Cragg v. State
| Decision Date | 25 January 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 43162,43162,2 |
| Citation | 117 Ga.App. 133,159 S.E.2d 717 |
| Parties | Arthur CRAGG v. The STATE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The indictment charging accused with indecent molestation of a child in the terms and language of the statute (Ga.L.1950, pp 387, 388 Ga.L.1953 (Nov.Sess.), pp. 408, 409) was sufficient.
The indictment charged that 'accused on the 30th day of March in the year 1966, in the county aforesaid, did then and there, unlawfully and with force and arms, take improper, immoral and indecent liberties with the body of * * * a minor under 14 years of age, with intent of arousing, appealing to and gratifying the lust and passions and sexual desires of him, the same accused, and of said female child, and did commit lewd and lasivious acts upon and with the body and parts of the body of said child with intent of arousing and appealing to and gratifying the lust and passions and sexual desires of him, the said accused, and of said child.'
The first ground of demurrer contended that the indictment was insufficient for failure to particularize the acts charged.
John G. Davis, Clayton, for appellant.
Herbert B. Kimzey, Sol. Gen., Cornelia, for appellee.
'Every indictment or accusation of the grand jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct, which states the offense in the terms and language of this Code, or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may easily be understood by the jury. * * *' Code § 27-701. 'This means that an indictment conforming substantially to the requirements of this section will be sufficient, but it is not designed to deny to the accused the right to know enough of the particular facts constituting the alleged offense to enable him to prepare for trial.' Mell v. State, 69 Ga.App. 302, 303, 25 S.E.2d 142, 144; Johnson v. State, 90 Ga. 441, 444, 16 S.E. 92. Thus there are exceptions to the principle stated in Code § 27-701. See Burkes v. State, 7 Ga.App. 39, 65 S.E. 1091; Youmans v. State, 7 Ga.App. 101, 113, 66 S.E. 383; Roughlin v. State, 17 Ga.App. 205, 207, 86 S.E. 452.
One of the exceptions, argued by defendant, is that where the statutory definition of an offense includes generic terms, the indictment must state the species of act charged; it 'must descend to particulars.' Harris v. State, 37 Ga.App. 113, 114, 138 S.E. 922; Roberts v. State, 54 Ga.App. 704, 705, 188 S.E. 844; Ramsey v. State, 85 Ga.App. 245, 247, 69 S.E.2d 98. But the offense of indecent molestation of a child as defined by the Act of 1950 (Ga.L.1950, pp. 387, 388 Ga.L.1953 (Nov.-Dec.Sess.) pp. 408, 409); Code Ann. § 26-1301a does not come within this exception.
The words 'immoral, improper or indecent liberties' and 'lewd or lascivious act' are used to describe an act done 'with intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires.' Code Ann. § 26-1301a. We think the terms of the statute on which the indictment is based distinctly individuate the defined offense and that the use of those terms in the indictment is sufficient to give defendant reasonably certain notice of the specific acts charged and thus enable him to prepare his defense. Bute v. People of State of Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, footnote 3, 68 S.Ct. 763, 92 L.Ed. 986; People v. Scattura, 238 Ill. 313, 87 L.E. 332, 333; People v. Sims, 393 Ill. 238, 66 N.E.2d 86, 87; State v. Kernan, 154 Iowa 672, 135 N.W. 362, 363, 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 239; State v. Schumacher, 195 Iowa 276, 191 N.W. 870; ...
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State v. Marshall
...terms without particularizing details which would be offensive to decency.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Cragg v. State, 117 Ga.App. 133, 134-135, 159 S.E.2d 717 (1968) (same). D'Auria v. State, 270 Ga. 499, 500-501(1), 512 S.E.2d 266 (1999). Whether Marshall will ultimately be deem......
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Rowles v. State, 54276
...the accusation is sufficient to be easily understood by the jury or is substantially in the language of the statute. Cragg v. State, 117 Ga.App. 133, 159 S.E.2d 717 (1968); Mealor v. State, 135 Ga.App. 682, 218 S.E.2d 683 (1975). See Parsons v. United States, (C.C.A.Ga.) 189 F.2d 252 (1951)......
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Enloe v. State, A01A1106.
...need not allege the details of the offense, but may charge the defendant with child molestation in the general language of the statute. Cragg v. State;11 Burnett v. State.12 The language of Enloe's indictment was more specific, however, than the language of OCGA § 16-6-4(a), in that it alle......
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Cole v. State
...v. State, 50 Ga.App. 165(2), 177 S.E. 522. The disjunctive phrases are, instead, descriptive of the offensive act. See Cragg v. State, 117 Ga.App. 133, 159 S.E.2d 717. While the better practice would be to draw indictments charging this offense in the conjunctive, the denial of the special ......