Cranston v. Thomson, AFL-CIO
| Decision Date | 17 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 4445-4447,AFL-CIO,A,AFL-CI,s. 4445-4447 |
| Parties | Albert H. CRANSTON et al., Appellants (Plaintiffs below), Wyoming Political Action Committee for Education and Wyoming State(Intervenors Below), v. Thyra THOMSON, Secretary of State, et al., Appellees (Defendants below). WYOMING POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE FOR EDUCATION, Appellant (Intervenor below), Wyoming State Intervenor below), and Albert H. Cranston et al., (Plaintiffs below), v. Thyra THOMSON, Secretary of State et al., Appellees (Defendants below). WYOMING STATE, Appellant (Intervenor below), Wyoming Political Action Committee for Education (Intervenor below), and Albert H. Cranston et al., (Plaintiffs below), v. Thyra THOMSON, Secretary of State, et al., Appellees (Defendants below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Walter C. Urbigkit, Jr., of Urbigkit, Moriarity, Halle & Mackey, Cheyenne, for appellants Cranston and Wyo. State AFL-CIO.
Charles E. Graves and Patrick E. Hacker, Cheyenne, for appellant Wyo. Political Action Committee for Ed.
Laurence Gold, Washington, D. C., for appellant Who. State AFL-CIO.
David B. Kennedy, Atty. Gen., Jerome F. Statkus, Asst. Atty. Gen., and William M. Sutton, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellees, Thyra Thomson and the Office of the Attorney General, State of Wyoming.
John Lynch, Deputy County and Prosecuting Attorney, Cheyenne, for appellees, Thomas J. Carroll and John B. Huisman.
Before PARKER *, C. J., McEWAN, GUTHRIE and McCLINTOCK, JJ., and ARMSTRONG, District Judge.
This is an appeal by plaintiffs and the two intervenor organizations from an order dismissing the complaints for failure to state a justiciable cause. 1 In their complaint plaintiffs sought to declare void and unconstitutional § 22.1-401, W.S.1957, 1973 Cum.Supp., requiring a candidate's written approval to expenditures on his behalf, and certain subsections of § 22.1-389, W.S.1957, 1974 Interim Supp., 2 concerning the limitation of campaign expenditures and restricting certain practices. There was also a prayer seeking to prohibit enforcement of the mentioned statutes, but this aspect is not pursued in the appeal.
The complaint asserted plaintiffs' status as resident electors, that said Cranston and Doughty had been candidates for state representative in the 1972 election and Cranston was an announced candidate for the same office in 1974, that Otto 'may become a candidate for office in 1974,' and alleged the membership of all plaintiffs in one or more organizations which seek through joint action to support the nomination and election of candidates for public office, which activities exposed the plaintiffs to potential civil and criminal penalties. It stated that the challenged statutes affected and harmed them, charging unconstitutionality on numerous grounds as violative of
The intervenor AFL-CIO stated its organizational structure, certain provisions in its constitution, and said that it had 'in the past and anticipatorily in the future, will endorse candidates, make contributions from funds voluntarily contributed and otherwise support the electoral interests of candidates including specifically those seeking national office, deemed best to recognize and support the interests of labor.' Its prayer was similar to that of plaintiffs.
The intervenor Wyoming PACE recited its voluntary nonprofit, unincorporated status, the individuals combined to support political candidates favorable to education, the receipt of donations from its members, and the selection through its board of directors of candidates favorable to education, who would receive the campaign donations. PACE charged unconstitutionality of the mentioned statutes on grounds substantially similar to those asserted by plaintiffs and by the intervenor AFL-CIO, appending a like prayer.
In an amended complaint the intervenor AFL-CIO recited additionally its contribution of moneys in various capacities to candidates in the 1972 general election as well as the fact that it had on hand substantial funds collected from per capita tax and moneys received from nonresidents of the State and desired to contribute some of the money to the Congressional candidate and presently planned and desired to continue its past practice of making contributions to candidates for election.
In an amended complaint, PACE further alleged that it presently held a checking account of $4,152.90 contributed by its members for the purposes of soliciting and receiving donations to the campaigns of announced political candidates supporting education or to the political parties they represent, and that its Board of Directors had selected certain candidates whom they wished to support and had donated the sum of $500 to the National Education Association Political Action Committee, an organization which makes campaign donations to candidates for the United States Congress and Senate from various states, including Wyoming.
From a dismissal of plaintiffs' and intervenors' complaints, on the grounds that neither the pleadings nor the testimony in evidence adduced in support thereof gave rise to a justiciable controversy upon which the court might act, this appeal has resulted.
The appellants here urge the existence of a justiciable controversy, the unconstitutionality of the challenged laws on the grounds asserted in the pleadings, and ask for a decision as to the merits of the action. The threshold question, of course, is that of justiciability, the basis for the trial court's order of dismissal. On that aspect, all parties here take comfort in the case of Brimmer v. Thomson, Wyo., 521 P.2d 574; and it may therefore be salutary to summarize our analysis of what was said therein.
Aside from general discussion explanatory of but unnecessary to the result, we held in Brimmer that each of the three senators who were defendants had, if qualified therefor, a genuine, existing, and fundamental right to seek the public office of governor. Such right had been improperly restricted and abrogated by a previous opinion of the Attorney General. Thus, a justiciable controversy existed. In reaching the decision, various incidental and foundation matters received some attention, including (a) the necessary elements of a justiciable controversy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, (b) a notation of the unquestioned axiom that the Declaratory Judgments Act cannot be relied upon to secure an advisory opinion, and (c) the caution assential to application of the public interest concept; but reference to any of these remarks taken out of context is unwarranted.
Perhaps there should be some delineation of the rule that a declaratory judgment cannot be relied upon to secure an advisory opinion.
'* * * Courts will not render advisory opinions on abstract questions of law about which there is only a disagreement rather than an actual controversy between the parties. * * *' Wagner v. Mahaffey, 195 Kan. 586, 408 P.2d 602, 605.
'The Declaratory Judgments Act gives courts no power to determine future rights or controversies in anticipation of events that have not occurred * * *.' Glasgow v. Fox, 214 Tenn. 656, 383 S.W.2d 9, 13.
We adopt these holdings. The reasons for this rule are obvious since binding legal determinations made in the abstract and decisions rendered without concrete factual background would be imprecise, subject to speculation, and would create rather than diminish future controversies. We have thus made it clear that the court is precluded by logic as well as precedent from issuing advisory opinions. We have also indicated in Brimmer the requisites of a justiciable controversy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act: (a) that it requires parties who have existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical rights and interests, (b) the controversy must be one upon which a court may effectively operate rather than an argument calling for a purely political, administrative, philosophic, or academic conclusion, and (c) it must be one of which a judicial determination may have the force and effect of a final judgment upon the rights, status, or legal relationships of a real party in interest.
We think that, wanting any of these requisites, a great public interest alone is insufficient to warrant the action of the court under any situation which we might at present foresee. As has been pointed out in numerous authorities, the difference between an abstract question and a controversy contemplated by the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is necessarily one of degree; and it is difficult, if not impossible, to fashion in advance a precise test for determining the question. Basically, the problem in each case is whether the facts alleged under all the circumstances show that there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the declaratory judgment. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 959-960, 22 L.Ed.2d 113.
In the matter before us, there are asserted either by the pleadings or the evidence no existing right or interest with the possible exception (1) of an opinion of April 29, 1974, by the Attorney General to the Secretary of State wherein the questions 3 were answered in the affirmative, and (2) the pleaded and undenied payment by PACE of $500 to the ...
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