Crawford v. Soennichsen

• Decision Date: 22 March 1963
• Docket Number: No. 35328,35328
• Citation: 175 Neb. 87,120 N.W.2d 578
• Parties: Violet CRAWFORD, Appellant, v. Waldemar C. SOENNICHSEN, d/b/a Soennichsen's I. G. A. Grocery, Appellee.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 578

120 N.W.2d 578

175 Neb. 87

Violet CRAWFORD, Appellant, v. Waldemar C. SOENNICHSEN, d/b/a Soennichsen's I. G. A. Grocery, Appellee.

No. 35328.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

March 22, 1963.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In testing the sufficiency of the evidence for determining the propriety of a directed verdict, the plaintiff is entitled to have all controverted facts resolved in her favor, and she is entitled to have the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

2. Where the facts adduced to sustain an issue are such that but one conclusion can be drawn when related to the applicable law, it is the duty of the court to decide the question as a matter of law and not submit it to a jury.

3. A business inviter owes the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep an adjacent parking area, and the approaches to his business, maintained by him for the use of patrons and customers, properly on the premises, in a reasonably safe condition.

4. Generally, there is no liability on the part of an inviter owner to protect a customer against hazards which are known to the customer, and are so apparent that he may reasonably be expected to discover them and protect himself.

5. The liability of an owner or occupant of the premises is predicted on proof of his superior knowledge, actual or constructive, of dangers to which invitee is subjected and of which invitee is unaware.

6. Proof of knowledge, either actual or constructive, may not be predicted upon conjecture, surmise, or speculation.

7. Generally, a store owner may not be charged with negligence by reason of the natural accumulation of ice and snow due to weather conditions, where he has not created the condition, and where the hazardous condition is as well known to the invitee as to the store owner.

Schrempp & Lathrop, Henry C. Rosenthal, Jr., Omaha, for appellant.

Crawford, Garvey, Comstock & Nye, James R. McGreevy, Omaha, for appellee.

Heard before WHITE, C. J., and CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER, SPENCER, BOSLAUGH and BROWER, JJ.

WHITE, Chief Justice.

This is a negligence action for damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiff on January 26, 1959, as the result of an accidental daytime fall at about 2:30 p. m., on snow and ice ruts present on a store owner's hard-surfaced parking lot maintained by him for the use of customer invitees. At the conclusion of all of the evidence in the case, the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant.

The question presented to this court by the assignments of error is whether or not there was sufficient evidence in the record to warrant submitting to the jury the issue of failure by the defendant store owner to exercise ordinary care for the reasonable safety of the plaintiff, which was the proximate cause of her fall and injuries.

In testing the sufficiency of the evidence for determining the propriety of a directed verdict, the plaintiff is entitled to have all controverted facts resolved in her favor, and she is entitled to have the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Pupkes v. Wilson, 165 Neb. 852, 87 N.W.2d 556. Where the facts adduced to sustain an issue are such that but one conclusion can be drawn when related to the applicable law, it is the duty of the court to decide the question as a matter of law and not submit it to a jury. Milk House Cheese Corp. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 161 Neb. 451, 73 N.W.2d 679; Kohl v. Unkel, 163 Neb. 257, 79 N.W.2d 405.

The testimony in this case, insofar as pertinent to the issue presented here, is undisputed. Giving maximum reach to plaintiff's testimony, it proves the following facts: Defendant's retail grocery store has checkout stands at both the front and rear, the rear entrance being to the south. Across an alley to the south, the defendant maintained a parking lot for the use and benefit of employees and customers. The plaintiff was employed in a restaurant abutting the southwest corner of the parking lot. She left her place of employment at about 2:30 p. m., on January 26, 1959, to go to the defendant's grocery store, as she had numerous times before. Plaintiff walked part of the way across the parking lot, noticing patches of snow and spots of pavement, to a point almost across the parking lot and directly south of the rear entrance to the grocery store. She accidentally fell and slipped on some snow ruts at this point. The sole testimony as to the existence and nature of the snow ruts and the condition, which was the occasion of plaintiff's fall, is her own testimony as follows:

'Q. Well, Mrs. Crawford, after you came up and stopped at the ruts, what did you do then? A. Well, for a couple or three seconds I was looking to see which was the best way to go, to go to the store, and I figured that was just as good a place as any because they were all ruts and I went to step across with my right foot and down I went on the buttocks and that is the last I remember.'

She further testified that it was her right foot that slipped. She does not state whether she stepped clear over the ruts or not; but that the ruts were 5 or 6 inches wide and 3 or 4 inches deep; that she had crossed 3 or 4 days prior and this condition was not present; and that if she remembered right it had snowed 3 days before, '* * * I think, it had, if I remember right.'

As to the presence of snow, there was testimony from the official weather bureau records at the Omaha Airport and from Nebraska City, to the effect that there was snow of 2.9 inches on January 20 and 21, 1959, and that after the 24th of January, when the temperature went to 50? , the snow went back to a trace.

There is no issue in this case as to the status of plaintiff as a business invitee while crossing the parking lot, or the duty of the business inviter to exercise ordinary care to keep the adjacent parking area in a reasonably safe condition, Broadston v. Beddeo Clothing Co., 104 Neb. 604, 178 N.W. 190; Rogers v. J. C. Penney Co., 127 Neb. 885, 257 N.W. 252; Malolepszy v. Central Market, 143 Neb. 356, 9 N.W.2d 474. The defendant specifically concedes this, makes no contention as to issue of contributory negligence, and rests his position solely on the proposition that under the law no duty was owed to the plaintiff under the circumstances of this case.

Precisely, then, we address ourselves to the question of the measure of duty the defendant owed the plaintiff under the circumstances. It is elementary that negligence and the duty to use due care does not exist in the abstract, but must be measured against a particular set of facts and circumstances. We refer now to the evidence previously recited, and particularly to the fact that this accident occurred at 2:30 p. m., in broad daylight.

In Taylor v. J. M. McDonald Co., 156 Neb. 437, 56 N.W.2d 610, we classified cases of this nature and stated that the first class consists of cases where inadequate lighting of a hazardous condition permitted recovery. A second class of cases extends the range of duty to those cases where the defendant created a hazardous condition, such as improperly oiled floor in an aisle, or soap and water on a tiled floor. Glenn v. W. T. Grant Co., 129 Neb. 173, 260 N.W. 811; Rankin v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 135 Neb. 86, 280 N.W. 260. We have, furthermore, drawn a distinction between conditions existing inside and outside an inviter's place of business, holding, in effect, that the...