White v. Penton

• Decision Date: 28 October 1926
• Citation: 92 Fla. 837,110 So. 533
• Parties: WHITE v. PENTON, Sheriff.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

110 So. 533

92 Fla. 837

WHITE v. PENTON, Sheriff.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

October 28, 1926

Error to Circuit Court, Escambia County; A. G. Campbell, Judge.

Proceeding by E. E. White for habeas corpus to be directed to Moses Penton, Sheriff of Escambia County. Judgment remanding the petitioner to custody, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Statute regulating salt water fishing held not invalid for defect of title (Laws 1925, c. 10123, § 1; Const. art. 3, § 16). That portion of chapter 10123, Laws of 1925, § 1, providing that it shall be unlawful for any person to have in his possession certain fish of less than a specified size, does not transcend, in violation of article 3, § 16, of the Constitution of Florida, the title to said act, which title is, in part, 'An act to protect and regulate the salt water fishing industry, * * *' even though the act be construed to prohibit the possession in Florida of fish lawfully acquired in another state.

Generally statutes in exercise of police power not conflicting with those of Congress, though indirectly or remotely affecting interstate commerce, are valid. Generally speaking, laws passed by a state in the appropriate exercise of its police power, not in conflict with the laws of Congress upon the same subject, but indirectly or remotely affecting interstate commerce, are nevertheless valid laws.

Prohibition of possession of certain fish of less than certain size does not violate commerce clause of federal Constitution (Laws 1925, c. 10123, § 1; Const. U.S. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3). That portion of chapter 10123, Laws of 1925, § 1, providing that it shall be unlawful for any person to have in his possession certain fish of less than a specified size, is not repugnant to the commerce clause of the federal Constitution (art. 1, § 8, cl. 3), even though that portion of the act be construed as applicable to the possession of fish lawfully acquired in another state and imported into the state of Florida in interstate commerce.

Object of writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether person is legally imprisoned or restrained of liberty. The object of the writ of habeas corpus is not to determine whether a person has committed a crime or the justice or injustice of his detention on the merits, but whether he is legally imprisoned or restrained of his liberty.

Writ of habeas corpus should not be used to test sufficiency of evidence on which charge may have been based; writ of habeas corpus is not available to review sufficiency of substantive defense. The use of the writ of habeas corpus to test the sufficiency of the evidence upon which a charge may have been based is not sanctioned by this court. Nor is that writ available to review the sufficiency of a substantive defense.

COUNSEL

J. McHenry Jones, of Pensacola, for plaintiff in error.

Forsyth Caro, of Pensacola, for defendant in error.

OPINION

STRUM J.

Plaintiff in error, hereinafter called the petitioner, stands charged with the offense of unlawfully having in his possession mullet of smaller size than ten inches in length, and, having been committed to jail by the county judge, seeks to test the legality of his detention by habeas corpus. Upon hearing before the circuit court, petitioner was remanded to custody and was allowed and took writ of error. The validity and scope of chapter 10123, Acts of 1925, under which the affidavit, warrant, and subsequent commitment were issued, are challenged by petitioner in three major particulars.

Petitioner's first contention is that the act violates article 3, § 16, of the Constitution of Florida, in that 'the title does not express the subject matter of the act.' Petitioner urges that from its title the apparent purpose of the act is only to regulate the taking of fish from Florida waters and to define the character of certain waters as salt or fresh, and that the title does not sufficiently indicate that the mere possession of fish of prohibited sizes, when lawfully acquired in another state, is denounced as an offense by the body of the act.

The title of the act assailed is:

'An act to protect and regulate the salt water fishing industry in the state of Florida, and to declare certain fresh waters in this state salt waters for the purpose of this act and to define certain waters as salt waters.'

Petitioner is charged with violation of section 1 of said act, which provides, amongst other things:

'It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, firm or corporation to take, have in his or their possession, buy sell, or offer for sale at any time, or unnecessarily destroy any of the fish known as * * * mullet, * * * of less length than twelve inches from tip of nose to fork of tail; provided, however, that mullet of ten inches can be taken in the waters at points located west of Aucilla river to the Alabama Line, provided, however, that silver mullet of a less length than twelve inches may be caught and possessed during the open season.'

The title of an act need not be an index to the contents of the latter; neither is it necessary that the title of an act should give a synopsis of all the means by which the object of the law is to be accomplished. Ex parte Guiseppe Gilletti, 70 Fla. 442, 70 So. 446; Ex parte Pricha, 70 Fla. 265, 70 So. 406; Ex parte Wells, 21 Fla. 280; County Comm'rs of Duval County v. City of Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 196, 18 So. 339, 29 L. R. A. 416; State v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; Butler v. Perry, 67 Fla. 405, 66 So. 150; Campbell v. Skinner Mfg. Co., 53 Fla. 632, 43 So. 874.

The act under consideration is designed, amongst other things, to guard against a premature depletion of the available supply of mullet, and other designated fish, by prohibiting the capture of such fish while immature. Such a measure tends to conserve the source of supply of a wholesome food commodity, and when reasonable in its restrictions, is obviously a 'protection' to the fishing industry and a valid 'regulation' thereof. That portion of the act which prohibits the buying, selling, or possession of fish of forbidden sizes is incidental to the principal object of the act--the protection and regulation of the salt water fishing industry--and is but a means by which that object is to be accomplished. As such, a specific reference thereto in the title is not indispensable to the constitutional validity of the act. By also prohibiting the possession of and trading in immature fish the Legislature provides a most practicable and effectual means of accomplishing the desired and specifically designated 'protection' to the fishing industry. Such provisions are frequently found in regulatory measures of this nature as a means of accomplishing the principal object of the act (see Massey v. U.S. [C. C. A.] 281 F. 295), and have been held to be sufficiently expressed by titles couched in language of equivalent import with the title now under consideration (People v. O'Neil, 71 Mich. 325, 39 N.W. 1; State v. Harrub, 95 Ala. 176, 10 So. 752, 15 L. R. A. 761, 36 Am. St. Rep. 195; Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 320). Furthermore, it seems to us that a provision which prohibits the possession of or trading in certain immature fish is a matter properly connected with an act the object of which, as declared by its title, is to 'protect and regulate' the fishing industry. See Ex parte Gilletti, 70 Fla. 442, 70 So. 446; People v. Sayer, 246 Ill. 382, 92 N.E. 900; Cawsey v. Brickey, 82 Wash. 653, 144 P. 938. The possession of immature fish is a matter clearly germane to the protection of the fishing industry. This court has said that:

'It is sufficient compliance with section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution if the subject is expressed in the title to the act, the matters properly connected with such subject not being required to be expressed in the title.' Hayes v. Walker, 54 Fla. 163, 44 So. 747; Thompson v. State, 66 Fla. 206, 63 So. 423; Ex parte Pricha, supra.

The title to the act under consideration is neither deceptive nor misleading, but is sufficient to reasonably lead an ordinary mind to an inquiry into the body of the act for the purpose of ascertaining the means by which the 'protection and regulation' of the fishing industry is to be accomplished. Nor would the body of the act elearly transcend the title, in violation of article 3, § 16, of the Constitution of Florida, even though the act be construed to prohibit the possession in Florida of fish lawfully acquired in another state.

Petitioner next contends that the act was not intended to prohibit the possession of fish lawfully acquired in another state, and that if it does apply to the possession of fish so acquired and imported into the state of Florida in interstate commerce, it is to that extent in conflict with the commerce clause of the federal Constitution (article 1, § 8 cl. 3) and hence invalid. Upon the latter phase of the question just stated, petitioner has cited good authority to support his contention. See People v. Buffalo Fish Co., 164 N.Y. 93, 58 N.E. 34, 52 L. R. A. 803, 79 Am. St. Rep. 622; In re Davenport (C. C.) 102 F. 541; McDonald & Johnson v. Southern Express Co. (C. C.) 134 F. 282. Subsequent, however, to the decisions last cited, the Supreme Court of the United States, the final authority in the construction of the federal Constitution, has settled the question contrary to the contention of petitioner as supported by those cases just referred to.

In People ex rel. August Silz v. Henry Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 29 S.Ct. 10, 53 L.Ed. 75, the essential facts were that Silz, a restaurant keeper, had in his possession in New York state certain game birds during the closed season for those birds in the state of New York at which time the possession of...