Crawford v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1908
• Citation: 60 S.E. 445,79 S.C. 166
• Parties: CRAWFORD et al. v. ATLANTIC COAST LUMBER CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

60 S.E. 445

79 S.C. 166

CRAWFORD et al. v. ATLANTIC COAST LUMBER CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 24, 1908

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Berkeley County; J. C Klugh, Judge.

Action by S. L. Crawford and others against the Atlantic Coast Lumber Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Judgment modified.

See 57 S.E. 670.

Willcox & Willcox, Le Grand G. Walker, and Henry E. Davis, for appellant.

J. O Edwards, Thos. B. Curtis, and W. A. Holman, for respondents.

POPE C.J.

This action is for the purpose of having a deed to an interest in real estate construed. The defendant, Atlantic Coast Lumber Company, claimed through Webber & Davis, a firm composed of Chas. W. Webber and George T. Davis, to whom P. C. Crawford ancestor of the plaintiffs herein, on September 15, 1892, made a deed containing the following grant: "The said party of the first part, P. C. Crawford, for and in consideration of the covenants, promises, and agreements of the said parties of the second part hereinafter stated, does hereby grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer and set over unto the said Webber & Davis, copartners as aforesaid, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, all of the pine trees, alive and dead, standing or fallen, measuring nine inches in diameter, twenty feet from the butt, now being on the various tracts of land described as follows [describing them]." In consideration therefor Webber & Davis covenanted, among other things, as follows: "The said Charles Webber and George T. Davis, copartners as aforesaid, hereby covenant, promise, and agree to and with the said party of the first part, P. C. Crawford, in consideration of the within agreement, to pay to the said party of the first part, P. C. Crawford, his executors, administrators and assigns, the sum of seventy-five cents (75) an acre for the said pine timber, which amounts, after deduction one-third of the total number of acres for bays, branches, etc., to the sum of eight hundred and eighty-six dollars and fifty cents ($886,50)." Plaintiffs contend that from these stipulations it was clearly the intention of the parties to the deed to convey only the pine timber on the uplands, while that in the bays and branches remained in possession of the grantor. Defendant takes the position that all of the pine timber on all of the land was conveyed, and that the provision of the covenant above quoted was intended merely as a mode of payment. His honor Judge Klugh, at the September, 1907, term of court of common pleas for Berkeley county, decided in favor of plaintiff's contention, from which decision defendant appealed to this court.

It is elementary that where it is possible, without violating the legal rules of construction or the clear intention of the parties, effect should be given to every part of an instrument. Allen v. Brazier, 2 Bailey, 55; Anderson v. Holmes, 14 S.C. 162; Shaw v Robinson, 42 S.C. 345, 20 S.E. 161; 13 Cyc. 604. Equally as fundamental is the principle that the real object of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties. McCown v. King, 23 S.C. 235; Brown v. McCall, 44 S.C. 511, 22 S.E. 823. This intention, however, must be gathered from a reading of the whole instrument and a consideration of it in the light of certain well-recognized rules of construction. Now, effect and validity can be given to each of the above quoted sections only when we regard the first as conveying the property, and the second merely as a mode for arriving at the amount of consideration to be paid therefor. Prima facie, then, such was the intention of the parties. Such a construction is not by any means unusual or arbitrary. Not infrequently it is found expedient to incorporate such provisions in a deed or other instrument without the least intention of varying the terms of the grant. Especially in conveyances of the nature of the one here under consideration are such provisions useful. Sometimes from the scarcity of timber on certain land, sometimes from other reasons, the grantor and grantee recognize the fact that it would not be equitable to make the entire acreage contained in the tract upon which the timber is situated the basis of transfer. Acreage, however, is usually...