LeBlanc v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 06 June 1963
• Parties: , 6 A.L.R.3d 83 Joseph LeBLANC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 301

191 N.E.2d 301

346 Mass. 225, 6 A.L.R.3d 83

Joseph LeBLANC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued May 7, 1963.

Decided June 6, 1963.

Thomas S. Carey, Worcester, for plaintiff.

Stanley B. Milton, Worcester (Robert C. Milton, Worcester, with him), for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, KIRK and REARDON, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

LeBlanc obtained a verdict in this action to recover for injuries suffered when he was struck by an automobile. It was alleged that the vehicle had been manufactured negligently by the defendant (Ford). Ford has argued various exceptions, including those (a) to the denial of its motion for a directed verdict, and (b) to the admission of expert testimony. The evidence is stated in its aspect most favorable to LeBlanc.

LeBlanc was employed by a Ford dealer. On September 27, 1958, he was given by one Godish, his foreman, the keys to a new nine-passenger automobile which the dealer had sold but had not yet delivered. LeBlanc was told to clean the automobile which was then standing near a driveway leading from the street to the back of the dealer's garage.

LeBlanc unlocked the door of the automobile, which had an automatic transmission. The 'car was in neutral * * * with the hand brake on; * * * he turned the key and pressed on the accelerator.' When the motor started, 'he had it run for a while * * * [then] put it in drive and release[d] the hand brake.' He proceeded to a point about eight feet from the garage door on an 'apron * * * located directly in front of the doorway.' Then 'he stepped on the * * * foot brake and stopped the car * * * put the selector in 'Neutral' * * * brought the hand brake up ¹ * * * opened the car door and got out,' leaving the motor running.

As LeBlanc moved 'to open the garage doors,' he 'observed a piece of glass on the apron [and] bent down to pick it up.' Over the sound of the motor he 'heard a click * * * turned around, and the car was already on' him. The automobile, with its motor racing, pinned his right leg at the corner of the garage building, injuring him seriously. One of the sliding garage doors was banged in and knocked off its roller which 'was cemented into the * * * floor.' LeBlanc was not able to move the automobile at all, even with the help of Godish, who came to his assistance.

Godish 'jumped in the car and backed it off [about seven or eight feet], and LeBlanc fell to the ground. * * * [W]hen * * * [Godish] got into the car * * * he looked at the selector lever and it was in neutral.' He put it in reverse to back the vehicle, did not remember applying or moving the hand brake, and 'didn't notice whether the brake was on or off.' He stopped the automobile 'partly by the [mechanical] foot brake; the car seemed as though it stopped by itself * * * when he took the foot off the gas pedal.' He 'put the car in 'Park' and shut off the motor.'

The dealer had purchased this automobile from Ford on May 16, 1958, and it had been delivered by trailer truck on May 19, 'already greased, oiled and gassed.' Upon delivery, some representative of the dealer 'would go around the car' to check for 'scratches or dents,' but no inspection was then made of the motor or operating equipment connected with it. Automobiles, so delivered to the dealer, were stored on the dealer's premises until sold and were moved 'quite frequently' around the premises, which included an unfenced area across the street, where LeBlanc himself first saw this vehicle.

The automobile was sold 'as a new car.' It 'was never placed as a demonstrator.' No available record showed what was done to the vehicle before it was sold. The normal procedure was that a new automobile was 'serviced before it * * * [was] cleaned.' Cleaning and washing 'are the last jobs before delivery.' There was testimony, however, that this automobile was to be 'serviced' that afternoon after LeBlanc finished cleaning it. Inspection prior to delivery includes the shifting levers. After the sale, at the 'thousand mile service,' the dealer found a defect of factory origin in the water pump. There was no testimony that any other mechanical defect was found before or after the sale to the customer.

From the point where LeBlanc left the automobile before the accident the ground sloped up slightly and uniformly toward the garage door. The front wheels of an automobile seventeen feet in length, placed on the apron seven or eight feet from the garage entrance, would be about an inch above the rear wheels.

One Dupont, an expert witness called by LeBlanc, testified that the selector lever of the automobile, below the steering wheel, is connected to the transmission by a link from the bottom of the steering post. All 'working parts of the transmission are encased inside a metal housing.'

A hypothetical question to Dupont, among other things, assumed that LeBlanc left the selector lever with the indicator showing it in neutral position and that Godish so found it. Dupont stated that for the automobile 'to move ahead the clutch will be on either through a malfunction in the clutch itself or from some outside force such as a wrong or malfunctioning linkage.' He went on to say, 'If the unit is in neutral * * * on either level or an up-grade * * * the car cannot move forward unless there is a clutch applied * * *. If we have the clutch applied through its own means such as a malfunction or sticky clutch or through linkage out of adjustment, and if we have a carburetor which is racing, which this car should have been * * * then we have met all the conditions for the car to move forward.' A clutch, he said, 'consists of a pack of clutch discs,' which would have 'either four or five drive members, depending on the model, and these rotate within one another at very close tolerances. If one or more of any of these members were bent or warped they would be pressed against the next one which in turn would press all the way through the clutch pack * * *. This would, in effect, apply the clutch not hydraulically but through malfunction; then we make the conditions for making this car move * * *. With the motor racing [as had been testified] it would indicate a cold motor and that the carburetor was running on fast idle.' A '[f]aulty adjustment of the linkage could be caused by the linkage from the bottom of the steering post or the transmission being adjusted so that the arm is either too long or too short; then the * * * position in the transmission would not be corresponding with the selector pin,' which might read 'Neutral,' when the transmission was not in neutral but in 'Drive.' He demonstrated these possibilities from models. Either faulty conditions in the clutch or in the linkage, he said, could 'cause a car to move forward under the conditions * * * explained * * * in the hypothetical question.' His opinion would be that the 'more probable' cause 'in this particular case' would be 'the clutch pack itself, either * * * foreign material inside of it, or warped or sticky plates.'

1. Ford contends that the mere happening of the accident did not constitute proof (a) that Ford, as manufacturer, was negligent in that it knew or should have known that the automobile was defective or would become so (see Carter v. Yardley & Co., Ltd., 319 Mass. 92, 96, 64 N.E.2d 693, 164 A.L.R. 559; Ricciutti v. Sylvania Elec. Prod. Inc., 343 Mass. 347, 352, 178 N.E.2d 857; Restatement: Torts, §§ 388 [and 1948 Supp.], 395), or (b) that the automobile's condition had not changed after it ceased to be within Ford's control in May. See Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., Inc., 339 Mass. 177, 183, 158 N.E.2d 342; Selissen v. Empire Bottling Co., Inc., 343 Mass. 779, 180 N.E.2d 324. The Yardley case establishes that Ford, as manufacturer, with respect to persons who might use the automobile, had a duty of care in its manufacture and inspection. If the automobile in fact was delivered to the dealer in a condition where, with the selector indicator in the 'neutral' position, the clutch would operate the transmission (if the motor was running) and drive the automobile, we think that the jury could reasonably infer (1) that the automobile had been negligently manufactured or inspected by the manufacturer and (2) that such a defect should have been discovered by reasonable inspection and road testing. Such an inference would be permissible if this condition was found to exist immediately or shortly after delivery by the manufacturer. Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910, 912-913 (4th Cir.), cert. den. sub nom. Ford Motor Co. v. Pierce, 342 U.S. 887, 72 S.Ct. 178, 96 L.Ed. 666. Markel v. Spencer 5 App.Div.2d 400, 401, 403-404, 171 N.Y.S.2d 770, affd. without opinion, 5 N.Y.2d 958, 184 N.Y.S.2d 835, 157 N.E.2d 713. See Pelland v. D'Allesandro, 321 Mass. 387, 389, 73 N.E.2d 590; Poulin v. H. A. Tobey Lumber Corp., 337 Mass. 146, 148-149, 148 N.E.2d 277; Brennan v. Arlington Gas Light Co., 341 Mass. 679, 683, 171 N.E.2d 838. ²

The Yardley case did not relieve LeBlanc of the burden of proving (see the Ricciutti case, 343 Mass. 347, 352, 178 N.E.2d 857) that a defect attributable to Ford's negligence caused the injury or that after Ford 'surrendered control of the * * * [automobile, it] had not been improperly handled by himself or' others. See the Evangelio case, 339 Mass. 177, 183, 158 N.E.2d 342. There undoubtedly could have been tampering with, or abuse of, exposed portions of the linkage...