Craig v. Pyles

• Citation: 39 S.W. 33,101 Ky. 593
• Parties: CRAIG et ux. v. PYLES.
• Decision Date: 13 February 1897
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

39 S.W. 33

101 Ky. 593

CRAIG et ux. v. PYLES.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

February 13, 1897

Appeal from circuit court, Carroll county.

"Not to be officially reported."

Action by Isaac W. Craig and wife against John Pyles for slander. Judgment dismissing the petition on demurrer, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Gaunt & Downs, for appellants.

HAZELRIGG, J.

The words spoken by appellee of and concerning the appellant Katie A. Craig, wife of her co-appellant, namely, "She is a dirty bitch; she has no character, and is no account," are not actionable words, in themselves importing, as averred in the petition, that appellant was "a whore, common prostitute, or was guilty of fornication and adultery." In Schurick v. Kollman, 50 Ind. 336, the words spoken of the wife were that she was a d___n b___h, meaning to charge, as is averred, a want of chastity and virtue. The court held that the words did not amount to a charge of either incest, fornication, adultery, or whoredom, saying further that "the word 'b___h,' although a very coarse and ruffianly expression when applied to a woman, does not, in its common acceptation, import whoredom in any of its forms"; citing K___ v. H___, 20 Wis. 239. The latter case is to the same effect. The innuendo, as averred by the plaintiffs, cannot change the meaning of the words from their common acceptation. "It is a well-settled rule," said this court in Watson v. Hampton, 2 Bibb, 319, "that an innuendo cannot extend the meaning of words beyond their natural import. It is only explanatory of some matter already expressed. It may show the application, but cannot add to or enlarge or change the sense, of the words." We think that the other words relied on are in themselves indefinite and meaningless, or at least wholly fail to import the crime of fornication or adultery without a colloquium to show the connection in which they were used. The judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition is affirmed.