Cracolici v. Shah

• Decision Date: 02 April 2015
• Citation: 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 02853,127 A.D.3d 413,4 N.Y.S.3d 506 (Mem)
• Parties: Vincent M. CRACOLICI, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants–Respondents, v. Sovrin SHAH, M.D., Defendant–Appellant, Simon Barkagan, M.D., et al., Defendants–Respondents, Gabor Nemesdy, M.D., et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

127 A.D.3d 413

4 N.Y.S.3d 506 (Mem)

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 02853

Vincent M. CRACOLICI, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants–Respondents

v. Sovrin SHAH, M.D., Defendant–AppellantSimon Barkagan, M.D., et al., Defendants–RespondentsGabor Nemesdy, M.D., et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

April 2, 2015.

Cohen, Labarbera & Landrigan, LLP, Goshen (Joshua A. Scerbo of counsel), for appellants-respondents.

Aaronson Rappaport Feinstein & Deutsch, LLP, New York (Steven C. Mandell of counsel), for appellant, and Zafar Khan, M.D., respondent.

Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan LLP, Valhalla (Adonaid C. Medina of counsel), for Simon Barkagan, M.D., respondent.

Opinion

Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered July 31, 2013, which, to the extent appealed from, dismissed the action as against defendants Drs. Zafar Khan and Simon Barkagan and denied Dr. Sovrin Shah's motion to dismiss the complaint as against him, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In this action for medical malpractice, the claims against Drs. Khan and Barkagan were properly dismissed as untimely (see CPLR 214–a ). Plaintiff last treated with Dr. Khan on October 15, 2007 and with Dr. Barkagan on April 24, 2008. The mere hope that discovery may reveal a course of continuous treatment with Dr. Khan, does not warrant denial of the motion (see CPLR 3211[d] ). With respect to Dr. Barkagan, the motion court properly found that the claims asserted against him do not relate back to those timely asserted against Dr. Shah (see CPLR 203[c] ; Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d 173, 177–178, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978 [1995] ). The allegations against the two doctors relate to separate conduct (Buran, 87 N.Y.2d at 178, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978 ). Plaintiffs have not established a “unity of interest” since they have not identified any relationship between the doctors, let alone one “giving rise to the vicarious liability of one for the conduct of the other” (Cuello v. Patel, 257 A.D.2d 499, 500, 684 N.Y.S.2d 528 [1st Dept.1999] ) or that their interests will stand or fall together (see id.;see also Lord Day & Lord, Barrett, Smith v. Broadwall Mgt. Corp., 301 A.D.2d 362, 753 N.Y.S.2d 68 [1st Dept.2003] ). Additionally, there is no evidence that Dr. Barkagan had notice of the complaint or reason to believe that he would be named as a defendant, within the statutory period (see Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d at 180, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978 ; Alvarado v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 60 A.D.3d 981, 982, 876 N.Y.S.2d 147 [1st Dept.2009] ).

The court properly found that service of the amended complaint on Dr. Shah, within 120–days of the filing of the action, was proper and timely (see CPLR 306–b ; Schroeder v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 80 A.D.3d 744, 746, 915 N.Y.S.2d 302 [2d Dept.2011] ). Leave of the court was not required for the amendment since defendants' time to respond to the original complaint had not yet expired (see CPLR 1003 ; CPLR 3025[a] ; Schroeder, 80 A.D.3d at 746, 915 N.Y.S.2d 302 ). The court providently exercised its discretion in disregarding the fact that the amended complaint was served prior to its filing (see CPLR 2001 ; ...