Crater v. Furlong
| Decision Date | 15 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94SA172,94SA172 |
| Citation | 884 P.2d 1127 |
| Parties | James M. CRATER, a/k/a Jimmie E. Crater, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Robert FURLONG, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
James M. Crater, pro se.
No appearance by respondent-appellee.
The petitioner, James M. Crater, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County District Court, seeking immediate release from the Limon Correctional Facility. The district court denied the petition without holding a hearing, and the petitioner appealed. 1 Because the petitioner has not alleged sufficient acts or omissions by state officials to constitute a waiver of Colorado's interest in his further incarceration, and because the petitioner is not otherwise entitled to immediate release, the district court denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
According to the petitioner, 2 he was convicted of second-degree murder in 1967, in Adams County District Court, and in January 1967 was sentenced to not less than thirteen, nor more than thirty, years imprisonment. The petitioner escaped from the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) on September 3, 1972, and fled the state. State authorities subsequently issued a fugitive arrest warrant for the petitioner, and escape charges were filed in Fremont County.
On November 14, 1972, the petitioner was arrested in Kentucky on charges of armed robbery and assault on a police officer. The petitioner was also held on the Colorado warrant. The authorities in Colorado were informed in May of 1973 that the petitioner had been convicted of four counts of armed robbery and sentenced to four ten-year sentences in Kentucky, to run concurrently. The DOC was also advised that the petitioner would be serving his Kentucky sentences at a particular penitentiary, that the warrants issued by the Governor of Colorado and the Governor of Kentucky would follow the petitioner as detainers in the Kentucky prison system, and that Colorado would be notified when the petitioner was "available" to the DOC. Thereafter, the charges relating to the petitioner's escape were dismissed in Colorado without prejudice. When the petitioner was discharged from the Kentucky prison system in July 1979, there were no Colorado detainers of record pending against him. As a consequence, on discharge petitioner was not returned to the custody of the DOC but, instead, he was released by Kentucky officials, allowing him to travel to Illinois.
Months later, in December 1979, the petitioner was arrested in Illinois and charged with armed robbery. He was subsequently convicted of that offense and sentenced to thirty years in the Illinois penitentiary. On March 25, 1986, almost fourteen years after his escape, Colorado lodged a detainer against the petitioner in Illinois. The petitioner was extradited to Colorado on December 28, 1993, and reincarcerated in the DOC. The petitioner alleges that the DOC has not credited him with the time of his actual confinement in Kentucky and Illinois toward his Colorado sentence, and that he has not been given proper credit for good-time and earned-time.
Petitioner first contends that Colorado either waived or forfeited all legal jurisdiction over him, or that the actions of state officials constituted a pardon or commutation of the unserved portion of his sentence. The petitioner cites Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (5th Cir.1967) (); and Lanier v. Williams, 361 F.Supp. 944, 947-48 (E.D.N.C.1973) () as the controlling cases.
In Piper v. Estelle, 485 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.1973), however, in explaining and distinguishing its decision in Shields v. Beto, the Fifth Circuit stated that in order to show a violation of due process
it is not sufficient to prove official conduct that merely evidences a lack of eager pursuit or even arguable lack of interest. Rather the waiving state's action must be so affirmatively wrong or its inaction so grossly negligent that it would be unequivocally inconsistent with "fundamental principles of liberty and justice" to require a legal sentence to be served in the aftermath of such action or inaction.
485 F.2d at 246. Accord Fabian v. Reed, 714 F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir.1983).
Unlike the situation in Lanier v. Williams, the petitioner's confinement in Colorado was interrupted not by the state but by his own acts--his escape. Had he not escaped and become a fugitive from justice, his incarceration in Colorado would not have been interrupted. Colorado officials did not exhibit conduct that was so "affirmatively wrong" or constituted "inaction so grossly negligent" for due process to require the state to waive any interest in the petitioner's continued incarceration. Notwithstanding the dismissal of charges relating to the petitioner's escape, Colorado officials could have reasonably believed that a detainer had been placed on the petitioner so as to assure his return to Colorado upon release. For whatever reason, however, upon completion of the petitioner's sentence, Kentucky did not notify Colorado when it released the petitioner.
Even if a prisoner does not escape (like the petitioner did), but is instead released by mistake, the prisoner's conduct following the release is a relevant factor in determining whether he should be given credit for time spent in another state's custody. In Brown v. Brittain, 773 P.2d 570, 570 (Colo.1989), the prisoner was committed to the custody of the DOC. He was released by mistake rather than being transported to the DOC, and he went to Louisiana where he was subsequently arrested and charged with aggravated robbery, resisting arrest, escape, and damage to property. Id. at 571. He was convicted in Louisiana, sentenced to the Louisiana prison system, and after he was paroled, was released to Colorado authorities because a detainer had been lodged against him. Id. In reversing the district court's ruling granting the prisoner credit for the time he was confined in Louisiana, we held that the prisoner's "reincarceration would not be inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty and justice." Id. at 575.
In this case, after the petitioner escaped from the custody of the DOC and left Colorado, he went to Kentucky where he was arrested for, and convicted of, armed robbery. Upon his release from the Kentucky prison system, the petitioner did not voluntarily return to Colorado. Instead he traveled to Illinois where he was arrested and again convicted of armed robbery. Learning of the petitioner's conviction in Illinois, Colorado then placed a detainer on the petitioner and upon the completion of his sentence in Illinois, the petitioner was returned to Colorado. Thus, the petitioner's "reincarceration would not be inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty and justice." Id.
Cases where a prisoner is discharged from prison erroneously, and without fault on the prisoner's part, are not comparable or applicable to cases like this one where the prisoner in fact escapes. See White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir.1930) (). We conclude that the petitioner has not alleged sufficient misconduct or inaction on the part of Colorado officials to constitute a waiver of jurisdiction over him for purposes of continued imprisonment on his original 1967 sentence for second-degree murder.
The petitioner also claims he should be given credit for time served in Kentucky and Illinois after his escape from Colorado, including credits for good time and earned time. We disagree.
In Barber v. Cooper, 719 P.2d 1094 (Colo.1986), the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was entitled to credit on his Colorado sentence for the time he spent in federal custody. The prisoner was convicted of first-degree murder in Colorado in 1971, and the trial court imposed a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Seadin v. Raimisch
...eligibility and conditional release specifically excludes any time that the inmate is at large due to his own escape. Crater v. Furlong, 884 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Colo. 1994); see Meyers v. Price, 842 P.2d 229, 231 (Colo. 1992) (holding that section 17-22.5-402 did not entitle inmate to uncondit......
-
People v. Stark, 94CA1082
...analysis in cases involving mistaken release, we conclude that the trial court should consider those factors as well. Cf. Crater v. Furlong, 884 P.2d 1127 (Colo.1994). The order is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this STERNBE......