Crampton v. Farris

• Decision Date: 26 November 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 01-18-00432-CV,01-18-00432-CV
• Citation: 596 S.W.3d 267
• Parties: Holly Gail CRAMPTON, Appellant v. Susan Morgan FARRIS, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

596 S.W.3d 267

Holly Gail CRAMPTON, Appellant

v.Susan Morgan FARRIS, Appellee

NO. 01-18-00432-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued November 26, 2019

Rehearing Denied March 24, 2020

Rehearing En Banc Denied March 24, 2020

Kristin Brady, Dean Schaffer, Austin, Lisa Holt, for Appellee.

Susan C. Norman, Houston, for Appellant.

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.

Richard Hightower, Justice

The Texas Commission for Lawyer Discipline (the Commission) brought a disciplinary action against appellant, Holly Gail Crampton.¹ While the Commission's case against her was pending, Crampton filed a "Third-Party Petition" against the Commission attorney assigned to the disciplinary case, appellee Susan Morgan Farris, in her individual capacity, asserting claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among others. The court hearing the disciplinary matter severed Crampton's claims against Farris in her individual capacity from the disciplinary matter.

Farris subsequently filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity and absolute immunity pursuant to Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 17.09. The trial court granted Farris's plea, dismissing all of Crampton's claims with prejudice. Crampton now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction because (1) Farris was not entitled to any form of immunity for her "illegal, ultra vires" acts; (2) Farris, in her individual capacity, was not immune from suit under Section 1983 ; and (3) a plea to the jurisdiction was not the proper procedural vehicle to address Farris's affirmative defense that she was not liable in the capacity in which she was sued. Because we conclude that Farris is immune from suit under the absolute immunity granted by Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 17.09, we affirm the trial court's granting of the plea to the jurisdiction.

Background

The Commission filed the underlying disciplinary proceeding against Crampton in 2016. The disciplinary proceeding arose out of a grievance filed by Crampton's former client, Michael Lemont, in connection with Crampton's representation of him in an insurance dispute and complaint against the Veteran's Administration. As part of the disciplinary proceeding, Crampton filed an amended answer together with a "Third-Party Petition" alleging various wrongdoings by the Commission's attorney, Farris, committed in the course of prosecuting the disciplinary action based on Lemont's grievance.²

In her live pleading, Crampton asserted claims against Farris in her individual capacity and alleged that Farris was the prosecutor in a previous disciplinary proceeding against Crampton based on a grievance filed by different complainants, the Youngs. See Crampton v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline , 545 S.W.3d 593 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied) (the Young case). Crampton alleged that Farris engaged in "a series of ultra vires and illegal acts beginning with the Young case and intertwining it into the Lemont grievance" and that Farris violated Crampton's rights "under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Art. I § 19 of the Texas Constitution." Crampton asserted causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and she further alleged that Farris's behavior violated public policy and State Bar Rules, constituted abuse of her official capacity in violation of Texas Penal Code section 39.02(a)(1), and constituted "public disclosure of private facts."

Crampton alleged, "Ms. Farris' acts of professional misconduct—at best—and acts violating criminal statutes—at worst—as a [Commission] prosecutor, demonstrate her belief that as a [Commission] prosecutor, she is ‘absolutely immune,’ ‘above the law,’ and that ‘the ends justify the means.’ " Crampton pleaded various ultra vires acts by Farris, including that Farris filed a previous private reprimand against Crampton in the public record in the Young case in violation of Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure 2.16 (governing confidentiality) and 6.08 (governing access to confidential information); Farris "generated the Lemont grievance" by making or failing to correct false statements of law and fact to Lemont regarding the statute of limitations applicable to Lemont's claims; Farris suborned perjury by Lemont in affidavits and deposition testimony; and Farris caused spoliation of evidence.

Crampton sought monetary relief of between $100,000 and $200,000, as well as "non-monetary relief." She also alleged that Farris's "malicious ultra vires conduct entitles [her] to prospective injunctive relief," including "[e]njoining Ms. Farris from acting as counsel in this or in any other case involving Ms. Crampton"; enjoining the "Dallas District Office and the Dallas Regional Office of the Commission for Lawyer Discipline from acting with regard to this or any other case involving Crampton" and enjoining "the Commission for Lawyer Discipline's prosecution of this case and referring the matter to CAAP (Client Attorney Assistance Program) for an attempted resolution of this case between Mr. Lemont and Ms. Crampton."

The trial judge assigned to the underlying disciplinary action determined that "the assignment for the proceeding involving the Commission for Lawyer Discipline applied solely to the claim by the Commission for Lawyer Discipline vs. Holly Gail Crampton and would not involve a third-party action against Susan Morgan Farris in her individual capacity." That court severed Crampton's claims against Farris into a separate cause of action that was transferred to the trial court underlying this appeal.

Farris filed a plea to the jurisdiction together with special exceptions and her original answer in the severed cause of action. Farris asserted that both sovereign immunity and the absolute immunity granted to Commission lawyers under the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure made her immune from suit, including immunity from suit on Crampton's intentional infliction of emotional distress and Section 1983 claims. Farris challenged the factual basis of Crampton's pleadings, asserting that the private reprimand identified in Crampton's petition "was filed as part of a business records affidavit in November 2013" in the Young case, that Crampton's discipline history was a factor for the court in the Young case to consider in assessing sanctions, and that the reprimand "has been public for almost three years." Farris further asserted that there was no evidence that she suborned perjury by Lemont, caused spoliation of evidence, induced Lemont to file the underlying grievance, or made misrepresentations of law or fact to Lemont. She cited excerpts of Lemont's deposition indicating that he had not received advice from anyone at the State Bar at the time he filed his grievance against Crampton, and Farris argues that nothing in Lemont's deposition testimony supports Crampton's allegations of perjury, spoliation, or inducement to file a grievance. Farris argued that Crampton's ultra vires claims were deficient as a matter of law because, among other reasons, Crampton had sued Farris in her individual capacity and not her official capacity and because ultra vires claims would not entitle Crampton to recover retrospective monetary damages from Farris.

Finally, Farris asserted special exceptions, stating that Crampton's petition contained no allegation of waiver of any of the immunity protections afforded to the State Bar of Texas and its agents and employees and that the petition "contain[s] no legally cognizable cause of action." Farris also asserted affirmative defenses including sovereign immunity, official immunity, and "the affirmative defense of not being liable in the capacity sued." Farris further indicated that she had retired and resigned her position as Senior Trial Attorney with the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel effective October 31, 2016, which was just a few weeks after Crampton had first filed her claims against Farris, and that she no longer worked for the Commission.

Crampton responded to the plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that "illegal acts cannot be immunized," that governmental immunity does not apply to Farris, and that she was legally permitted to sue Farris in both her individual and official capacity. Crampton asserted that the alleged ultra vires acts—breach of confidentiality rules and suborning perjury—do not involve discretionary matters and the "ultra vires bad acts override any ‘attorney privilege’ [Farris] may have enjoyed prior to her committing illegal, ultra vires acts."

The trial court granted Farris's plea to the jurisdiction, dismissing with prejudice all of Crampton's claims in the severed suit. Crampton appealed.

Plea to the Jurisdiction

Crampton argues in three issues that the trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction.

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a jurisdictional plea. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). The ultimate inquiry is whether the particular facts presented in the pleadings affirmatively demonstrate a claim within the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Bacon v. Tex. Historical Comm'n , 411 S.W.3d 161, 170–71 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) ; see City of Elsa v. Gonzalez , 325 S.W.3d 622, 625 (Tex. 2010) ; Miranda , 133 S.W.3d at 226.

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a challenge to its jurisdiction, we consider the plaintiff's pleadings and factual assertions, as well as any evidence relevant to the jurisdictional issue.

City of Elsa , 325 S.W.3d at 625–26 ; Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). We construe pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader's intent, and determine if the pleader has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating the court's jurisdiction. City of Elsa , 325...