Merrill v. Crossman

• Decision Date: 15 September 1878
• Citation: 68 Me. 412
• Parties: FRED S. MERRILL v. CHARLES CROSSMAN, administrator.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

68 Me. 412

FRED S. MERRILL v. CHARLES CROSSMAN, administrator.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

September 15, 1878

ON EXCEPTIONS.

ASSUMPSIT, for money had and received, $156.00, commenced under R. S., c. 66, § 13, under an appeal by the plaintiff from the decision of the commissioners appointed by the judge of probate for the county of Cumberland, to receive and decide upon claims against the estate of M. C. Merrill, late of Brunswick, in said county, represented insolvent, and to determine the plaintiff's claim against said estate.

The defendant seasonably pleaded in abatement to the plaintiff's writ. The presiding justice sustained the plea in abatement and ordered judgment for the defendant; and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.

L H. Hutchinson, A. R. Savage & F. D. Hale, for the plaintiff.

I. This is an appellate proceeding in a probate matter. R. S. of 1871, c. 66, §§ 11, 12, 13, 15.

II. The superior court of Cumberland county has no jurisdiction in appellate proceedings in probate matters. Acts and Resolves of 1868, c. 151, § 5.

III. The supreme judicial court has jurisdiction. R. S., c. 63, § 21, and c. 66, §§ 12, 13.

H Orr, for the defendant.

BARROWS J.

The plaintiff insists that this action for money had and received is to be regarded as substantially a probate appeal, and so cognizable by the supreme judicial court, which is the supreme court of probate under R. S., c. 63, § 21; and not by the superior court for Cumberland county, which has in that county exclusive original jurisdiction of " all civil actions at law, not exclusively cognizable by municipal courts and trial justices, where the damages demanded do not exceed five hundred dollars," with certain exceptions which do not touch this case.

If his position is correct, it would follow that all actions commenced against the administrators of insolvent estates, in pursuance of the provisions of § § 11, 12, 13, of R. S., c. 66, must be commenced in the supreme judicial court, however trifling the amount involved. Such a result, with its burdensome consequences as to costs, is to be avoided, unless the statute provisions construed together clearly require it. All existing statute provisions upon a particular topic are to be examined together to ascertain the intent of each; and a meaning which is found to be incompatible with any plain provision must be rejected. Now R. S., c. 66, § 14, distinctly provides for the commencement of actions of this particular description before justices of the peace. Such magistrates have no jurisdiction of probate appeals.

The true solution of the matter is that this statute action given to one who claims to be a creditor of an insolvent estate, where the commissioners of insolvency decide against him, or where the administrator, an heir at law, or another creditor, gives notice at the probate office of an appeal from a decision of such commissioners in his favor, is not to be regarded as a probate appeal. In cases of dissatisfaction with the decision of the commissioners of insolvency appointed by the probate court, under certain statute provisions and restrictions, the question between the claimant and the estate is transferred from the probate court to a common law court having jurisdiction of the parties and case for decision.

The language of § 25, c. 51, laws of 1821, is this: " Provided that, notwithstanding the report of any commissioners, any creditor whose claim is wholly or in part...