Crampton v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline

• Decision Date: 14 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 08–15–00074–CV,08–15–00074–CV
• Citation: 545 S.W.3d 593
• Parties: Holly Gail CRAMPTON, Appellant, v. COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

545 S.W.3d 593

Holly Gail CRAMPTON, Appellant,

v.COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, Appellee.

No. 08–15–00074–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

December 14, 2016

James Dyer, for Holly Gail Crampton.

Cynthia Canfield Hamilton, for Commission for Lawyer Discipline.

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.

OPINION

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

This appeal from a disciplinary proceeding posits several questions, including what it means when the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court "rescinds" the appointment of a judge to hear a case, and then appoints a new judge in his stead. Specifically, does the order rescinding an appointment void everything that went before, or does it merely mean the newly appointed judge picks up where the former judge left off? Thereafter, we must examine whether the former judge properly granted partial summary judgment, and whether Texas summary judgment practice is constitutionally sufficient to deprive a lawyer of their license to practice law. We set forth the background facts from the summary judgment record.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

The disciplinary proceeding at issue starts with Steven and Tammy Young who were foster parents wishing to adopt one of the children they had in their care. They claim that the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department), for nefarious reasons, removed the child and put the child up for adoption by another family. The Youngs hired Crampton on November 16, 2009. They paid her a $7,500 non-refundable retainer. The Youngs signed an employment contract which defined the scope of Crampton's representation to include the filing of a civil rights claim against the Department in state district court, and the filing of an intervention in the on-going adoption of the child. The contract provided in all capitalized and bolded wording that it was for "state court matters only and does not include representation in any federal court." Despite that disclaimer in the employment contract, the Youngs believed, based on their discussions with Crampton, that the civil rights suit would wind up in federal court either because it would be filed there, or would be removed from state court. Crampton conceded that she informed the Youngs that the potential defendants would have the right to remove a case asserting only a federal civil rights claim, but she had a different take on litigating the case if it got to federal court.

Crampton contends that following the initial consultation, the Youngs agreed with her that if the suit were removed, they would do nothing and simply let it be dismissed. Her affidavit states:

I explained while we could file initially in state court, we could not stop or prevent the [Department] from removing the case into federal court if the Defendants chose to. I explained that if this happened (the case was removed to federal court), that I would do ‘absolutely nothing’ and that the civil rights case would be over. The Youngs' [sic] agreed that they would accept this, and discussed that at least they would have tried.

Crampton contends that the employment agreement purposely did not recite this part of their agreement because it might be subject to discovery and she would not want the Department to know of the consequence of a removal. Conversely, the Youngs claim they were never made aware of any plan to not file responses to dispositive motions if the case found its way to federal court.

As it turned out, litigating in federal court presented a problem for Crampton. Based on an unpaid monetary sanction that had been assessed against her in a prior federal case, she could not practice in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Crampton had been disbarred from practicing in that court since July 1, 1999.¹ The Youngs stated that they were never told this fact, and Crampton concedes she did not inform them of her federal disbarment.

The civil rights suit was filed on October 17, 2011, in the 30th Judicial District Court for Wichita County, Texas against the Department and three of its employees. It alleged that because Mr. Young provided truthful testimony in a judicial proceeding that undermined the position of the Department, it revoked the Youngs' license to provide foster care. The suit sought injunctive relief "to secure the rights" of the Youngs. It also sought monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and § 1983. The suit did not assert any state law claims.

The Department removed the suit to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas based on federal question jurisdiction. Once removed, one of the individual defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the Department and the other individual defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the pleadings. When no response was filed in opposition to the motion to dismiss, the federal district court issued an order requiring a response to be filed by a date certain. Again, no response was filed to the motion to dismiss, or to the motion for summary judgment, and the federal case was dismissed without prejudice on February 23, 2012. The dismissal order allowed the Youngs to reinstate the case within thirty days. No motion to reinstate or appeal the dismissal order was ever filed.

Crampton never withdrew as counsel of record in the federal proceeding, nor did she advise the Youngs of their ability to retain other counsel. She contends in part that a "domestic relations exception" to federal jurisdiction bars federal civil rights suits "if issues of family law were in any way involved." Her affidavit describing the domestic relations exception is not grounded in a discussion of the controlling case law on that issue, but is rather based on the statement that a federal district judge made to her in 1982 during a proceeding in another case. She also discussed in her affidavits how federal court is a less desirable forum for a litigant. Based on these concerns, she would not have asked any other attorney to substitute in for her in this case.

The record presents several conflicting claims between Crampton and the Youngs. The Youngs contend that they were never given a copy of the original suit papers. Crampton directly disputes this claim. The Youngs also claim they never received any notice of the removal, the answer filed by the Department and its employees, the motion to dismiss, or the motion for summary judgment. Crampton contends she orally told Mr. Young that an answer had been filed, that the case had been removed, and that the suit was "essentially over" as there was no basis to seek a remand to state court. Crampton concedes that she did not specifically inform them of the motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, or order requiring a responsive pleading to be filed. She did not do so, however, based on the previous agreement to do nothing if the suit was removed. Conversely, the Young's claim they were never made aware of any plan not to file responses to dispositive motions. Crampton maintains she spoke with the Youngs by phone several times a month and saw them several times in her office; she attached a matrix documenting the dates of those alleged calls and office visits.

Mr. Young met with Crampton in August 3, 2012. Even then he was not told that the civil rights case had been dismissed some six months earlier; he only learned that fact later from another lawyer. Crampton, however, insists that she orally informed Mr. Young of the dismissal within a week or two after the court entered the order.

Crampton had also attempted to intervene in the adoption, but asserted that the district clerk, at the direction of the state trial court hearing that case, refused to accept her filing. Upset with Crampton's representation, Mr. Young initiated a grievance with the State Bar against her.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Under Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution and Section 81.011(c) of the State Bar Act, the Texas Supreme Court has the power to regulate the practice of law in the State of Texas. In re State Bar of Texas, 113 S.W.3d 730, 732 (Tex. 2003). The Court has the constitutional and statutory responsibility to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct and to dispose of individual cases of lawyer discipline. TEX.RULES DISCIPLINARY P.R. Preamble, reprinted in TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. , tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A–1 (West 2013). The Supreme Court has delegated the responsibility for administering and supervising lawyer discipline and disability to the Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas. Id. The Board is vested with authority to adopt rules of procedure and administration consistent with the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Id. The Commission for Lawyer Discipline (the Commission) is a permanent committee of the State Bar of Texas. TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.076(b) (West 2013); TEX.RULES DISCIPLINARY P.R. 1.06(D). Each attorney admitted to practice in Texas is subject to the disciplinary and disability jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Commission. TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.071. Likewise, each attorney is subject to the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Id . at § 81.072(d).

Under these rules, a grievance against a lawyer starts as an administrative proceeding, and may be classified either as an inquiry or a complaint. Id . at § 81.073. The Youngs' grievance against Crampton was pursued as a complaint by the Commission. At one point in the process, the lawyer can choose to have a complaint heard by a district court. Id . at § 81.075(b)(2)(A). Crampton made that election. The Commission then filed its petition detailing the complaint with the Texas Supreme Court. The Texas Supreme Court is to designate an "active district judge" to hear the case. TEX.RULES DISCIPLINARY P.R. 3.02, reprinted in TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. tit 2, subtit. G, app. A–1. On August 1, 2013, the Texas Supreme Court appointed then sitting district court judge ...