Crapp v. City of Miami Beach

• Decision Date: 21 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-13492 and N,No. 96-00479-CV-FAM,99-13492 and N,96-00479-CV-FAM
• Citation: 242 F.3d 1017
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2001) WALTER CRAPP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Defendant-Appellant, o. 00-10643 D.C
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1017

242 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2001)

WALTER CRAPP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Defendant-Appellant,

No. 99-13492 and No. 00-10643

D.C. No. 96-00479-CV-FAM

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Feb. 21, 2001

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

Before WILSON, KRAVITCH and COX, Circuit Judges.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

The appeal of this Title VII race discrimination case presents two main issues: whether the district court erred by treating the suspension of a police officer's certification made retroactive to the date of his termination as after-acquired evidence under McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995), and whether decisions by state administrative agencies unreviewed by state courts are entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII cases. We answer both in the negative.

I. Background and Procedural History

Walter Crapp, who is black, worked as a police officer for the City from September 10, 1986 until his termination on November 26, 1996.¹ In September 1996, following an argument with his supervisor, Crapp filed a complaint with Internal Affairs alleging that his supervisor had battered him.² In the course of its investigation, Internal Affairs came to the conclusion that Crapp had lied about the incident.³ Richard Barreto, the City's Chief of Police, recommended that Crapp be fired. Chief Barreto then held a pre-determination hearing during which Crapp was given an opportunity to present evidence why he should not be terminated. After investigating Crapp's evidence, Chief Barreto again concluded that Crapp was lying, and subsequently fired him. Crapp appealed his termination to the City's Personnel Board. Counsel represented Crapp at the hearing and called witnesses on his behalf. The Personnel Board upheld Chief Barreto's decision.

Crapp filed suit against the City in federal court, alleging that his termination was racially motivated in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1997).⁴ Crapp claimed that similarly situated non-minority police officers were not terminated for similar disciplinary problems. The jury found for Crapp and awarded him $150,000 in compensatory damages. In a Final Order dated July 28, 1999, the district court entered judgment in favor of Crapp and awarded him backpay and reinstatement. The court stayed reinstatement, however, pending a decision by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE") regarding whether Crapp would be decertified as a police officer.⁵ The district court subsequently denied the City's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, and the City filed its first notice of appeal (No. 99- 13492).

The FDLE suspended Crapp's certification for two years effective from the date of his termination. The City then moved for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b), asking the court to set aside the judgment or order a new trial. Although the district court denied the motion, it vacated the award of backpay and reinstatement. The court reasoned that under McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995), Crapp was not entitled to backpay or reinstatement because he was no longer certified to be a police officer. The court entered an Amended Final Judgment on January 25, 2000,⁶ pursuant to which the City filed its second notice of appeal (No. 00- 10643).⁷

II. Discussion

A. The City's Rule 60(b) Motion

We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Certain Real Property Located at Route 1, Bryant, Ala., 126 F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 1997). The City argues that because the FDLE made its suspension of Crapp retroactive to the date of Crapp's termination, Crapp cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination. We conclude that the district court properly accounted for Crapp's suspension by amending the judgment to preclude backpay and reinstatement.

The City argues that it is entitled to judgment in its favor or, in the alternative, a new trial, under two provisions of Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b)(2) provides that a party may seek relief because of "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." Under Rule 60(b)(6), a court may grant relief for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment." "[R]elief under this clause is an extraordinary remedy which may be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances." Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).

The City contends that the FDLE's retroactive suspension of Crapp's certification vitiated his ability to make out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he was subjected to adverse job action; (3) his employer treated similarly situated employees outside his classification more favorably; and (4) he was qualified to do the job." Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997). The City argues that the FDLE's decision to retroactively suspend Crapp's certification prevented Crapp from showing that he was qualified to be employed as a police officer.

Even assuming that the requirements of either Rule 60(b)(2) or 60(b)(6) have been met,⁸ we are unpersuaded that the FDLE's decision affected Crapp's ability to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden shifting scheme articulated in McDonald Douglas is designed to "bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to the ultimate question [of discrimination]," and the prima facie requirement "is not an onerous one." Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). We have recognized that in termination cases, the question of whether the plaintiff was qualified to do the job is not often at issue. "[I]n cases where a plaintiff has held a position for a significant period of time, qualification for that position sufficient to satisfy the test of a prima facie case can be inferred." Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure Products, Inc., 827 F.2d 1493, 1495 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987). Thus, "allegations of poor performance against plaintiffs discharged from long-held positions may be properly considered . . . when a court evaluates the pretextual nature of an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for termination." Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1109, 120 S.Ct. 1962, 146 L.Ed.2d 793 (2000).

In this case, the FDLE's decision to suspend Crapp's certification-even though made retroactive to the date of his termination-does not prevent Crapp from establishing his prima facie case. Because the FDLE did not make the decision to suspend Crapp's certification until after his termination, it cannot serve as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Crapp's termination; nor does it change the fact that at the time of the alleged discriminatory treatment, Crapp was certified to be police officer, and was therefore qualified for his job.

Furthermore, the FDLE's decision was only made retroactive to November 26, 1996-the effective date of Crapp's termination-not October 11, 1996, when Chief Barreto decided to fire Crapp. Therefore, even accepting the City's argument that the FDLE's determination should be given retroactive effect, the FDLE's decision does not vitiate Crapp's prima facie case because Crapp was certified to be a police officer when Chief Barreto made the decision to fire Crapp.

After learning of the FDLE's decision, the district court vacated its award of backpay and reinstatement without vacating the compensatory damage award. In doing so, the court appropriately recognized that the City could have fired Crapp for a lawful reason-lack of certification-on the same day that it fired him for a discriminatory reason. We conclude that the district court properly took account of the FDLE's decision as "after-acquired evidence" under McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995).

In McKennon, the employer conceded that it had discriminated against the plaintiff, but argued that its after-acquired evidence justified the termination. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that after-acquired evidence should not be used to determine liability because "[t]he employer could not have been motivated by the knowledge it did not have and it cannot now claim that the employee was fired for the nondiscriminatory reason." Id. at 360. Rather, the Court held that after-acquired evidence should be used in fashioning the remedy: neither reinstatement nor frontpay generally is appropriate, and backpay should be limited to the point when the employer discovered the after-acquired evidence. Id. at 361-62.

The City argues that it is inconsistent to deny Crapp backpay for a discriminatory termination and yet award him compensatory damages for that termination. The district court's action, however, is consistent with the treatment of after-acquired evidence under McKennon. The district court vacated its award of backpay and reinstatement because the FDLE's decision precluded the City from retaining Crapp as a police officer. The FDLE's decision does not, however, change the fact that the jury concluded that the City's decision to fire Crapp was a racially motivated adverse employment action for which Crapp should be compensated. The district court's Amended Final Judgment complies with the Supreme Court's statement in McKennon that "[r]esolution of the [problem of after-acquired evidence] must give proper recognition to the fact that [unlawful discrimination] has occurred which must be deterred and compensated without undue infringement upon the employer's rights and prerogatives." Id. at 362. Denying Crapp any damages in this case would neither compensate...