrence of the accident shows negligence as a cause. Roscigno v. Colonial Beacon Oil Co., supra, at 235, 200 N.E. 883; Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co. Inc., supra, at 182, 158 N.E.2d 342.

We believe that a trier of fact could infer as matter of common knowledge ⁵ that a relatively new aluminum stepladder would not collapse in such a way that one of its legs was bent inward at a 45 angle in the course of usage unless someone had been negligent. Plainly, a properly fabricated and designed aluminum ladder which had received proper care and usage would not collapse if put to the use for which it was intended. See Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal.3d 379, 387, 93 Cal.Rptr. 769, 482 P.2d 681 (1971). There are numerous conceivable acts of negligence which might have contributed to the collapse: A leg of the ladder might have been constructed with defective materials and then inadequately tested by the manufacturer. The ladder might not have been designed to support a load which the manufacturer should reasonably have expected the ladder to hold. The ladder might have been mishandled by a middleman in the distribution process. At the time of the accident, a leg of the ladder might have been positioned in such a way that it could not withstand the weight applied, or, in the alternative, the weight applied might have been excessive when considered in light of the ladder's manifest construction and design. In any event, the likelihood that the collapse was caused by some negligent act could be found to be greater than that it was not. Just as in the case of a mysteriously exploding bottle (see Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., Inc., supra) or a mysteriously malfunctioning automobile transmission (see LeBlanc v. Ford Motor Co., 346 Mass. 225, 191 N.E.2d 301 (1963)), the occurrence of this accident will support an inference of negligence. ⁶

However, the above mentioned inference alone will not support a finding for the plaintiff in the instant case. 'Where, as here, the accident occurs after the defendant has surrendered control of the instrumentality involved, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that the instrumentality had not been improperly handled by himself or by intermediate handlers.' Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co. Inc., 339 Mass. 117, 183, 158 N.E.2d 342, 347 (1959). Rafferty v. Hull Brewing Co., 350 Mass. 359, 363, 215 N.E.2d...