Craver v. Norton

• Decision Date: 15 May 1901
• Citation: 86 N.W. 54,114 Iowa 46
• Parties: CRAVER v. NORTON.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

114 Iowa 46

86 N.W. 54

CRAVER

v.NORTON.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 15, 1901.

Appeal from district court, Story county; S. M. Weaver, Judge.

Action for slander. The defendant appeals from a judgment against him. Affirmed.H. M. Funson, for appellant.

J. F. Martin, for appellee.

LADD, J.

The evidence tended to show that, while plaintiff's father and defendant were engaged in an angry altercation, she interrupted by admonishing the latter to “shut up,” as he had said enough, and that he then, in a loud voice, denounced her as a “bitch,” qualified by “damned old,” “dirty,” “dirty, low-lived,” or all of these. According to Webster, “bitch” is an opprobrious name for a woman,--especially a lewd woman. In Bailey v. Bailey, 94 Iowa, 598, 63 N. W. 341, it was remarked that “the word is synonymous with ‘wench’ or ‘hussy,’ and often implies lewdness.” But, though a word of reproach, it has not generally been thought, in its common acceptation, to imply a want of chastity. “It is very clear to us,” said the court in K______ v. H______, 20 Wis. 239, 91 Am. Dec. 397, “that the word ‘bitch’ has not any such meaning as ‘prostitute.’ It is used as a term of reproach when applied to a woman, but not to charge the crime of prostitution.” In Schurick v. Kollman, 50 Ind. 338: “The word ‘bitch,’ although a very coarse and ruffianly expression, when applied to a woman, does not, in its common acceptation, import whoredom in any of its forms.” So, in Craig v. Pyles (Ky.) 39 S. W. 33, the words: “She is a dirty bitch. She has no character and is no account,”--were held not actionable in themselves, as importing that the woman was “a whore, common prostitute, or was guilty of fornication or adultery.” In Blake v. Smith (R. I.) 34 Atl. 995, the jury was not warranted in finding from the use of the language denouncing a woman as a bitch, without more, that it was intended to charge her with wanton and lascivious behavior. Recovery was denied in all these cases, however, owing solely to the absence of a colloquium in the complaint pointing out the application and sense in which the words were used; the innuendo being insufficient, as it could not introduce a meaning broader than the words naturally bear. But in Logan v. Logan, 77 Ind. 558, where the woman was alleged to have been so designated “in the presence of divers worthy citizens at a time and place when and where the term ‘bitch,’ applied to a woman, was understood to mean, and did mean, an imputation of whoredom,” an award of damages was sustained. See, also, Riddell v. Thayer, 127 Mass. 490, and Scott v. McKinnish, 15 Ala. 664. In this state extrinsic facts, for the purpose of showing matters were spoken in a defamatory sense, need not be alleged. Section 3592, Code; Clarke v. Jones, 49 Iowa, 477. And where the language is ambiguous in meaning, and susceptible to a use in a defamatory sense, it is permissible for those...