Craig v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No.: 11-cv-1200 (RC)

• Decision Date: 15 July 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 11-cv-1200 (RC)
• Citation: 197 F.Supp.3d 268
• Parties: Joanne T. CRAIG, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

197 F.Supp.3d 268

Joanne T. CRAIG, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 11-cv-1200 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 15, 2016

Boniface K. Cobbina, Boniface K. Cobbina, Esquire, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Kerslyn D. Featherstone, Shermineh C. Jones, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S BILL OF COSTS

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Joanne Craig brought an employment discrimination action against Defendant the District of Columbia under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2–1401.01 et seq. ("DCHRA"). Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Craig, awarding her $20,000.00 in compensatory damages against the District. See Verdict Form, ECF No. 141. With the judgment now final, Ms. Craig seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing her successful claim. See Pl.'s Corr. Mot. Reas. Att'y's Fees, Costs & Exp. at 1–4, ECF No. 149 ("Pl.'s Mot."); see also Pl.'s Reply Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Reas. Att'y's Fees & Costs at 1–2, ECF No. 158 ("Pl.'s Reply"). The District opposes Ms. Craig's motion on the ground that the requested award is unreasonable and excessive. See Def.'s Opp'n Pl.'s Corr. Mot. Reas. Att'y's Fees, Costs & Exp. at 1–12, ECF No. 151 ("Def.'s Opp'n"). Upon consideration of the parties' filings, the Court concludes that only some of Ms. Craig's requested fees and costs are reasonable. In this opinion, the Court will also address the District's objections to Ms. Craig's bill of costs, and concludes that Ms. Craig has failed to justify certain aspects of her request. Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Ms. Craig's motion for fees and costs and will grant in part and deny in part Ms. Craig's bill of costs.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ms. Craig brought this action after being subjected to a series of sexually charged and inappropriate comments over the course of her employment with the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department.¹ See Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1. After initially proceeding pro se , Ms. Craig retained counsel on October 26, 2011. See Cobbina Decl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 149-1. Thereafter, Ms. Craig filed her second amended complaint and set forth various employment discrimination claims under Title VII and the DCHRA. See 2d Amend. Compl. at 1–19, ECF No. 26.

In response, Defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint. The Court granted the motion as to Ms. Craig's claims for unliquidated damages under the DCHRA and her Title VII claims against Commander Maupin. See Craig v. District of Columbia , 881 F.Supp.2d 26, 36 (D.D.C.2012). The following claims remained: (1) sex discrimination by the District in violation of Title VII and the DCHRA, (2) sex discrimination by Commander Maupin in violation of the DCHRA, (3) retaliation by the District in violation of Title VII and the DCHRA, and (4) retaliation by Commander Maupin in violation of the DCHRA. See Craig v. District of Columbia , 74 F.Supp.3d 349, 359 (D.D.C.2014). After discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment and prevailed on all claims except Ms. Craig's discriminatory hostile work environment claim against the District under Title VII and the DCHRA. See id.

In May 2015, the case proceeded to trial. On the third day of trial, the Court declared a mistrial because of a medical emergency that arose with Ms. Craig's counsel. See May 20, 2015 Minute Entry. In January 2016, a second trial commenced. See Jan. 11, 2016 Minute Entry. Ultimately, Ms. Craig prevailed at trial against the District and the jury awarded her $20,000.00 in damages. See Verdict Form.

Ms. Craig's counsel has now filed a motion seeking attorney's fees and costs for 985.30 hours of work in connection with litigating and trying this case through entry of the judgment.² Ms. Craig's counsel seeks $559,650.40 in fees based on an hourly rate of $568.00 per hour. See Pl.'s Reply Ex. 1 at 24, ECF No. 158-1. Ms. Craig's initial fee motion failed to attach supporting documentation and billing invoices to support the requested fee award. See Pl.'s Mot. at 1–5. Thereafter, the District filed its opposition, emphasizing that omission. See Def.'s Opp'n at 1, 5–12. Despite Ms. Craig's error, the Court accepted Ms. Craig's reply to the District's opposition, which included the necessary documentation and evidence to support her fee request, and sua sponte granted the District leave to file a surreply.³ See Mar. 7, 2016 Minute Order. Separately, Ms. Craig submitted a bill of costs, seeking payment of $10,802.83⁴ in costs for the following: $350.00 in filing fees, $7,567.91 in deposition transcripts and pretrial transcripts, $679.92 in witness fees, and $2,205.00 for summons and subpoena fees. See Bill of Costs, ECF. No. 150.

III. ANALYSIS

Resolving Ms. Craig's motions requires an analysis of two distinct requests: her requests for reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and her bill of costs. The Court will consider each in turn.

A. Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs

1. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) requires a party seeking attorney's fees and "related nontaxable expenses" to file a motion with the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A). The motion must "specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the movant to the award." Id. It must also state the amount or provide a fair estimate of the award sought. Id. ; see also Does I, II, III v. District of Columbia. , 448 F.Supp.2d 137, 139–40 (D.D.C.2006).

Under Title VII, the court is authorized, in its discretion, to award "the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k). Generally, "[a] reasonable fee is one that is adequate to attract competent counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to attorneys." West v. Potter , 717 F.3d 1030, 1033 (D.C.Cir.2013) (quoting Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). In awarding appropriate attorney's fees, the court's determination is based on a two-step inquiry. Does I, II, III , 448 F.Supp.2d at 140.

First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff is the prevailing party. Id. Plaintiffs are considered prevailing parties, and thus entitled to attorney's fees, "if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Harvey v. Mohammed , 951 F.Supp.2d 47, 53 (D.D.C.2013) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). A litigant need not succeed at every step of the litigation in order to be a prevailing party for the purpose of Title VII; indeed, "a litigant who is unsuccessful at a stage of litigation that was a necessary step to her ultimate victory is entitled to attorney's fees even for the unsuccessful stage." Ashraf – Hassan v. Embassy of Fr. in the U.S. , No. CV 11–805, 189 F.Supp.3d 48, 54–55, 2016 WL 3014615, at *3 (D.D.C. May 24, 2016) (quoting Air Transp. Ass'n of Can. v. FAA , 156 F.3d 1329, 1335 (D.C.Cir.1998) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, the court must determine whether the plaintiff's fee request is reasonable. Does I, II, III , 448 F.Supp.2d at 140. In calculating a reasonable fee award, a district court must determine: (1) the reasonable hourly rate (or "lodestar") for the services rendered by the plaintiff's attorney, (2) the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, and (3) whether the plaintiff has offered specific evidence demonstrating that this is one of the rare cases where a lodestar enhancement or multiplier is appropriate. See Covington v. District of Columbia , 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.Cir.1995) ; Heller v. District of Columbia , 832 F.Supp.2d 32, 38 (D.D.C.2011). "The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. With respect to the number of hours expended, the court must exclude hours that are "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Does I, II, III , 448 F.Supp.2d at 140 (quoting Palmer v. Rice , No. CIV.A.76–1439, 2005 WL 1662130, at *9 (D.D.C. July 11, 2005) ).

Ultimately, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing both her entitlement to attorney's fees and the reasonableness of the fees she seeks. See Covington , 57 F.3d at 1107 ; Turner v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics , 354 F.3d 890, 895 (D.C.Cir.2004). A plaintiff can satisfy this burden by submitting evidence of: "the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Covington , 57 F.3d at 1107. Once the plaintiff has provided such information, a presumption arises that the hours billed are reasonable and the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's showing. Id. at 1109–10.

2. Analysis

Although Ms. Craig prevailed and is therefore entitled to reasonable attorney's fees, the District argues that Ms. Craig's requested fees are excessive and lack the requisite specificity to justify the number of hours reasonably expended.⁵ See Def.'s Opp'n at 1; Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def.'s Sur-Reply at 4–13, ECF No. 163 ("Def.'s Sur-Reply"). Specifically, the District requests that the Court reduce Ms. Craig's counsel's request by eighty percent. Def.'s Sur-Reply at 15.

a. Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

Ms. Craig's counsel seeks fees at a rate of $568 per hour—which...