Cram v. Inhabitants of Cumberland County

Decision Date27 April 1953
Citation96 A.2d 839,148 Me. 515
PartiesCRAM, Reg. of Deeds, v. INHABITANTS OF COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Nathaniel M. Haskell, Portland, for plaintiff.

Daniel C. McDonald, County Atty., Frederic S. Sturgis, Portland, for defendant.

Before MURCHIE, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, MERRILL, NULTY and WILLIAMSON, JJ.

MERRILL, Chief Justice.

On report. This is an action brought by the plaintiff, who is Register of Deeds for Cumberland County, to recover compensation for compiling and completing a revised and consolidated index covering all deeds recorded in the Registry of Deeds for said County for the period from January 1, 1945 to and including December 31, 1949. Compensation is claimed under R.S.1944, c. 79, § 243. So much of said section as is applicable is as follows:

'The registers shall make an alphabetical index to the records without charge to the county, * * *. As often as every 10 years the register shall revise and consolidate such index * * *. For this work the register shall receive a reasonable compensation to be approved by the county commissioners of the respective counties and drawn from the county treasury.'

The plaintiff's claim is resisted by the County which claims that R.S.1944, c. 79, § 231 absolves it from any liability for the aforesaid work. Said section 231, in part, is as follows:

'Registers of deeds in the several counties shall receive annual salaries from the treasuries of the counties in monthly payments on the last day of each month, as follows: * * *

'Cumberland (as amended) $3,600, * * *.

'The sums above mentioned shall be in full compensation for the performance of all official duties and no other fees or compensation shall be allowed them. All registers, except in the western district of Oxford county, shall devote their entire time to the duties of the office. They shall account quarterly under oath to the county treasurers for all fees received by them or payable to them by virtue of the office, specifying the items, and shall pay the whole amount of the same to the treasurers of their respective counties quarterly on the 15th days of January, April, July, and October of each year. They may make abstracts and copies from the records and furnish the same to persons calling for them and may charge a reasonable fee for such service, but shall not give an opinion upon the title to real estate. Fees charged by them for abstracts and copies shall be retained by them and not paid to the county.'

With respect to the payment for services rendered in revising and consolidating the index, which is an official duty of the register, these two sections of the statute are apparently in direct and irreconcilable conflict one with the other. If the provisions of section 231 relative to compensation of registers of deeds prevail, the plaintiff cannot recover. On the other hand, if the provision of section 243 relative to the compensation of such registers for services in revising and consolidating the index is to prevail, the plaintiff would be entitled to receive a reasonable compensation for his services. The question is one of construction.

It is for the Court to determine the expressed legislative intent. 'The legislative intention must prevail in the construction of statutes, whenever that intention can be ascertained.' Lyon v. Lyon, 88 Me. 395, 401, 34 A. 180, 181.

'Statute provisions, unless absolutely conflicting, are to be construed so as to make them operate harmoniously as a whole, giving each its appropriate effect--not using one section to evade or abrogate another.' Collins v. Chase, 71 Me. 434, 436.

'All existing statute provisions upon a particular topic are to be examined together to ascertain the intent of each; and a meaning which is found to be incompatible with any plain provision must be rejected.' Merrill v. Crossman, 68 Me. 412, 414.

An existing statute that is inconsistent with a new statute enacted upon the same subject matter must be regarded as necessarily repealed by the subsequent legislation. Poor v. Willoughby, 64 Me. 379.

The foregoing general principles to be applied in the construction of statutes are elementary and further citation of authorities thereon is unnecessary.

In this case the two sections of the statute which we are considering, R.S.1944, c. 79, §§ 231 and 243, although reenacted simultaneously in the revisions of 1916, 1930, and 1944 successively, were not initially enacted simultaneously. Their legislative history is illuminating.

Section 231, the section relied upon as affording a defense to this action, was first enacted in its present form as Chapter 141 of the Public Laws of 1915. Section 2 of the 1915 act expressly provided that 'All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.'

Section 1 of Chapter 141 of the Public Laws of 1915 was carried into the revision of 1916 without any change material to the issues here involved. It appeared as R.S.1916, c. 117, § 43 and except for changes in the amount of salary to be paid to the several registers, appeared again in R.S.1930, c. 125, § 44, and is now R.S.1944, c. 79, § 231, quoted supra.

An examination of the legislation which P.L.1915, c. 141 replaced is not only interesting but throws light upon its construction.

Prior to 1893, registers of deeds received no salaries but were compensated for their services in the registries principally by the fees for recording. By the following acts, P.L.1893, c. 219, P.L.1895, c. 22, P.L.1901, c. 230, salaries were established for the registers of deeds of Penobscot, Kennebec and Androscoggin Counties respectively. The provisions of these three acts were carried into the Revision of 1903, c. 116, § 6. After specifying the salaries, with allowances for clerk hire the statute provided: 'The above salaries shall be received instead of the fees provided by law, and said registers shall collect such fees and pay them into the treasuries of their counties quarterly, for the use of said counties.'

By R.S.1903, c. 11, § 15, provision was also made for the revision of the index by the registers 'for which they shall receive a reasonable compensation, to be approved by the county commissioners of the respective counties', which provision without change material to decision of this case was continued in R.S.1916, c. 12, § 15, R.S.1930, c. 15, § 15, and now appears in R.S.1944, c. 79, § 243, quoted supra.

It is to be noted that the provisions of R.S.1903, c. 116, § 6 with respect to the salaries of registers of deeds in the counties of Androscoggin, Kennebec and Penobscot provided that the salaries should be received instead of the fees provided by law, and that the registers should collect the fees and pay them into the treasuries of their counties. This provision evidently applies only to fees to be charged and collected according to the schedule of fees set forth in the statute. It manifestly did not apply to the compensation to be paid to them for services in consolidating and revising the index under R.S.1903, c. 11, § 15. It would be absurd to make provision for the payment of a reasonable sum by the county commissioners to the registers for revising and consolidating the index, and then require them to pay such sum into the county treasuries. In 1905 the Legislature passed an act, P.L.1905, c. 173, placing all registers of deeds on a salary basis with a provision that the salaries 'shall be in full compensation for the performance of all official duties and in lieu of all fees', and that the registers account quarterly to the county treasurers for the fees received by them or payable to them by virtue of the office.

In 1907, the 1905 act was amended by some readjustment of salaries and clerk hire but the foregoing provision of the 1905 act was continued verbatim. P.L.1907, c. 177.

It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or not the 1905 act and the 1907 act repealed the provisions of R.S.1903, c. 11, § 15 relative to compensation to the registers of deeds for revision and consolidation of the index as inconsistent therewith. If any doubt existed with respect thereto it was settled by P.L.1915, c. 141. That act not only stated that 'the sums above mentioned [the salaries] shall be in full compensation for the performance of all official duties' but expressly provided that 'no other fees or compensation shall be allowed them. (Emphasis ours.) All registers, except in Oxford, western registry, shall devote their entire time to the duties of the office.' Section 2 of the act as above stated declared that all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of the act were thereby repealed. Furthermore, a provision contained in section 1 of the act relating to the registers provided that 'They may make abstracts and copies from the records and furnish the same to persons calling for them and may charge a reasonable fee for such service, but shall not give an opinion upon the title to real estate. Fees charged by them for abstracts and copies shall be retained by them and not paid to the county.'

This latter provision allowing registers, who were full time officials, to perform certain specified acts and receive and retain fees therefor clearly indicates that the provision that the salaries were to be in full compensation for the performance of all official duties and that no other fees or compensation shall be allowed to them is, save for the exception, all inclusive, and excludes any right to the additional compensation allowed under the then existing statute for revising and consolidating the index. We hold that P.L.1915, c. 141 repealed the provision of R.S.1903, c. 11, § 15, as then amended, which provided for the payment of compensation to the registers of deeds, for revising and consolidating the index of deeds.

As above stated, in the revision of 1916, P.L.1915, c. 141 appeared as R.S.1916, c. 117, § 43; and although the provision for...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Vanasse v. Labrecque
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • December 21, 1977
    ...89 Me. 43, 35 A. 1033 (1896); Stevens v. Dixfield and Mexico Bridge Company, 115 Me. 402, 99 A. 94 (1916); Cram v. Inhabitants of County of Cumberland, 148 Me. 515, 96 A.2d 839 (1953). The 1883 revision kept intact the requirement that licenses to sell at private sale or to accept an advant......
  • Finks v. Maine State Highway Commission
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • November 21, 1974
    ...and contemporaneous legislation upon a particular topic should be considered in interpreting any statute. Cram v. Inhabitants of Cumberland County, 1953, 148 Me. 515, 96 A.2d 839; Merrill v. Crossman, 1878, 68 Me. 412, The Legislature is presumed to have in mind previous decisions of this C......
  • State v. Taplin
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • November 29, 1968
    ...inconsistency or repugnancy appears in different sections of the Revised Statutes.' Cram, Reg. of Deeds v. Inhabitants of County of Cumberland, 1953, 148 Me. 515, 96 A.2d 839; Lyon v. Ogden, 1893, 85 Me. 374, 27 A. 258. A former statute, once repealed, becomes as if it had never existed. Co......
  • Brown v. Warchalowski
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • January 19, 1984
    ...Cummings v. Everett, 82 Me. 260, 264, 19 A. 456, 457 (1890); Hughes v. Farrar, 45 Me. 72 (1858); Cram v. Inhabitants of County of Cumberland, 148 Me. 515, 521-22, 96 A.2d 839, 843 (1953). Thus, the revised statutes of 1857 generated the question, whether the introduction therein of the new ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT