Crane v. Hayes

• Citation: 253 So.2d 435
• Decision Date: 29 September 1971
• Docket Number: No. 40832,40832
• Parties: Clarence Levi CRANE, Petitioner, v. Christina Bruce HAYES, formerly known as Christina Bruce Crane, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 435

253 So.2d 435

Clarence Levi CRANE, Petitioner, v. Christina Bruce HAYES, formerly known as Christina Bruce Crane, et al., Respondents.

No. 40832.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 29, 1971.

Joel T. Daves, III, West Palm Beach, Joseph M. Nadler and William B. Roman, Miami, for petitioner.

Hubert M. Lindsey and Rosemary Barkett, of Farish & Farish, West Palm Beach, for respondents.

ADKINS and DEKLE, Justices.

This action travels on a petition for writ of certiorari supported by a certificate of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, that its decision reported in 244 So.2d 544 is one which involves a question of great public interest. Fla.Const., art. V, § 4(2), F.S.A.

The question certified is:

In a habeas corpus proceeding involving child custody, does the trial court, once its jurisdiction has become final, retain continuing jurisdiction in the same proceeding to enforce and/or modify such judgment at a subsequent date?

We conclude that a trial court in a habeas corpus proceeding does not generally have continuing jurisdiction after entry of final judgment. However, for reasons explained within, the court may exercise its equitable jurisdiction after the judgment, as to the custody and care of minor children within its jurisdiction, if such subsequent jurisdiction is properly invoked and accords with due process.

Respondents appealed the final judgment in habeas corpus but the appeal was dismissed in September, 1968, and became final. The present (second) order (which is here on certiorari) emanating from the original habeas corpus proceeding, was entered a year later, based upon what was apparently considered by the trial judge as 'continuing jurisdiction.' The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed it as such. We do not find such 'continuing jurisdiction' to 'continue' in these circumstances although there can be jurisdiction in equity.

The undisputed facts of this litigation are complex, and reveal a succession of in-court skirmishes over custody of a minor child.

Petitioner husband and respondent wife were married in North Carolina. In 1966, respondent wife and mother, having become a resident of Palm Beach County, Florida, was granted a divorce in Martin County, Florida. Petitioner husband resided in North Carolina and did not appear personally in Florida. The couple's minor daughter was present in the jurisdiction of the court, and the court awarded custody to the mother, which it had authority to do. State ex rel. Rasco v. Rasco, 139 Fla. 349, 190 So. 510 (1939); Richter v. Harmon, 243 N.C. 373, 90 S.E.2d 744 (1956).

Shortly after the Florida divorce the mother took the one year old child to North Carolina and voluntarily delivered custody to the father at their original home. Later, the father refused to return custody of the child. The mother then invoked the jurisdiction of the North Carolina court, by petition for an order for custody of the child, pursuant to the Florida court order. It appears the action was in the nature of an equitable action for custody. The North Carolina court entered a temporary order placing custody in the mother, whereupon she left with her daughter and returned to Palm Beach County. Thereafter, the North Carolina court obtained welfare reports, heard testimony and ruled on the merits, finding the mother to be an unfit person to have custody of the child and awarding permanent custody to the father. Both parties had counsel in the North Carolina suit, although respondent mother did not return and appear at the final hearing.

Respondent mother did not obey the order of the North Carolina court. The father came to Florida and petitioned in the Palm Beach County Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain custody of his child by enforcement of the North Carolina court order. The Florida court entered an order granting custody in the father, according full faith and credit to the North Carolina order, and specifically refraining from a determination on the merits as to the interests of the child or fitness of either parent.

Respondent mother failed to comply with the Florida court order, removing the child to Kentucky where her new husband was stationed with the United States Army. Her parents (also respondents here) had petitioned for adoption of the child with the consent of their daughter. They declined to reveal the child's whereabouts when the sheriff's deputy went to their home pursuant to writ of assistance to place custody of the child in the father who had travelled at that earlier time from Highlands, North Carolina (his home) to West Palm Beach, Florida, to receive the child pursuant to the original Florida court order. Petitioner father thereupon commenced criminal prosecution against his former wife, alleging violation of Fla.Stat. § 805.03, F.S.A., for removal of a child from the state in violation of a court order.

After three unsuccessful writs of assistance directed against her, respondent mother after a year and a half returned to Florida with the child, pleaded guilty and was placed on three years' probation conditioned on compliance with the court's child custody order. Petitioner father thereupon journeyed to Palm Beach County a second time to receive custody. The child was delivered to him in the afternoon and he immediately started the return trip to North Carolina. On the same day, respondent mother served petitioner's attorney with a paper, styled in the same manner as the habeas corpus petition previously filed by the father, seeking to modify the prior judgment as to custody and seeking a hearing on the merits as to custody.

Petitioner father's counsel objected that the court was without jurisdiction. The Circuit Court found that it had jurisdiction and thereafter conducted a hearing on the merits without the presence of the father who had immediately returned to North Carolina with the child on the same day the petition was filed. The Florida court awarded custody to the mother, finding her a fit person on the basis of conditions changed subsequent to the North Carolina order, and holding that it was in the child's best interests to be placed with its mother. Petitioner, who was not personally served and did not personally appear in the new proceeding, did not appeal this final judgment, disclaiming jurisdiction. Petitioner father did not comply with the order, and thereafter was held in contempt of court. Petitioner appealed from the contempt order, arguing that the Circuit Court was without continuing jurisdiction in a habeas corpus proceeding to conduct the hearing on the merits on petition to modify, and that he was not required to obey an order of the court which was void for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court upheld the contempt citation, concluding that the court had continuing jurisdiction in a child custody habeas corpus proceeding. The question then was certified to this Court.

Two important State interests are before this Court. One is the interest of the State in securing in every custody action the best interests of the child. The other is the need to preserve the summary nature and high priority of the habeas corpus proceeding.

As a general rule, a habeas corpus proceeding is an independent action, legal and civil in nature, designed to secure prompt determination as to the legality of restraint in some form. State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski, 111 Fla. 454, 152 So. 207, 156 So. 261 (1933); State ex rel. Kopp v. Headley, 60 So.2d 734 (Fla.1952); White v. Penton, 92 Fla. 837, 110 So. 533 (1926); Hancock v. Dupree, 100 Fla. 617, 129 So. 822 (1930). When child custody is involved, however, a habeas corpus action takes on the nature of an equitable proceeding, and the trial judge has the duty and authority to enter orders which will best conserve the welfare of the child, subordinating if necessary the legal rights of the parents. Hancock v. Dupree, supra; Neal v. State ex rel. Neal, 135 So.2d 891 (Fla.App.1st, 1961); Miller v. Miller,38 Fla. 227, 20 So. 989, 56 Am.St.Rep. 166 (1896); Danson v. Danson, 76 Fla. 449, 80 So. 62 (1918); 11 F.L.P., Habeas Corpus, § 23. Accord, In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204 (1966).

There is no question but that habeas corpus is a proper proceeding to obtain custody of a child wrongfully withheld. Trotman v. Thomas, 154 Fla. 71, 16 So.2d 640 (1944). However, this does not mean that a habeas corpus proceeding involving child custody is converted into a full-dress civil action in equity. On the contrary, habeas corpus retains its form as a special proceeding of high priority and limited scope, designed to secure summary determination of rights and needs relating to restraint. Upon entry of a judgment settling the question, jurisdiction terminates, and the judgment becomes subject to timely review just as any other final judgment. Rules 1.530, 1.540, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure (1967), 31 F.S.A.; Florida Appellate Rules.

When the proceeding terminates in a final judgment, the questions decided becomes res judicata. The decision is entitled to full faith and credit in forums of sister states. Shenk v. Shenk, 126 So.2d 286 (Fla.App.3rd, 1961). Accord, In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204 (1966). An order of a court in a sister state granting temporary custody is not res judicata, and a Florida court has a duty on petition for writ of habeas corpus to determine the child's best interest. Tom v. State ex rel. Tom,153 So.2d 334 (Fla.App.2d, 1963); Fox v. Fox, 179 So.2d 103 (Fla.App.3rd, 1965). An order by a foreign court which is without jurisdiction is not binding. See O'Neal v. O'Neal, 158 So.2d 586 (Fla.App.3rd, 1963). Accord, Richter v. Harmon, 243 N.C. 373, 90 S.E.2d 744 (1956).

An exception to the rule of res judicata and full faith and credit exists where conditions are shown to have changed subsequent to entry of the prior order or judgment. Willson v. Willson, 55 So.2d 905 (Fla.1951). Accord, In re Marlowe, supra; Richter v....