Craig v. Suncrest Lumber Co
Citation | 189 N.C. 137,126 S.E. 312 |
Decision Date | 31 January 1925 |
Docket Number | (No. 593.) |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | CRAIG v. SUNCREST LUMBER CO. et al. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Haywood County; Ray, Judge.
Action by Maud Craig against the Suncrest Lumber Company and others. Prom judgment on demurrer for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Morgan & Ward and W. J. Hannah, all of Waynesville, for appellant.
Alley & Alley, of Waynesville, for appellees.
The plaintiff, who is the widow of George Craig, alleges that her husband was an employee of the defendant company, performing the duties of an engineer on its logging train, and that on April 11, 1922, he was instantly killed by the negligence of the defendants. Thereafter she qualified as his personal representative, and brought suit against the defendants in which she recovered judgment for $12,000. 185 N. C. 560, 118 S. E. 8. The present action is prosecuted in her individual capacity. She alleges that by reason of her husband's death she has suffered, now suffers, and will continue to suffer, grief and pain, both ofbody and of mind, as well as the loss of the society, companionship, support, and consortium of her husband.
The defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, in that it appears upon its face that the deceased was killed instantaneously, and that the action cannot be maintained by the plaintiff in her individual right. The demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff appealed.
At common law a civil action was not permissible for an injury resulting in death. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493; Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754, 24 L. Ed. 580; Mitchell v. Talley, 182 N. C. 683, 109 S. E. 882. Under Lord Campbell's Act (C. S. § 160) the suit must be brought by the personal representative, and cannot be prosecuted by the widow of the deceased. Howell v. Com'rs, 121 N. C. 363, 28 S. E. 362. Conditions may exist under which an action may be brought for loss suffered during the period between the injury and the death, but this principle does not apply when the death is instantaneous. Killian v. Railroad, 128 N. C. 261, 38 S. E. 873; Croom v. Murphy, 179 N. C. 292, 102 S. E. 706. Upon the allegations in the complaint the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for loss of her husband's society, support, and consortium. This question is discussed and determined in Hinnant v. Power Co., 188 N. C. ——, 126 S. E. 307, ante.
The demurrer was properly sustained, and the judgment is...
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...mental suffering caused by injury to a spouse by means other than alienation of affections or criminal conversation. Craig v. Lumber Co., 189 N.C. 137, 126 S.E. 312 (1925) (denying wife's recovery for grief and pain where husband died instantaneously); Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426, 102 S......
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