Craig v. Dist. of Columbia

• Citation: 881 F.Supp.2d 26
• Decision Date: 02 August 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–1200 (RC).
• Parties: Joanne T. CRAIG, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

881 F.Supp.2d 26

Joanne T. CRAIG, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–1200 (RC).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

Aug. 2, 2012.

Boniface K. Cobbina, Boniface K. Cobbina, PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Brian Gook–Hyun Kim, Eric Sebastian Glover, District of Columbia, Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff claims that a co-worker subjected her to a series of sexually charged and inappropriate comments over the course of her employment with the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department. After she complained to her superiors, she alleges, she was transferred to a different office. She now brings suit, alleging that her employer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code §§ 2–1401.01 et seq. (“DCHRA”). Now before the court is the defendants' motion to dismiss,¹ which the court will grant in part and deny in part for the reasons discussed below.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND²

The plaintiff, Sgt. Joanne Craig, was hired as a police officer by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) in October 1988, 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 9, and was assigned to the Seventh District in November 1995, id. ¶ 11. Sgt. Craig first made contact with Sgt. Eric Levenberry in 2006 when the latter was assigned to investigate an incident involving one of the plaintiff's officers. Id. ¶ 12. While conducting the investigation, Sgt. Levenberry was discourteous to the plaintiff, yet respectful of the plaintiff's subordinate male officer. Id. In October 2007, Sgt. Craig had a chance encounter with Sgt. Levenberry, where he made an apparently sexist remark relating to a female coworker. Id. ¶ 16.

Both Sergeants were assigned to work out of the same office in December 2007. Id. ¶ 18. Beginning in February 2008, Sgt. Levenberry acted rudely toward the plaintiff during group discussions. Id. ¶ 23. Soon thereafter, he began to repeatedly ask her questions of an increasingly personal nature. Id. ¶¶ 24–26, 29, 34. Sgt. Levenberry persisted with his inappropriate behavior through the summer of 2008, commenting on her physical appearance and attire, id. ¶¶ 40–41, and making inappropriate and unwanted physical contact, id. ¶¶ 35–36. He also made tasteless remarks about her sexual life, id. ¶¶ 43, 47, and gave her suggestive looks, id. ¶¶ 41, 48.

In the summer of 2008, Sgt. Craig complained to Lt. Peter Hunt, her superior, about Sgt. Levenberry's conduct. Id. ¶ 37. Her complaint fell on deaf ears. Id. Sgt. Craig next went to Commander Maupin, one of the named defendants, to protest Sgt. Levenberry's actions. Id. ¶ 52. Rather than taking measures against Sgt. Levenberry, Commander Maupin responded by preventing Sgt. Craig from receiving Police Segway Certification training in November 2008. Id. ¶ 53. Moreover, he denied her requests to participate in a Crisis Intervention Training, as well as the MPD's Take Home Vehicle Program. Id.

On February 26, 2009, the plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claiming gender discrimination and retaliation. Id. ¶ 7. On February 21, 2010, Commander Maupin transferred Sgt. Craig away from the Seventh District, her home of fifteen years, to a temporary detail with the Fourth District, thus moving her farther away from her residence and positioning her with a less desirable assignment. Id. This transfer was made permanent on April 24, 2011. Id. ¶ 57. The plaintiff filed another EEOC charge on February 10, 2012, alleging that the April 2011 transfer was an act of retaliation.2d Am. Compl. ¶ 7. The EEOC issued the plaintiff notice of her right to sue on February 28, 2012. Id.

The plaintiff's second amended complaint sets forth four counts: Sex Discrimination under Title VII (Count I); Retaliation under Title VII (Count II); Sex Discrimination under the DCHRA (Count III); and Retaliation under the DCHRA (Count IV). The defendants move to dismiss all four claims.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

All that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require of a complaint is that it contain a “short and plain statement of the claim” in order to give the defendants fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff's ultimate likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). A court considering such a motion presumes the factual allegations of the complaint to be true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C.2000). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of his prima facie case in the complaint. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–12, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F.Supp.2d 25, 28–29 (D.D.C.2010).

Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. A court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, id., nor must the court presume the veracity of legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

B. The Defendants Have Not Shown that the Plaintiff Failed to Timely Exhaust Administrative Remedies for Her Title VII Claims

1. Discrimination

The defendants argue that the plaintiff's Title VII gender discrimination claim must be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in a timely manner. Defs.' Mot. at 4. Specifically, the defendants maintain that the plaintiff's EEOC charge was untimely because it was not filed within 180 days of the allegedly unlawful incident. Id. at 5. The plaintiff counters that Title VII plaintiffs have 300 days to file a charge with the EEOC. Pl.'s Opp'n at 4. The plaintiff has the better side of the argument.³

The EEOC has broad authority to enforce Title VII's mandates, and the EEOC has established detailed procedures for the administrative resolution of discrimination complaints. Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C.Cir.1997). “Complainants must timely exhaust these administrative remedies before bringing their claims to court.” Id. In particular, Title VII ordinarily requires that plaintiffs file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the allegedly unlawful act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). But this deadline is extended to 300 days if the plaintiff also initiated proceedings with a state or local agency. Id. In the District of Columbia, the EEOC and the local agency tasked with investigating discrimination claims operate on a “worksharing agreement” whereby a claim filed with one agency is simultaneously cross-filed with the other. Lee v. District of Columbia, 733 F.Supp.2d 156, 161 (D.D.C.2010). As a result, plaintiffs in the District of Columbia who file a complaint with the EEOC are deemed to have instituted proceedings with a state or local agency and are thus afforded 300 days to file their complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). Carter v. George Washington Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 879 (D.C.Cir.2004); Griffin v. Acacia Life Ins. Co., 925 A.2d 564, 568–69 (D.C.2007).

Here, the plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to repeated acts of sexual harassment between 2006 and 2008. She alleges that she filed a charge with the EEOC alleging gender discrimination and retaliation on February 26, 2009. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 7. It thus appears that her February 26, 2009 EEOC charge would be timely for any discrete discriminatory acts that occurred May 2, 2008 or later. Due to the lack of factual development in this case and the parties' limited briefing on the issue, it remains unclear which acts occurred on or after this date. This reasonalone would be grounds to deny the defendants' motion. Bowe–Connor v. Shinseki, 845 F.Supp.2d 77, 87–88 (D.D.C.2012) (noting that unresolved factual issues precluded the court from determining whether the plaintiff had exhausted her administrative remedies); Smith–Thompson v. District of Columbia, 657 F.Supp.2d 123, 137–38 (D.D.C.2009) (denying the defendant's motion to dismiss claims based on the failure to administratively exhaust “[g]iven the number of potentially pertinent factual issues that remain unresolved”).

But the defendants' argument suffers from a deeper flaw. The defendants assume that the plaintiff's claim is based on a number of separate, discrete acts of discrimination. They ignore the possibility that the plaintiff could prevail under a “hostile work environment” claim, which would require the court to apply a different timeliness analysis entirely. To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must show that her “workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 ...