Crane v. Bennett

• Decision Date: 05 January 1904
• Citation: 177 N.Y. 106,69 N.E. 274
• Parties: CRANE v. BENNETT.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

177 N.Y. 106

69 N.E. 274

CRANE

v.BENNETT.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 5, 1904.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Action by Leroy B. Crane against James Gordon Bennett. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (79 N. Y. Supp. 66) modifying and affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Charles F. Brown, William Jay, Flamen B. Candler, and Robert W. Candler, for appellant.

Eugene Frayer, for respondent.

MARTIN, J.

This action was for libel. It was based upon four articles published in the New York Herald, a newspaper owned by the defendant, who resides in France, but whose paper is published in the city of New York. Its management was confided solely to persons in his employ, who had practical control of the entire business. The plaintiff was a magistrate in the city of New York. The matter complained of was published in four issues of the defendant's newspaper, and related to alleged flagrant misconduct imputed to the plaintiff in the discharge of his official duties. The articles were published, respectively, on the 21st, 22d, 23d, and 24th days of August, 1899. The first and each succeeding article related to the same subject, and they were all libelous per se. After the publication of the first and of each succeeding one, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant's manager, stating that each of the articles was untrue and unjust, and asked that the defendant retract or apologize therefor. Instead of sending or publishing a retraction or apology, another article to the same general effect, and relating to the same subject, was published, including an editorial. After these repeated requests of the defendant's manager, and after writing to the defendant personally upon the subject, stating that the publication of such articles was creating a feeling of distrust, and tending to disgrace him in the eyes of the community, the plaintiff waited until the 13th of the following November, when this action was brought to recover the damages sustained by reason of such publications. That each of the articles published was proved to be false and was libelous per se is not denied, nor is it disputed that their publication was continued from day to day, and no retraction made by the defendant or those managing and conducting the publication of his newspaper and the business connected therewith. Obviously there was abundant evidence to justify the jury in finding that the publication of the libels complained of was recklessly and wantonly made and continued, with utter disregard of the rights or feelings of the plaintiff. This brief but general review of the situation is all the statement as to the facts we deem necessary to dispose of the questions of law which are presented upon this appeal.

The defendant contends that, as the acts complained of were performed in his absence by his manager and employés, he is not liable for punitive or exemplary damages, inasmuch as there was no proof of personal ill will or hatred upon his part sufficient to form a basis for the finding of actual malice That the proprietor of a newspaper is responsible for all that appears in its columns, although the publication may have been made in his absence and without his knowledge, is too well settled to require discussion. His liability is not upon the ground of his being the publisher, but because he is responsible for the acts of the actual publisher. Townshend on Slander & Libel, § 123; Newell on Defamation, Slander & Libel, p. 377; Odgers on Libel & Slander, p. 412; Huff v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120; Andres v. Wells, 7 Johns. 260, 5 Am. Dec. 267. In libel cases, the falsity of the libel being proof of malice sufficient to uphold exemplary damages (a question we shall presently discuss), the right to recover them, in discretion of the jury, rests in the very act done in the publication of the false libel; and whoever is chargeable with that act is chargeable with the legal consequence, which is the right of the jury to redress the wrong by imposing reasonable damagesbeyond any injury actually shown. Dissenting opinion of Davis, P. J., in Samuels v. Evening Mail Ass'n, 9 Hun, 288, 294, affirmed in 75 N. Y. 604.

Although a mere servant or agent employed to perform some specific act for a principal may not render the latter absolutely liable for increased damages on account of his motives in performing it, yet, when a principal surrenders to his general manager and employés all his business affairs, or the general management of some particular business, absents himself from the jurisdiction where his paper is edited and published, leaving such manager in entire charge thereof, he is responsible for the manner in which his business is conducted. In other words, a principal surrendering his entire business to another, to be conducted for him, should be held to the same responsibility he would incur if he himself personally directed it, as to all matters coming within the line of the authority which he has conferred upon such manager or employés. Therefore, while, as was held by the trial court, the defendant might not have been liable for any personal ill will of his employés or servants against the plaintiff, if there was a willful departure from such business for their private or individual purposes, yet he is responsible for the manner in which the business so delegated was performed by his manager; and if the publication complained of was wanton, reckless, or heedless of the rights or feelings of the plaintiff, and, upon being apprised of the groundlessness of the charges, there was a continued refusal to make or publish any retraction thereof, the defendant was fully responsible for the acts of his general manager, and liable for such punitive damages as the jury, in its discretion, might award. In considering this question, we have not regarded it necessary to refer to the cases, relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant, relating to the question of punitive damages in ordinary actions for negligence, as it is manifest that the rule governing the question in such actions is totally unlike that which obtains in actions for tort or personal wrong.

Upon the trial the counsel for the defendant submitted to the court a great number of requests to charge, some of which were charged, others modified, and charged as modified, while others the court refused. To such rulings, exceptions were taken by the defendant. Although many of these exceptions were discussed by counsel upon the argument and in their briefs, still the exception to that portion of the charge by which the court instructed the jury ‘that the falsity of the libel is sufficient evidence of malice to uphold exemplary damages, but the plaintiff's right to recover exemplary damages is in the discretion of the jury,’ fully presents the only other question we deem it necessary to discuss or decide upon this appeal. Indeed, we should not have regarded it necessary to discuss that question at all, but for the fact that there seems to be a misapprehension among some of the members of the profession, and an existing uncertainty on the part of courts, as to the effect of the decisions of this court relating to the existing rule upon that subject. The situation seems to have chiefly arisen from our decision in Krug v. Pitass, 162 N. Y. 154, 56 N. E. 526,76 Am. St. Rep. 317, or from considering what was said in the opinion in that case, without limiting it to the facts involved, rather than what was decided by the court. That was an action against several defendants for the publication of an article libelous per se. Each of the defendants testified he had no malice or ill will toward the plaintiff, when the latter, in order to show express malice, was permitted to prove against all the defendants that, several years before the publication, one of them, who knew nothing about the article until after it had been published, had made statements expressing ill will and contempt for the plaintiff, which were never heard by or communicated to the other defendants before the publication complained of; and this court held that a judgment recovered against all must be reversed, as the general malice proved neither caused nor prompted the publication, and that the admission of such evidence presumably affected the verdict. That case was properly decided. In the opinion, however, there are some expressions that may, perhaps, be regarded as not absolutely accurate, because not including certain exceptionsor added principles which would be applicable to a case where the circumstances were essentially different. As was said by the learned writer of that opinion in Colonial City Traction Co. v. Kingston City R. Co., 154 N. Y. 493, 495,48 N. E. 900: ‘It was not our intention to decide any case but the one before us, * * * and our opinion should be read in the light of that purpose. If, as sometimes happens, broader statements were made, by way of argument or otherwise, than were essential to the decision of the questions presented, they are the dicta of the writer of the opinion, and not the decision of the court. A judicial opinion, like evidence, is only binding so far as it is relevant, and when it wanders from the point at issue it no longer has force as an official utterance.’ Stokes v. Stokes, 155...